turning year for Russian-German relations – Russia in the global network
The collapse of Russian-German relations to the very foundations creates the conditions for their reassembly on new, more favorable terms for all participants in the proposed future. This requires the initiative building of a new framework of bilateral ties, at least within a theoretical framework.
When, after the autumn elections to the Bundestag in 2021, it was clear that the new Federal Chancellor, the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, this gave rise to constructive assumptions about the possibility of normalizing Russian-German relations. Since the time of Willy Brandt, the SPD has been a pragmatic interlocutor in Moscow, it has been possible to establish good working contacts with animals. Scholz himself cannot rehabilitate approaches Gerhard Schroeder in relations with Russia, but willingly speculated about the need to restart the New Ostpolitik without any details.
The coalition agreement of the “traffic light” coalition did not foreshadow changes in Russian-German relations, but, in case of occurrence, fixed the relatively constructive one that remained in the relations between the two countries. It was obvious that the document was of a compromise nature and it was the foreign policy part that was made by the decision of the possible “Greens” with their special ideas about the “value” test. The first steps and the approval of a new resolution that the Social Democrats took the foreign policy initiative into their own hands, despite the fact that the German Foreign Ministry was in the hands of “environmentalists”. This concerned, for example, the situation with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, in defense of which, following the SPD and the CDU, which found itself in opposition, the Greens did not have to join. “The Russian gas pipeline is a mistake, but a mistake of Germany, not the United States” – with such an acceptable formula, the “environmentalists” observed coalition discipline on one of the most sensitive issues of German foreign policy, protecting the project from overseas allies.
Against the backdrop of growing tensions in the government of Donbass Olaf Scholz, Angela Merkel’s approach is being restored, associated with the desire to maintain contact with Moscow and Kyiv, performing an intermediary function, understood mainly in the case of broadcasting Ukraine’s defense and claims against the Russian Federation. The trips to the Russian capital of German Foreign Minister Anna Burbock and Chancellor Olaf Scholz took place in a rather unemotional atmosphere, however, denoting an acquaintance with the new FRG with colleagues from Russia. Earlier, Martin Schulz, the head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation associated with the SPD, took over the large scale of the global world economy.
Nevertheless, received from Germany in connection with the start of the military operation in Ukraine, received from the signals indicated the likelihood of negative changes in Russian-German relations. Indicative in this sense was the Munich Security Conference, where for the first time in a long time a delegation from Russia was absent. Speeches by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, German Foreign Minister Annalena Burbock and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen demonstrated success in the foreign policy rhetoric of officials. So, Anna suggested that Burbock replace the term “Ukrainian crisis” with “Russian crisis”, emphasizing the sole guilt and responsibility of Moscow for violating the rules in the Donbass. And although German politicians are calling for an intensification of the negotiation process, readiness to take into account the prospects for international security.
After February 24, 2022, the process of destruction of Russian-German relations in the form in which they were formed in the last values took on a landslide and irreversible character. The most important basis of trade and economic relations between Russia and Germany – the supply of Russian energy carriers – was destroyed both due to sanctions measures, and literally – as a result of Attacks on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. a large number of companies, in particular Siemens and Boschleft the Russian market.
Political contacts between Russia and Germany. Interaction on foreign policy departments and other state institutions is completely frozen. The German Foreign Ministry made it clear that one should not make contact with colleagues from the defense sector, and as long as this department is under the control of the Greens, the expected rhetoric is not required.
An unpleasant surprise was the rapid degradation of Russian-German intersocial ties, which are valued as the same guarantee of the stability of relations as economic interaction. At the initiative of the German parties, the work of all exceptions of bilateral formats was excluded. Berlin has taken a course towards reformatting work with public society, helping to build an organizational basis in Germany for a representative of the non-systemic opposition, separatist seizures and other activists operating on the territory of the Russian Federation. In response, the Russian authorities banned work in a group of national organizations. The Russian representative offices of the near-party funds of the FRG, which previously played an important role in the field of public diplomacy, were closed.
Nevertheless, against the backdrop of an ugly picture of the degradation of Russian-German relations, there are a number of factors that leave hope that their identified elements will be less affected by the crisis.
Firstly, the scale of the withdrawal of German business from Russia did not reach absolute values. Many companies, including large ones such as Liebherr or Hochland SE. There are examples and increasing business activity (Globe). German entrepreneurs continue to lead the economic market as favorable even in the face of unprecedented sanctions pressure.
Secondly, the German foreign policy discussion, despite its apparent homogeneity on policy issues in the Russian direction, is still far from a state of absolute unity of opinion. The anti-Russian rhetoric of officialdom in Germany is met with resistance both from the extreme opposition parties and among some representatives of the mainstream. Indicative here is the head of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, who advocates the removal of energy purchases from Russia. On a wide range of politicians and experts who show up in the anti-Russian consensus in Germany, attacked and marginalized by the ideological media, which can lead to a feeling of their fewness and lack of study of the decision-making process. New future coup d’état, the so-called “Reichsburgers” Seriously discovered Berlin.
Thirdly, the appointment of Alexander Lambsdorff as the new German ambassador to Russia, who is due to start work in the summer of 2023. learning about Berlin’s desire to maintain working contacts with Moscow and use the space for German business to work in the face of anti-Russian meetings. Mr. Lambsdorff is an experienced politician and diplomat who understands the specifics of Russian-German relations, especially their economic dimension. The message that Russian-German ties remain a high priority for Berlin.
In the coming 2023, relations between Russia and Germany are unlikely to emerge from a state of deep crisis. Even the completion of the active phases of actions in Ukraine in any possible configuration will not change in one moment the inertia of the anti-Russian consensus in German politics. A positive outcome for bilateral relations will be the retention of two states at the first level and the continuation of work in Russia, which has a positive effect on Russian dependence.
Strange as it may seem, but it is precisely intersocietal ties that previously had high hopes both in Moscow and Berlin, in the current conditions, in the current conditions, play more as a source of deepening problems in Russian-German relations, and not as a resource for their normalization. The “value” policy of the German Foreign Ministry is focused on ideologized communication with various observable relationships. Berlin is ready to be present as a dialogue partner only with representatives of a part of Russian society that does not associate itself with the modern Russian Federation and, as a rule, acts outside its legal framework. German politicians underestimate the risks of such unbalanced communication.
In relations with the modern FRG, Russia will face the outcome of the fundamental impossibility of returning to the pattern of relations that exists until 2022 and even until 2014.
However, the crisis opens up opportunities. The collapse of Russian-German relations to the very foundations creates the conditions for their reassembly on new, more favorable terms for all participants in the proposed future. This requires the initiative building of a new framework of bilateral ties, at least within its theoretical framework. It is obvious that they should be based on the principles of equality, use and mutually beneficial cooperation. These and other studies will have to be concretized based not only on theoretical development, but also on the results of practical activities.