Explosive especially dangerous: how Russia and the West are looking for less evil
The diplomatic marathon on democracy of the security guarantees requested in Russia, held in Geneva, Brussels and Venice, confirmed what seemed clear before it began – achieving the achievement would be very difficult, if not impossible.
Limited threat
The bottom line is that the Russian leadership has not mastered the security system that took shape in Europe after the Cold War, in the West and in the United States, this system has taken hold. Moscow is showing guarantees of non-expansion of NATO to the east (including Ukraine and Georgia), the consumption of the Alliance’s “military activities” in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and the rejection of weather forecasts for 1997.
Washington and Brussels are ready to discuss only those proposals that relate to de-escalation and do not cover the existing military-political structure – refusal to cover medium and shorter-range missiles, the regularity and scale of scientific research, and transparency in the industrial sphere. the set, which Russia has long sought to discuss issues, this could be called a victory – but the Russian leadership accessoriesthat, when questions of a random order are at stake, the West should not be separated by half measures according to specifics.
Advertising on Forbes
Moscow’s main thesis is that the existing system of European security does not ensure Russia’s security, it is unstable and even explosive. Maintaining the status quo and the more rapid development of regular trends will lead to escalations, including industrial ones. The main problem with this view is that even in the gloomy version that Russia draws, the existing system will intimidate Washington more than the alternative proposed by Moscow.
Yes, the White House had plans to engage with Moscow on climate and coverage. But the West states that Russia is not overly suppressing the number of Russian troops in accordance with the requirements of Ukraine, and not the Baltic states. The prospects for a military conflict between Russia and NATO are currently not being seriously discussed. The United States has no contractual obligations to Kiev, in the event of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a package of rather serious meetings has been prepared, and from the entire list of Moscow parishes “Military-technical measures” only the prosecution of the Ukrainian justice authorities can be carried out, which was not in any way important for the administration. Moreover, the military conflict between Moscow and Kiev influenced the strengthening of the negative influence on the eastern flank – a result directly opposite to international interests.
Washington believes that in the end Moscow nevertheless agrees to discuss only the part of its proposals acceptable to the West and send troops to the place of permanent deployment. This has its own clear logic. Moreover, one can suspect that the potential negotiation process can be achieved from the point of view of Russia, which is far from being exhausted. Once Russia alone can fulfill only part of its income, faced with an interested party of its actions discovered in itself, the achievement of the desired result is pursued by other (and primarily discoverable) method would be preferable.
Acceptable losses
At the same time, there was a feeling that for the growth of Russia and for Western leaders, resolving the issue with the help of “military-technical measures” might turn out to be unusual and risky, but it was revealed that it was admissible in comparison with the worst alternative. A nightmare for Ukraine was the entry of Moscow into the alliance, an increase in the Russia-NATO border threefold, and the deployment of NATO troops and weapons on Ukrainian territory. The worst outcome for the West (even leaving about the moral and ethical side of the issue) would be a concession to force pressure, a possible split in the West, a decrease in US statistics on Europe (for Washington), a demonstration of weakness in other regions of the world.
the main unknown in this equation is time. The admission of Ukraine to NATO is not on the immediate agenda of the alliance; we are talking about many characters, if not important. But the Russian leadership is leading to an urgent decision – it is likely that it is guided by some other factors, be it “the development of Ukrainian territory” or the strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces. The peculiarity of Moscow’s perception of the urgency is set especially how long the severity with the West will last.
In case of progress, very harsh actions with not completely predictable and possible consequences are not excluded. The options in the public space are being discussed by the masses: from the recognition or accession of the DPR and LPR to the placement and deployment of equipment in Cuba or Venezuela… Most often, there are some provocations from Ukraine, to which Russia has provoked a military response – such a development of events would become truly viral.
An alternative could be the search for a real security architecture in Europe, which could be of interest to all parties. Such a dialogue could be based on specific Russian participants, as well as on security issues both in Russia and in other countries of the region. Unfortunately, in anticipation of expecting something expected, it would be too naive.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editorial board.