The energy crisis in Moldova and the feelings of “unity” with Romania
The energy crisis in Moldova continues, but the difficulties are becoming more manageable for the Moldovan government. Returning to the contract with the Transnistrian region (Centrala Termoelectrică de la Cuciurgan – MGRES) regarding the supply of electricity allows a certain relaxation of financial order for the government of the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), consumers and the business environment. It also reduces the probability of negative scenarios related to a possible worsening of the humanitarian crisis involving the citizens of the Transnistrian region. At the same time, by directing the entire volume of Russian gas to Transnistria, it can revive the activity of its economy. In addition to natural gas, another concession from Chisinau consists in the extension of ecological authorizations for the polluting Transnistrian metallurgical industry (Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca) until the end of 2022. Thus, the old status-quo is being reinstated, which was convenient for the separatist administration and the “Sheriff” oligarchic group to ensure some minimum conditions to avoid an anti-regime uprising and/or an exodus from the region. Last but not least, with the re-establishment of access to electricity produced in Transnistria, the pressure on Romania to increase assistance to Moldova decreases. Romania managed to integrate the advantages of the energy order in the sales policy towards Moldova, thus responding to the high level of “unionist” sympathies among the Moldovan citizens.
Denis AshPhoto: Personal archive
The utility of the Transnistrian energy factor for Moldova is undoubted, if Transnistria pays for the gas consumed. This argument is partial as long as Moldova does not have access to turf at the price of the Russian one sent in full to Transnistria (5.7 million m3 per day) for more affordable electricity production. The price for electricity sold by the separatist regime is 17 euros per MWh lower than the preferential price offered by Romania in October-November (73 euros/MWh and 90 euros/MWh, respectively). Under these conditions, the Chisinau authorities will try to at least partially reduce the electricity tariff or, as an alternative, keep it frozen during the winter. The population is already alerted by the continuous increases in electricity tariffs, the fourth one taking place in November. The latest surveys show that high prices are the most important problem facing the population (IRI, November 2022 – 57%).
Although it was signed during non-transparent negotiations, the contract with MGRES denotes the fact that Moldova has to choose from a series of dilemmas and opted for the “lesser evil” (Intellinews, December 2022). The approval of this contract by the US Embassy and the EU through the Energy Community highlights the fact that even external partners understand that Moldova depends on the Transnistrian region, at least during this winter. The objective on which the Moldovan government has focused is to ensure political and socio-economic stability in the short term – until the spring of 2023 – when the energy crisis has the most acute effects.
“Pragmatic” concessions, even if in favor of the Transnistrian region
In the end, the Moldovan government appears to have caved in to Russian pressure, leaving the Transnistrian region to be the major beneficiary of the deal to restore electricity supply. In short, Transnistria receives Russian gas at a convenient price (twice lower than on the spot market in Europe), produces electricity for its own economy and for export to the territory controlled by the constitutional authorities, and for this money. In this way, Russia solves the problem of socio-economic and political survival of the separatist regime, which relied on this type of transaction with Chisinau back in October.
Although the Transnistrian region benefits the most, the Chisinau area commands time and political ground to manage the energy crisis with minimized image costs. The Moldovan authorities manage to prevent a further increase in inflation in December and later in the first quarter of 2023. This means that fewer resources are allocated for compensation schemes, which already now number 5 billion lei (245 million euros) . Thus, it may reduce political pressure on the government, which already faces a high level of public disapproval. About 30% of the population against the change of government the main area of solution for overcoming the socio-economic crisis (BOP, December 2022). The level of negative opinion in society is high, even though the government enjoys rather favorable treatment from most media sources, which qualify as independent. The low popularity of PAS increases the credibility of its political opponents, who are mobilizing efforts for anti-government protests and preparations for local elections in 2023. At the same time, PAS’s attempt to substitute local legitimacy for the recognition of the side of external partners is a risky strategy.
Even if Russian propaganda is countered more effectively than ever in the past, 45.6% think the PAS government is responsible for the energy crisis, and about 67% think President Sandu should go to Moscow to demand a lower price for Russian gas (PPI, December 2022). Although more than 1/4 of the population sees the change of government as a solution to break the deadlock, PAS and its informal leader President Maia Sandu know that the resignation of Natalia Gavrilița’s government does not solve anything. However, apart from the routine deficiencies of the government, the biggest ones are structural and aim at economic dependence in relation to Russian gas and electricity production capacities in the Transnistrian region. For now, the natural gas and electricity respectively imported from the EU and Romania respectively are several times more than what Moldova can get from Russia and Transnistria. The objective reality is unpleasant for the government in Chisinau and contrasts with its geopolitical priorities of decoupling from Russia. Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian energy levers is accentuated by continued Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which repeatedly blackout the Odesa region (Medusa, December 2022). For these unfortunate reasons, risking the erosion of popularity, the government will try to make pragmatic arrangements with Transnistria as long as it feels in danger, if the terms of the deals favor more Russian-Transnistrian interests.
“Unionist” sentiments – between utilitarianism and the pressure of the energy crisis
In search of reliable sources of electricity, the Chisinau government turned primarily to Romania, which has an essential actor for Moldova’s energy security. From October-November, electricity from Romania is sold to Moldova at subsidized and market prices. President Maia Sandu’s request to Romania to save current in order to be able to supply more electricity to Moldova was one of the last steps, although not quite successful, to sensitize the Romanian public and politicians. The radical leaders of the unionist movement, such as George Simion, the leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR – 27 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and 12 in the Romanian Senate), suggested that Romania should not help Moldova anymore. The opinion given was disapproved, having a limited representativeness in the Romanian political framework. Although full of other disadvantages, the restoration of electricity imports from Transnistria takes some of the pressure off the shoulders of Romania, which continues to assist Moldova, but also to prevent attacks similar to those articulated by George Simion.
Even if Moldova can manage the energy crisis with the help of Romania (EU and Ukraine), the electricity provided by Transnistria levels the exaggerated expectations from Chisinau. As a result, the “unionist” feelings in society are protected from the expectations of hyper-optimists, but also from the attacks of skeptics who can see in the energy impasse in Moldova a possibility to speed up the reunification project with Romania.
The problems in the Moldovan energy sector and the usefulness of Romanian support could be one of the explanations for the fact that unionist sympathies remain between 30% and 33% (Date, November 2022). These sociological trends may persist even if the country’s status as a candidate to join the EU may diminish them. Romania’s official position is completely detached from the calculations of the unionists on both banks of the Prut, who worry that Moldova’s inability to solve the energy crisis would be an indication that reunification is something inevitable. However, Romania’s membership in NATO means that the attractiveness of unionism is met with resistance from supporters of neutrality. Although 54.5% oppose NATO compared to 22.4% who accept joining this military bloc, 41.1% claim that neutrality would not protect the country from external aggression (BOP, December 2022). The most powerful tools for consolidating a positive image in Moldova instead of Romania are from the energy field. Considering the restoration of electricity supply from Transnistria, Romania can adjust its assistance in the energy sector in such a way that it becomes feasible, proportional and does not generate negative reactions in the Romanian public, including the unionist one, in relation to Moldova.Read the entire article and comment on Contributors.ro