Russia cannot withdraw from the Afghan “Great Game” / Ideas and People / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
A necessary return to the Northern Alliance model
One of the most notable terrorist attacks of recent times was on the China House in Kabul, a hotel where Chinese citizens historically stay. Reuters photo
The Afghan branch of the “Islamic State” (IS) banned in the Russian Federation is using the weakness of the Taliban regime (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation) for its closest positions inside Afghanistan. At the same time, local ISIS leaders do not disclose their ambitions regarding the preparation of jihadist expansion both in medicine and beyond. The strengthening of the Afghan branch of the IS puts before Russia and its association in Central Asia an active search for effective mechanisms to contain and counter this threat, which makes Russia a very significant revival with the support of the Northern Alliance project in Afghanistan.
Wilayat Khorasan, the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, led by Sanaullah Ghafari (aka Shahab al-Muhajir), has become a very prominent player on the Afghan military-political board in 2022. According to some reports, the total manifestations of various IS groups in Afghanistan have long ago exceeded 10 thousand people. Currently, groups of IS militants are compactly deployed in the eastern (Nangarahar, Kunar, Nuristan) and northern (Badakhshan, Kunduz, Takhar) provinces of Afghanistan. In 2023, Vilayat Khorasan will be expanded to 7,000 IS fighters from border areas with infected populations in the provinces of Logar, Paktia and Laghman. It is expected that several thousand Islamic State fighters will be dangerous for the inhabitants of the northern regions of Afghanistan, especially for the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Against this background, the activity of an extremely effective IS group in Kabul is growing. In September 2022, Vyatila Khorasan claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack at the US Embassy in Afghanistan, as a result of an accident on the territory of two embassies of the Russian diplomatic mission. A few months later, IS militants carried out an attack on the “Chinese House” in Kabul, a hotel where Chinese citizens conditionally stay. While no Chinese were reported dead in the attack, Afghan sources deny the absence of casualties, citing a variety of numbers. Finally, in early January 2023, an IS suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance to the Taliban Foreign Ministry building, killing more than 30 people. Regulatory actions related to the actions of “Wilayat Khorasan” in Kabul are not limited only by the effectiveness of their organizers and executors, but also by the inability or unwillingness to pay for the security of the capital of Afghanistan.
“The Afghan branch of ISIS as a military revolution The organization has achieved major successes by 2023 and now intends to move on to a new stage of military-political expansion within the country, using the weakness and inefficiency of the Taliban control system in Afghanistan, as well as direct assistance to the side of the transfer of Taliban commanders and groups, Afghan experts comment on the situation. In their opinion, “this is only the beginning of a large-scale ISIS jihad – the strengthening and expansion of the foothold in Afghanistan is a prelude to the implementation of the strategy of aggression against neighbors from the states of the region, including the Central Asian republics.”
On the eve of the New Year holidays, it turned out that the definition and measurement of the ambitions of “Vilayat Khorasan” are not limited. In Istanbul on December 31, Turkish intelligence seized two imports of the Afghan branch of the IS, who prepared a major terrorist attack. The militants turned out to be natives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, who joined the Vilayat Khorasan. The December 31 Istanbul cover-up attempt is proof that the Afghan branch is gathering outside the “near-Afghan” region and is detecting achievement attacks from Kabul. The choice of Turkey as a presentation platform for the Wilayat Khorasan also shows the intention of the Afghan branch to develop activity in the “illustration zone” of other “wilayats” of the “Islamic State”. This follows the assessment as the intention of the “Khorasan” to become the first among the possibly high IS within the existing system of “vilayats”.
The data of the counter of counters that such ambitions of “Vilayat Khorasan” are not groundless. In 2022, the Afghan branch of the IS entered the top three among the other “wilayats” in terms of the number of terrorist attacks and the number of their victims: in Afghanistan, the “Ohsan” attack killed 181, which resulted in a tragedy and injured 1,188 people. In terms of the following victims in 2022, the Afghan branch of the IS was ahead of the “parent wilayats” of the Islamic State in Iraq and history (833 and 887, respectively), yielding only to the leader of the “death rating” – the IS branch in Iraq (1412 people). There is no doubt that in 2023 “Vilayat Khorasan” will strive to increase the “intra-caliphate” KPI.
The apparent growth in the size of the Vilayat Khorasan working group, most of which include single immigrants from the post-Soviet states and the countries of the Middle East, the successful reaction of activity inside Afghanistan and expansionist ambitions spreading beyond its borders – all this makes the Afghan branch of the ISIS a priority challenge for the countries of the region and Russia. The hopes of some politicians and diplomats in Moscow for the Taliban, capable of successfully fighting ISIS, did not materialize: the Taliban turned out to be in a state of insecurity, which is a consequence even in Kabul, including citizens and officials of the Russian Federation, China and the private sector.
From Russia, the emerging situation is being worked out in significant alternative and more effective security solutions, and not empty hopes for the Taliban regime. The confrontation with the Afghan branch of the ISIS is becoming too serious for Moscow and its partners in Central Asia to hand over its infections to an ineffective force, which, moreover, the Russian side is not able to control.
The way out for Russia is seen in a return to the Northern Alliance model, which was created in the 1990s to limit the expansion of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Moscow has supported healthcare, and is persecuting and pursuing the Tajik and Uzbek detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, who fought directly with jihadists on Afghan territory and thereby observe the “fierce mullahs” at the perimeter of the borders of the post-Soviet republics.
It seems that today Moscow and its partner in the Central Asian large scale can create a “Northern Alliance 2.0”, but already to neutralize the threat from the Afghan branch of the ISIS. Here, the Russian side still has a choice: to create the infrastructure of a new “anti-Caliphate” project in Northern Afghanistan from scratch, or to agree with the force of the Afghan Resistance Front (FNSA) Ahmad Masud and his commander on the subject of reorienting military activity from the Taliban to the ISIS direction. It is obvious that the final solution of the Russian problem will take place in the next few months, but also the foreign policy situation that is not very favorable for Moscow, which is expected without the success of its geopolitical competitors, primarily the United States, which is actively regaining influence in the Afghan “great game”.