Sweden’s NATO problem is also Turkey’s NATO problem
Last month, a series of anti-Turkey protests in Sweden deeply angered Ankara and threatened to further delay the Nordic country’s NATO bid. The demonstrations featured symbols of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and included seemed hanging of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s image from a lamppost. To make matters worse, Rasmus Paludan, dual citizen of Sweden and Denmark and leader of the Danish far-right political party Hard Line, burned a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish ambassador’s residence in Stockholm and told his stunt with disparaging statements against Islam and immigrants.
Swedish officials acted quickly condemn the documents and distance the government from the protests while pointing out that they did not violate Swedish law. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson is described the events as an act of sabotage against his country’s NATO bid, as Turkey (along with Hungary) has not yet ratified Sweden or Finland’s entry into the alliance. The Swedish Foreign Minister added that the protests played directly into Russia’s hands. At the same time, Finland’s former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, suggested that Russia may have been behind the Koran burning incident and warned of hybrid warfare tactics.
But their Turkish counterparts were not swayed by these explanations, and the deliberate act of throwing fuel on the fire seems to have worked. Turkey immediately canceled official visits to Ankara by the Swedish parliament speaker and defense minister, while Erdoğan – who is already busy campaigning for hotly contested elections in the coming months – lashed out at Sweden. He stated that the lack of respect for Turkish and Muslim faith would cost Sweden Turkey’s support for its bid for NATO membership.
Appealing to the masses, Erdoğan took advantage of the widespread anger unleashed in Turkish society. Although the difference between the protests, which had racist and Islamophobic aspects, and the Swedish government’s official position was clear to Erdoğan, the benefits of galvanizing public support in the midst of an election season outweighed all other considerations. This sentiment was reflected in demonstrations and statements from leading opposition parties, including from the main opposition Republican People’s Partycenter right Iyi Partyand the pro-Kurdish ones People’s Democratic Party.
But the prospect of Turkey further delaying Sweden’s NATO bid is not only a problem for Sweden but also for Turkey. The image of Turkey standing in the way of Sweden and Finland’s historic decision to join the alliance, against the background of the war in Ukraine and related geopolitical paradigm shifts, is not good. It feeds the perception of Turkey as an unreliable and disruptive actor at a time when Euro-Atlantic security is being reshaped.
Turkey supporters point out that Greece blocked North Macedonia’s NATO bid for years, until a negotiated solution to the country’s name was agreed between Athens and Skopje. But the context is very different today, and the strain on Turkey’s image is infinitely greater.
Turkey’s consent to start Sweden’s and Finland’s accession process to NATO had been conditional from the beginning. It came at the last minute act mediated on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid in June, after Sweden and Finland engaged to address Turkey’s security concerns regarding the activities of certain groups, including the PKK, which it – along with Sweden, the United States and a number of other countries – considers a terrorist organization. It also wanted the two countries to end official obstacles to defense industry cooperation.
The first of these goals formed the crux of the matter. It was designed for Sweden, where Turkey believed that anti-Turkish actors had found a safe haven and continued their recruitment, propaganda and fundraising activities. Ankara’s assessment of Stockholm’s performance on this point was negative even before the latest incidents. In a article he wrote for a local daily newspaper in December, the Turkish ambassador to Sweden questioned Sweden’s claims that the country had met its commitments, and he called for more action. One can only assume that recent experience has solidified this view in Ankara.
However, the Swedish belief and the official story are very different. Swedish authorities say they have done what is legally possible. The criticize Turkey for asking too much, reflecting a prevailing mood among the Swedish public and trying to gather external support for his position. For Sweden, with sticking points mostly resolved, the ball is now in Turkey’s court. The the next logical step would be that Turkey ratified Sweden’s and Finland’s accession treaty. Turkey might not like it, but most of its NATO allies – except maybe Hungary – would probably agree.
The core of this issue is a massive connection between Sweden and Turkey. This problem needs to be addressed, but there is no easy solution. The two sides have different legal interpretations, and in some cases Turkey’s expectations do not correspond with the reality of the Swedish governance system. Swedes often point out the independence of their institutions and the government’s inability to influence them, including the police. At the same time, Turks point out that the independence of the institutions does not necessarily guarantee fairness in their methods. (If it weren’t for the NATO deal, the Swedish government might point out that Erdoğan’s Turkey is not a credible gauge of fair democratic institutions, given Turkey’s poor record on freedom of expression and association.)
Moreover, this issue is starting to hang over Turkey’s desire to buy F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States. Ankara and Washington continue to emphasize that the NATO application and the Turkish F-16 procurement request are separate issues, but this connection may be ingrained in the minds of US congressmen who will have a say in fighter jet sales.
Regardless, Turkey will be in no rush to ratify NATO’s Accession Protocol. This is now a question for after the elections in May. At the same time, frustrations and emotions rise from all sides. The next critical threshold for NATO enlargement will be the upcoming summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July. The time until then should be managed wisely by Turkey, Sweden and Finland. Their focus should be on nurturing a period of relaxation by staying away from useless blame games and finding a reasonable way to deal with and eventually get out of this pointless impasse. As impossible as it may seem, there is a way to do this.
First, Turkey, Sweden and Finland should commit to keeping their differences out of the public domain. This would mean refraining from provocative statements and populist rhetoric. Increased silence should be their agreed stance.
The election cycle in Turkey may tempt Erdoğan to do otherwise, and one would expect Swedes and Finns to doubt his sincerity in such a commitment, especially given his reputation. But there is an ongoing precedent that offers hope. In contrast to fiery rhetoric he has recently adopted against Greece, Erdoğan has been silent on Israel and Armenia – two countries he can easily target to score points at home. This is a conscious choice on his part and shows his ability to be selective when needed. He should do the same for Sweden and Finland and their NATO aspirations. Erdoğan should no longer treat this situation as low-hanging fruit for domestic political issues. In the meantime, Sweden and Finland should continue their efforts in good faith to address Ankara’s concerns.
Second, the three countries should establish a mechanism to coordinate their strategic messages when necessary. They should be prepared to dominate the news cycles with coordinated and sometimes joint messages. This would mainly be of relevance in times of crisis.
Third, while political contacts may have been put on hold for now, working-level meetings between bureaucrats should be intensified. This will help build a culture of collaboration, eradicate clichés and facilitate a better understanding of each other’s concerns and limitations. The trilateral memorandum the parties signed in June now appear to have different interpretations that need to be addressed. Turkey should therefore reverse its recent decision to set up the meeting in the trilateral mechanism designed to do this. Sweden has already expressed its opinion interest to continue these conversations. Now is the time for the parties to increase the work on building a common level of ambition in the implementation of the memorandum. The two guiding principles should be no deviations from existing commitments and no new conditions.
Finally, Turkish defense industry companies are still struggling to get export licenses from Sweden. Sweden must resolve this issue. And it should make an honest internal assessment of the recent incidents targeting Turkey. While Stockholm will uphold its commitments to freedom of expression, Swedish authorities should consider ways to minimize provocations, whenever possible, to limit the damage to the country’s relationship with Turkey.
Turkey has been a NATO ally for more than seventy years, with a legacy as guardian of NATO’s eastern flank during the Cold War and as an ally that has contributed more than a consumer of security in the Euro-Atlantic space. And it has always strongly advocated NATO’s open door policy. For their part, Sweden and Finland deserve to become members of NATO. They have traditionally enjoyed good relations with Turkey, and these relations will take on a new, mutually beneficial dimension within NATO.
The convergence of interests between Turkey, Sweden and Finland is greater than the current differences of opinion that they are trying to resolve. That is the spirit in which they need to move forward.