How will events in Kazakhstan affect the future of Russia and the CIS? Opinions of political scientists
The events that unfolded in early January in Kazakhstan raise several questions: can we talk about the strengthening of the CSTO, how will Moscow’s influence on Kazakhstan grow, and can we forget about the so-called Kazakhstani (“Nazarbayev’s”) scenarios for the transit of power for Russia?
In the early days of 2022, protests broke out in Kazakhstan, which escalated into a conflict and movement with the security forces. The initial course of events gave rise to challenge the possibility of a change of power in the country – but this did not happen.
One of the main outcomes of the events was the resignation of the former President of the country, Nursultan Nazarbayev, from the official post that he retains for himself. Nazarbayev was the permanent president of Kazakhstan for 30 years and only in 2019 lost this post to Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, while retaining significant influence on the country’s investigator.
Such a move by Nazarbayev arises not only in Kazakhstan – about a possible transit of power by analogy with the scenario in which the long-term leader of the state formally remains in the background, but in fact continues to control the situation, political scientists started talking in Russia.
However, during protests in January, Tokayev announced Nazarbayev’s resignation as head of Kazakhstan’s Security Council, the last official post retained by the former president. Tokayev himself became the new head of the Security Council.
Soon after that, it was possible to stabilize the situation due to the introduction into the United Nations country of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), a structure created in the post-Soviet space 30 years ago, but until that moment had not taken any significant part in conflicts on its territory. At the same time, as they consider the role of observers, Russia met the key role both in the admission of the CSTO troops to Kazakhstan and in the development of the settlement of the situation.
Despite the fact that the conflicts in Kazakhstan are already fading away, the events that have spread in the country and have returned to their surface raise several serious questions: for example, is it possible to talk about the strengthening of the CSTO, whether Moscow’s influence on Kazakhstan will grow and it is possible whether to forget about the Kazakh scenario of the transit of power for Russia.
The BBC Russian Service has asked these questions to the editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Statistics” Fedorat Lukyanovat and political scientists Tatiana Stanovoy and Arkady Dubnov…
Can we talk about strengthening the CSTO? How does the situation in Kazakhstan affect the external audit of Russia?
Fedor Lukyanov:
Of course, we can talk about the strengthening of Russia’s positions in the post-Soviet and Eurasian space. Russia has demonstrated its ability to react very quickly and effectively and reminded that there is no actor in the sphere on this territory with regard to security. Russia has once again shown that it has sufficient potential in the military-power sphere.
For the first time, the CSTO served as a mass infection, because for many years it was believed that it was more of a symbolic alliance. Now he plays a role, that he can play some role to the extent that the means of legitimation determines actions on this surface. Of course, this does not have a direct meaning, but an indirect impact on relations with the United States, in particular.
Tatiana Stanovaya:
I would not exaggerate the importance of the CSTO – rather, we are talking about Russia’s preferences to increase its influence in the post-Soviet space using the CSTO instrument.
That is, the CSTO is not an end in itself. This is a tool that can be used in a very limited way, because all the partners in this agreement have different interests.
In 2010, the idea of the CSTO was used for observation in Kyrgyzstan, but Russia did not agree to this, because it was against solving this situation. In 2020, Armenia really wanted to introduce CSTO forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Azerbaijan was against this. That is, this tool is difficult to use in full force.
On the other hand, in this situation it so happened that it was very convenient for Russia and everyone. I think that, in particular, on the part of Western journalists there is a simple increase in the coverage of the CSTO, but we are talking more here about ambitions and blocking of Russia.
There is a change in the logic and priorities of Russia in how it reacts to events in the post-Soviet countries. If what happened happened two years ago, no entry [вооруженных] there would be no strength. At present, in Russia, since all of its and its high concentration are due to strategic security, reactions to the risks of destabilization in surplus countries are sharper – hence the more severe allergy.
Of course, this tendency for the participation of security officials in the fact that the feeling will grow.
Arkady Dubnov:
The CSTO ceases to be a paper tiger, reveals its readiness and determination to be completed in anticipation of dramatic and chaotic threats on the territory of its catchment area. Of course, this is not so much about the CSTO as about its nuclear part – Russia.
The CSTO is a fairly convenient subject, since the use of Russian military forces in this format does not require the permission of the Federation Council, a rather coordinated decision of the heads of state.
The most important thing is that Russia thus demonstrates its resistance to stability, security and order – that is, all these categories are in the Kremlin’s fortress. Moscow is returning to its role as a guarantor of a stable and responsible position in the post-Soviet space, albeit in a limited format. This has been demonstrated quite clearly today.
The case of Kazakhstan shows that now any threat to the stability of the CSTO countries will be characterized as expanding, even if it is caused by internal complexes: either socio-economic, or a fight between elites, or an attempt to stage a coup. There will always be a way to indicate an external trace, which was done in Kazakhstan.
Is it unlikely that age influences Russian influence on Kazakhstan and the CIS?
Fedor Lukyanov:
Review of a new stage in building Russia’s relations with post-Soviet countries. We did it a year and a half ago in Armenia for the arrest of events to which Russia does not belong. But Armenia has grown sharply from Russia, and Armenia found itself in a position where it was exposed to the risk of infection only in Russia and has nowhere else to devalue.
Now in Kazakhstan the situation is different – there is no external outbreak, there is a threat to stable stability in general. But all the same, Russia is becoming a partner. This is somewhat unexpected, because it was taken into account that Kazakhstan is a very stable state structure, that it is an established and prosperous state.
I think this is not the last [подобный] episode on the territory of the former USSR
Tatyana Stanovaya:
Russia has a very simple logic – either insufficient power to cope [со своими кризисами сами] and we will not go in, because we need stable partners, or if they fail, then in the eyes of the Kremlin it becomes a platform for influencing external forces.
They talk so much about external forces because they speculate, but because they have a valid right to consumption in connection with the European crisis, in order to use it as a factor to put pressure on Russia and to weaken it. Russia must take responsibility and stabilize the situation.
It is in Kazakhstan, I think, that Moscow does not care who to bet on, but in Moscow it is important to institutionally establish such a system where there would be no conflicts.
Arkady Dubnov:
Kazakhstan’s future dependence on Russia may be of a qualitative or speculative nature, but it is obvious. Arrival decisions in Kazakhstan related to the focus on external centers of power – the United States, application, China, Turkey – will be made taking into account how this can happen in Moscow.
Another thing is that he does not want to be in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Kazakhstan is fraught with internal upheavals of a national-patriotic nature, when not only young people, but also the elites will not be happy that Moscow is becoming such a high-ranking body or patron.
But in Moscow this is fine, you can start accepting the games and give Tokayev the rules to save face. He demonstrated this in his Twitter, said that the peace-loving forces would not stay long, maybe even leave in a week. Of course, it won’t go away in one week, an excuse will always be found, but the bill can go on for months.
What does this say about the success of the Kazakh transit scenario?
Fedor Lukyanov:
The Kazakh transit scenario turned out to be not at all as successful as at the beginning. In many cases, this was due to the fact that he took too long and did not find all the food. Although everyone verbally supports him, the all-encompassing battle for a meeting continued after Nazarbayev. Of course, this aggravated many processes.
It is important here that an era has passed when power could be discovered under investigation, only in one direction. This was during the “Arab Spring” and in the presence of post-Soviet countries.
Perhaps this era is over. Now, in at least two cases, in Belarus and Kazakhstan, we see that the consumption of increased discontent for regime change is increasing, firstly, on a harsh assessment of the regime itself, which does not make concessions and raises its position, and, secondly, in Russia.
It turns out that this changes the picture: it is obvious that the authoritarian regime in the European phase is doomed to upheavals and downfalls, but now it does not look like that. This is an important lesson for many countries, since authoritarian regimes are almost everywhere. And it is important for them to understand how to behave in a situation and who to rely on.
Tatyana Stanovaya:
I think that Putin has an initial setting – the institution of the president must not be weakened. The Kazakhstani scenario was built around putting in a weak successor, slowly tolerating it. Putin believes that this situation with the supreme power is very dangerous, and what happened only confirms for him that this scheme is very dangerous for a stable and secure one. If Nazarbayev had not opted for this transit option,
Arkady Dubnov:
In Kazakhstan, there was an attempt at a counter-coup on the part of the Nazarbayev part of the elite, striving to release Tokayev – or to extinguish his independent aspirations for power.
All delicately unmentioned names of Nazarbayev. This suggests that there is an intention to preserve Nazarbayev as the main symbol of sovereign Kazakhstan, as an attribute of this form of state.
It is extremely dangerous to question the success of this transit, so no one at the summit began to close the problem of transit and what happened. They talked about anything: about bandits, sleeping cells, the Islamist underground, about how the CSTO worked perfectly, but in fact nothing was said about what exactly threatened Kazakhstan.
And this suggests that there is a desire to preserve the characteristic of Nazarbayev’s state in that this statehood should be inherited. Tokayev is a successful marker of the Nazarbayev state, if he holds, then it will be recognized that this is just a temporary distortion during the audit.
Moscow is now treating this transit scenario with caution. Putin already burned himself 10 years ago, predicted the existence of such a Medvedev-type transit, and he hardly liked it. Therefore, he will strictly protect his right to power, assuring that otherwise the country is threatened with disintegration and all the worst scenarios. Once a decision was made, but now it seems that it is more and more distant.