“15 thousand – the lower estimate.” CIT analyst on the losses of the Russian army
The exact number of casualties in the war in Ukraine is still a mystery. The Russian Defense Ministry last disclosed these data only in March, and they cost tens of thousands from the calculations of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to a study by journalists, more soldiers died during the months of the so-called “special operation” than during the three years of the second Chechen war. Radio Liberty spoke with Conflict Intelligence Team analyst Kirill Mikhailov about how casualties are calculated during armed indicators and which indicators should be trusted.
The last time the Russian Ministry of Defense spoke about the loss was four months ago – then a meeting of 1351 people was announced. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine register the counts of the number of deaths among military personnel: on July 22, the department reportedthat it reached 39 thousand. Western intelligence agencies also use their data on Russian losses. On July 21, CIA Director of Intelligence William Burns said that the Russian army had lost 15,000 men killed and “probably” three times as many wounded during the invasion of Ukraine. The same date of delivery at the end of April was given by British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace.
Journalists of “Mediazona” and the Russian service of the BBC managed to check the death of 4940 Russian soldiers from February 24 to July 22. This is more than the loss of federal forces during the three years of the second Chechen war. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, from October 1999 to December 2002, 4,572 soldiers died in Chechnya.
CIT Analyst Kirill Mikhailov in a conversation with Radio Liberty, he assessed the data on the losses of the Russian army in Ukraine.
“Where do independent casualty estimates come from, like the ones released by the CIA?”
– Actually I do not know. This is based on some possible data, as well as data that can be obtained from Ukraine, and so on. It is difficult to say how Western intelligence does this, but you need to understand that their estimates still fall into approximately the same range. There were various Western estimates ranging from 15 to 30 thousand. What they roughly get says that, in general, their methodology should provide credibility.
– Does CIT have any rating?
Between 15,000 and 22,000 casualties is our more or less conservative estimate.
We haven’t discussed this issue for a long time. [в команде], but if we apply the methodology that we used a little earlier, then on our account – 15 thousand – can be considered the lower bar of growing losses. Let me explain our methodology in detail. Let’s try to look at the numbers “Mediazona”. In one of Mediazona’s videos, Dmitry Treschanin said that when they checked the probability of loss – total, not just confirmed – losses were two to three times more than confirmed, this is based on two or three such estimates. And in the end, we can say that Mediazona’s figures for the indeterminate loss in the Russian army can be multiplied by two or three to get resources. But this is only the Russian army. “Medizona” does not contain the content of the so-called “DPR”, “LPR”, “Wagnerites” and their use. Let’s take the official data of the “DPR”: it is now indicated that since January 1 – in fact, since the beginning of the Invasion – about 2,400 security officials of the “DPR” have died.
We assume that there should be slightly fewer losses in the “LPR” due to the fact that they have a smaller mobilization resource. It is also reported on the assumption that a certain part of the losses of the “DPR” does not come across, because part of the displaced parts of regular public transport and, for example, is located in the same Kherson region, and so on. Accordingly, roughly estimating, it is possible to give seriously from five thousand losses in the so-called republics. Plus, there is a certain amount of unjustified losses in PMCs and growing battalions that are not part of the Ministry of Defense. That is, you can throw another thousand or two. Thus, we can say that there are from 15 to 22 thousand losses – this is a more or less conservative estimate. I emphasize that this is not only the Russian army, but all the forces that take part in the battles on the side. This is my personal opinion based on our previous calculations.
What can you say about the number of wounded? William Burns suggested that the coefficient should be proportionally equal to three – that is, the number of wounded is about three times more than the dead. Perhaps this is plausible, how does it compare with the calculations in other conflicts?
One to three is a very bad ratio. In the US, it ranged from one in six in Vietnam to one in ten in Iraq, if my memory serves me right. But, the observed deplorable state of Russian tactical medicine, which does not allow prompt rescue of the wounded, and reveals the remoteness of hospitals that are located on the structure of the Russian border, a ratio of one to three seems plausible. At the same time, according to the “DNR”, their ratio is one to four. The so-called people’s militia of the “DNR” gained experience in evacuating the wounded and finding help. Using the fact that their evacuation takes place in a hospital in the occupied territory of the Donetsk region, and not in the Russian Federation, these figures are displayed quite plausibly.
Does the number of prisoners make any significant contribution to the total number of casualties?
– Not likely at the moment. Due to the fact that the number of prisoners with the defeat of the parties has become very noticeable. In general, it is enough for Ukrainians to freely withdraw from their positions if it is impossible to hold them, so the one-time number of prisoners in undesirable cases can be in the tens, as was the case in Gorsky and Zolote. As for the Russians, it is simply due to the fact that while they are mainly engaged in offensive operations, the number of prisoners is insignificant, although there are prisoners. But there are orders of magnitude fewer of them than there were during the first wave of the so-called “special operation”, when Russian columns came under fire, and some of the people were taken prisoner. It was a completely different war. And in the war that is going on now – it has a more positional character – there is no need to talk about the number of prisoners, comparable to those killed and wounded.
– Is there a practice of attributing the dead to the missing?
– For the death of a person, the dead must have a body or witnesses. This process is not fast and, of course, missing part of the statistics all the time. At the same time, there are completely hopeless cases, for example, when it is estimated that they survived without the conscripts who died on the Moskva cruiser, although the probability that they survived was close to zero. Probably, I know, thanks to the efforts of relatives who nevertheless reached death, they were given the so-called “coffin”. Of course, the Russian side has an incentive not to recognize the air force, because this allows not to increase the amount of promised money.
– How did Russian losses change for different invasions? Can we say that now they are small compared to the first stage?
– Now they are relatively smaller than observed at the first meeting. This can also be seen from the “Mediazone” graphs. On the other hand, at present there should be significant losses from artillery fire, including many wounded, because artillery shelling is accompanied by medium-sized fragmentation wounds. However, at present, the losses are not so great, and from the Ukrainian side they should have increased, since Russia began to use massive shelling. This was not done at the first event, when there were often no social events in rapid growth. Russian casualties are likely to have decreased, but the question is whether the current mobilization efforts are able to keep them going. We think we can, but the question is how long. Even the current losses still have a significant impact on the combat readiness and effectiveness of the Russian troops.
– In terms of coverage of completely independent losses, the Ukrainian side is practically not felt, there is only an assessment of the Russian Ministry of Defense. In this situation, can we apply the factor that the defending side is three times smaller than the attacking side?
Ukraine costs one and a half times less than Russia
– Russian forces currently simply do not happen in some kind of mass attacks if they used such a ratio. As British intelligence said, now the Russians are being called in by a conditionally conditional consolidated company. this is basically all the remaining infantry in one part or another of Russia. Therefore, naturally, there is no need to talk about any massive losses, about a threefold decrease in concentration. And our ratio has always been something like this: Ukraine is valued one and a half times less than Russia.
This is a war of detection, and now it’s not even about what territory will be occupied, but about which army will use the army that is unable to replenish its detachment and personnel. it is logical to assume that if the Russians have a goal to kill as many Ukrainian military as possible, then the ratio will be approximately one to one and a half. An accurate estimate of reduced weight loss is not pregnant, but it is clear that at present the increased proportion of loss has been reduced to 10,000, – Kirill Mikhailov.