Serbia’s activities in regional interstate relations
Due to a series of unfavorable circumstances in the last part of the 20th century, Serbia’s position in the international arena and diplomacy is in a deadlock.
If we take into account the enormous wealth that Belgrade accumulated in the Tito and post-Tito years (1945-1980, 1980-1991) within Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, as well as developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement, we understand that the Kosovo crisis, rather above all, scattered the international sympathy and support of many of these countries.
Back in the Cold War, the three “B’s” were the place where solutions for international problems came from and where “intelligence services” reached mediations, compromises and agreements: Berlin, Belgrade and Byzantium (Istanbul), with socialist, but “neutral”, Yugoslavia in the center of script interests. However, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the “uselessness” of Yugoslavia for the United States of America began to undermine the Yugoslav prestige gained through decades of patient and wise diplomatic work.
Furthermore, the Kosovo crisis – manifested in the country’s independence, declared on February 17, 2008 – has, to date, affected as many as 43 Afro-Asian and Latin American countries (sitting on the United Nations Security Council), Italy , Germany, etc. – support Pristina’s initiative to the detriment of Belgrade’s interests. Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain are EU member states that do not support Kosovo’s independence (the European Union is not unique in this regard either).
If we also add that Serbia has the support of the current “bad countries”, i.e. the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, we understand that for the right-thinking, conformist and amorphous European Union on the American track, Serbia is a boring and unpleasant factor that should be left aside. Thus, Belgrade – which in the past held the balance of power in major foreign policy matters (1948-1989) – is now essentially aiming for a regional security vision, as the conditions for global foreign policy maneuvering seem to be becoming less and less favorable.
On the other hand, despite the complexity of Serbia’s position in the structure of relations in the Balkan region, the Serbian state has recently managed to find a certain pattern of existence, and even politically and economically profit from it in the conditions of turbulence. History, however, aims to prove that the Serbian balancing model (even of pre-Yugoslav Serbia) has a certain root of solidity.
At the beginning of 2022, with due reserve, the Serbian state acted confidently, above all in its economic efforts. A sure indicator is the fact that the public debt of the Government of Serbia in the period 2020-2022. remained at the level of 51-53 percent of GDP, while the average of the eurozone countries is 98.3 percent. In general, Serbia managed to solve the problem of autonomy, stabilize the internal political situation at the expense of political centralization, fight against Covid-19 and position itself as a regional communication center. This ensured an influx of investments into large infrastructure and industrial projects.
The costs of this strategy are the preservation of the average salary level in Serbia compared to neighboring countries in the region. It is lower than in Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, but higher than in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and North Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until June 17, 2018).
It is important to note the significant presence of German companies in the country. As Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić pointed out at the press conference, 77,000 Serbian citizens are employed in German companies in Serbia (in 2014, there were 17,000 of them). It should also be noted that the share of Serbian exports to Germany (about 2.74 billion euros) is trying to equalize (42.1 percent) in the structure of bilateral trade (6.51 billion euros), but this is more true for Italy (44 percent), Hungary (47.5%) and Poland (44.3%).
Therefore, from an economic point of view, Serbia feels very comfortable in the system of continental economic relations, but the loss of the Serbian market and location is hardly in the interest of some European countries.
On the other hand, there are many points of pressure on the leadership of Serbia. Fiat-Chrysler Corporation’s decision to move part of its production from the city of Kragujevac (central Serbia) to Slovakia led to worker protests and a wave of lawsuits against the Serbian state, which owns 33 percent of the company’s shares. At the same time, the Serbian leadership still has the right to count on the attractiveness of investments in its country, because the company that is leaving could be replaced by companies coming from France, Turkey or other countries interested in Serbian communications and cheap labor.
We remind you that the first talk about Serbia’s intention to give up Russian gas dates back to 2015, but only now is the issue becoming more serious. But there are two factors standing in the way of limiting Russian supplies. The first factor is that even under the current conditions, the price of Serbian (re-exported) gas will be one of the lowest in Europe.
Another factor is related to the risk that Serbia will be destined for a peripheral position in alternative gas transport configurations. On the other hand, the increase in the level of gas price negotiations and the emergence of new demands will indicate two things: either that Serbia has finally found itself in new regional “alternative” gas configurations or that the costs of cooperation with Russia have begun to outweigh the benefits.
It is worth paying attention to the statements of Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković from June 2022, who said that “now is not the time to sit on two chairs” and that Serbia “must be very careful and decide which side to choose and support”. . The second question is related to the literature on the rights of the Croatian national minority in Serbia, which was prepared by the Croatian Academy of Sciences and the Croatian ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union. Therefore, the issue of Serbia’s accession to the EU carries the risk of causing a new problem – which must be combined with the above-mentioned dispute over Kosovo – for example, the possibility of a Croatian veto on Serbia’s membership in the EU.
Speaking of Croatia’s position, it should be noted that the number of the Croatian contingent in the KFOR (Kosovo Force) mission in Kosovo has increased by 3.5 times (from 40 to 150 people). Zagreb is therefore expanding its presence at this hub in the region. This decision was made in 2021, so long before the Ukrainian escalation, and it causes concern for the situation in the Balkans.
The concentration of foreign troops in the missions of EUFOR-BiH (Military operation of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and KFOR is a reality that Belgrade will come to terms with. It should be noted that we are talking about contingents mainly from European countries (Austria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Hungary), Turkey, as well as the United Kingdom, which seems to have decided to go back to its 2019 decision to reduce the presence of its army in the aforementioned EUFOR BiH.
We could argue that there is a clear probability of a scenario of direct control over Belgrade and Serbian interests in the region. It is about the fact that this targeted action will only multiply the problems, and the obvious absence of Russia’s ally at the negotiating table will not ensure balance among other powers interested in the fundamental issues of the new regional reorganization.
An extremely insidious situation cannot be ruled out, when completely sincere attempts at European integration on the part of the Serbian side meet the Croatian (or other countries’) veto and encourage the growth of Euroscepticism in the country. The paradox is that, without cultivating excessive European illusions, the Serbian leadership consciously supports specific integration initiatives anyway.
rofessor Giancarlo Elia Valori is a world-renowned Italian economist and international relations expert, who serves as president of the International World Group. In 1995, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem dedicated the Giancarlo Elia Valori Chair for Peace and Regional Cooperation. Prof. Valori also holds chairs in peace studies at Yeshiva University in New York and Peking University in China. Among his numerous honors from countries and institutions around the world, prof. Valori is an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences at the Institute of France, as well as a Knight of the Grand Cross and a Knight of Labor of the Italian Republic.