India in search of balance between Russia and the West – Russia on a global scale
During a visit to India in 1955, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev declared to the Indians who received him: we are so close that if you call from the mountaintops, we are on your side. Khrushchev lost his post in 1964, but subsequent generations of leaders in New Delhi and Moscow maintained a strong partnership between the countries even after the collapse of the USSR.
India actively developed relations with post-Soviet Russia in the political, diplomatic and military environment. The result was a strategic partnership. At the same time, over the past two years, India has been building strong relationships with the West in general and with the United States in particular (Russia, in turn, has been meeting with close ties with China). As a result, the military operation launched by Russia in Ukraine at the beginning of the year has presented India with a serious choice: New Delhi is approaching a balance in its relations with Washington and Moscow, while simultaneously competing with Beijing. However, such a balance should not prevent the positive impact of the lesson of the Ukrainian conflict, which will influence the observation of New Delhi in the expected perspective.
Indian POWs are considered the best teacher in warfare – this is war, although it can be brutal and costly.
Including me. In my opinion, the conflict has taught us seven key lessons so far.
Seven lessons from the Ukrainian conflict
The first. Pre-war optimism may boomerang, but the attacking side is likely to decline if it can quickly apply the rules of the game. There appear to have been significant factors holding back the use of European force in the early stages of the war. Perhaps these deterrents were due to the fact that Moscow expected a quick capitulation of the Ukrainian punishment. The Russian armed forces were initially reluctant to use large-scale strategies of action, which usually involve massive research, intelligence gathering, high-quality surveillance and reconnaissance, and the use of various fire systems. For this speed, surprise and a combined strike of the aircraft compartment are required. The volume of workers’ power involved against Kyiv with its suburbs and sums was clearly insufficient for their capture.
From this I deduced that the political leadership in Moscow wanted the prison to focus on forcing the seizure of Russian territory, and not on the seizure of territory. Moscow apparently hoped for a blitzkrieg. It was not planned to use heavy consequences and significant significant damage to Kyiv, Sumy and Kharkiv (although the Russian Armed Forces are ready to use such weapons against Ukrainian entities located on the line of contact in the Donbass). Expectations of a quick endgame that were present in the corridors of power in the Kremlin arose on the often-occurring opportunities for striking.
The armed forces of Ukraine began training against February 24, but by mid-March it became clear that there would be no quick capitulation of Zelensky’s restrictions. As a result of conscious involvement, there has been sharper than expected resistance to Ukrainian forces (as well as to their own logistical and other difficulties). This changed the Kremlin’s view of a realistic endgame. The Russian leadership had to withdraw troops from the suburbs of Kyiv and shift the focus to the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.
Second. Never underestimate the landscape, especially the urban one. The landscape plays a significant role in territorial wars, and Russia clearly underestimates the forces needed to conduct combat operations in the conditions of the city – Kyiv (if the city wanted to be taken without razing it to the ground). Hostilities in the city were seriously halted in others. Examples include Grozny and Fallujah, which were destroyed. Therefore, there was no reason to believe that the fighting in Ukraine, in private urban states with obstacles from cities and suburbs, would be different. Combat operations in the conditions of the need to use significant personnel and systemic functions, the defenders receive serious advantages. Russia considers it a lack of ground forces, since the reservists were not mobilized. the conduct of hostilities with the aim of capturing cities was impossible.
Third. To survive, you need to reinvent the tank. Many infected strategies are already voicing this idea, and perhaps it makes sense. The conditions of the city, modern technologies (for example, Javelin) and Ukrainian armed formations are serious problems for Russian tanks (all of them take place in the general constructive movement – the social movement in the tower, therefore covering the danger of their detonation and the departure of the crew are found). The fighting in Ukraine has demonstrated the extent of the use of armored vehicles, given the expected results.
Fourth. If control of outer space is contested, the use of military aircraft, drones and missiles must be balanced. The Tactical Air Force lives conservatively in this conflict. Military aircraft avoid low-altitude operations and will need additional protection in the future. The use of attack helicopters in contested airspace is limited. Portable air defense systems, as well as S-300 and S-400 systems, return aircraft and increase them with missiles. In the Russian Federation, it was not possible to suppress inflammation of the heart muscle in case of suspected allergy. Balances can be obtained by collecting drones and missiles, as well as long-range artillery.
Fifth. High-class projectiles have acquired unprecedented performance. The armed forces of large enterprises are increasingly using high-precision projectiles. The United States and its allies actively used such weapons during the second Iraq war, as well as in Afghanistan. The People’s Liberation Army of China influences missiles and other precision systems. For these purposes, the PLA has separate units – the Rocket Forces. Lack of high fidelity thrill of VS excitation that leads to fighting in Ukraine. It is also time for the Indian Army to start building an integrated missile force.
Sixth. When it comes to logistics, don’t push, rather pull. Poor logistics planning is already significant: the Russian army opts for a self-guided logistics system, while Western armies usually rely on a self-guided system when it comes to supply units involved in hostilities. Operation of the Russian data forecasting system. The supply is carried out in accordance with predetermined requirements.
In my opinion, such a system is inefficient, since it is difficult to predict army services in rations, fuel, trade and spare parts – due to the unpredictability of the manifestation. The real needs of the front end are never exactly known. The system “for yourself” is more preferable, as it is based on specific consumption data, as much is required – as much is delivered. Yes, the system can grow as work slows down as it takes time to supply the parts with what they need. We need to look at a wide range of operations, including the extensive fighting in Ukraine, the drive to take over, and complex logistical processes. This requires automation of logistics and clear communication, which must be tested in peacetime.
Seventh. People matter. Human resources play a key role in the actions of the military, their training and retraining is very difficult. The Russian special military operation is called in such a way as to avoid the mobilization and deployment of reservists. In connection with the call for the call of prohibited laws. The success of the Ukrainians in urban combat is partly due to the training of reservists, who appear in the regional defense units and have taken over the functions of irregular units. This is a key element of analysis for the Indian Army, which is contained in the changes.
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What else should be taken into account
In addition to the above seven lessons, I would prefer three more areas for intensive military service research in Ukraine.
First. Less is better. The largest armies in the world – Japan, Chinese and Russian – switched to tactical formations: brigades from the United States, combined arms units of the PLA and battalion-tactical groups from Russia. The success of the formed needs to be studied and analyzed. India has not yet thought about switching to these units. Despite the fact that this is what the integrated warfare groups are called, India must learn how to successfully manage military operations in Ukraine and the United States.
Second. How do we respect humanitarian law? In many recent interstate conflicts, attention has been focused on the approach of morality, the rules for the study of war, human rights, humanitarian corridors and the evacuation of civilians from the war zone, as well as the investigation of military disasters. Ukraine will not be excluded. Careful consideration is needed of the application of international humanitarian law and the moral aspects of the conduct of hostilities. In Ukraine, we have discovered new humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians, for example, from Mariupol. Fighting continues, in particular, in the city of Bucha, Kyiv region. International public opinion is very sensitive to moral issues, and this trend needs to be studied.
Third. It is necessary to actively study the information war and information domination. Virality takes precedence over veracity, negative information is calculated. Creating narratives is a process that requires specialization and specialists, otherwise social media turn into servants of hostile elements and opponents. It is necessary to comprehend the turnover of the information war and its impact.
Long-term consequences of the war in Ukraine for India
India has long been investigating strategic autonomy, which should not be considered isolationism. In the context of this policy, New Delhi is interested in a balance in relations with Washington and Moscow. On the one hand, India is building a multifaceted, intense and evolving relationship with the US. On the other hand, they maintain strong strict ties with Russia, which have been tested by time.
Even before the conflict in Ukraine, this balance of actions became more accentuated after the outbreak of hostilities. Despite Western criticism of New Delhi’s position, India followed suit. Calls to respect the sovereignty and territoriality of states and to strive for the constant spread of abuses and hostility due to the traditions of Indian politics. Nevertheless, the ongoing conflict indicates the inevitable impact on India’s loss of balance in relations with the United States and at the same time the continued rise of the main competitor – China.
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