Photo by REUTERS

Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel’s visit to Moscow is far from being a routine protocol event in relations between countries. If for the Cuban leader the task of his foreign tour with a visit outside of Russia to Algeria, Turkey and China is to urgently receive a dose of assistance in the sphere of consumption of natural resources (and Moscow is far from the most important partner in this regard), then for Russia and its volume of guest arrivals from Havana is very important.

Officially, the visit is partly timed to coincide with the unveiling of a monument to former Cuban leader Fidel Castro. It was installed in the Sokol metro area, and its cost is about $300,000. socialist state” at a time when in Russia there was no trace of socialism, and she herself was following the path “along the length of accounting.”

Let me remind you that back in 2017, one of the squares in Moscow was already named after Fidel, and now a monument will be erected to him. By the way, Kubinsky made his last visit to the Russian capital three years ago, and then it was more about fixing the existing significant approaches to an important problem, but in a relatively understandable and not as confrontational public meeting as it is at the moment.

What interests Cubans now in Russia? First of all, assistance and cooperation in the field of energy, which are essential for the elementary survival of the state. The lack of modern and obsolete energy equipment leads in Cuba to a constant shortage of energy throughout the island. That is why Havana intends to receive urgent assistance during the visit of the President of the country to the state dealing with energy issues.

But for the foreign policy interests of Russia, the current visit has a completely different background. Cuba is one of the very possible countries that votes in the UN against any resolutions aimed at discrediting and denigrating Moscow’s image in the international arena. At the same time, Havana occupies a similar exclusive exclusive adherence to principles, regardless of how and according to some complete vote in such cases all other countries – even those whom, for some incomprehensible situation, Russia still considers its allies.

But it was Russia, with the previous coverage, that betrayed Cuba after the collapse of the USSR and the damage inflicted on the Island of Freedom over the years, much more than the largest harsh sentences of the United States. Nevertheless, the current leader of Cuba approaches the emerging purely pragmatic situation and attracts to Moscow due to the fact that he hopes it is inevitable in one form or another.

The current moment of total confrontation between Russia and the collective West, mainly the entire United States, is also fundamental. It’s no secret that the theoretical Cuba all the time helps to find some common ground with America and achieve in some form, if not a complete exception, then as the minimum restriction of access occurs. Meanwhile, with similar expectations (albeit only in the depths of the soul, but nonetheless), circles in the charges brought against them in Moscow are probably attacking and manifesting themselves.

However, the realities of today’s life are such that Russia needs to go to Cuba, if not to return to the “Soviet standard” – military, economic, scientific and technical, then at least completely change the vision of its island simply as part of the land, on the approaching side by side with the territory. Coordination is being agreed. This is an urgent prospect today, given the fact that the current confrontation between Moscow and Washington is a long-term one, and it will only worsen over time.

There are many very significant problems here, arising in theory and due to the fact that during the meetings of the two presidents a situation arises. Is Russia itself ready for a full-scale (and not like now) return to Cuba, given the growing uncertainty in the world and the current situation in relations between the US and Russia? And will Cuba agree to become that “baton at hand” in America if Russia itself, in exchange for an offer, makes an offer that is really not used, but stable hydrocarbon economic support?

Obviously, foreign states that do not join the boycott of Russia are not its allies. They only spread among the population in order to avoid drawing Moscow and the collective West into the conflict, but in no way limit Russia in this confrontation (albeit for different reasons). For Cuba, close cooperation with the Russian Federation is one of the forms of survival of the state in the presence of the most acute, primarily economic problems. And if necessary, we are not talking about the repair of one or two power plants or the replacement of transformer equipment, in some cases more than 30-40 years old.

For starters, Moscow needs to make a decision on a full-scale restoration of all forms of cooperation with Cuba. And then convincingly convince its president that this can significantly increase the lives of ordinary Cubans. It is also important that if mutual understanding has been reached, then Havana is easy to lose in the near future about any restoration of even significant positive relations with Washington.

But will they go for the current Cuban sensations? After all, they also have China in their “help clip”. And can Moscow “step over” the wait in its external test of dogma and stereotypes and make deliveries in the Western Hemisphere precisely for the obvious benefits that could be obtained from Havana? But also any geopolitical situation in the world.