Russian espionage in Sweden: The Kia brothers
1.0. Who are the Kia brothers?
The Kia brothers are guilty of what could develop into one of the most significant cases of espionage in Swedish history.
The two brothers Peyman and Payam Kia came to Sweden from Iran with their family in the 1990s. In 2007, the Security Police (SÄPO) hired older brother Peyman after he completed a trainee program [source]. He worked in the organization between 2007-2011 and 2014-2015 [source]. According to Peyman, he served close to the organization’s core layer and was “chosen” to conduct counterintelligence operations on Swedish soil [source]. In addition, SÄPO is said to have employed his younger brother, Payam, although his exact role is unclear, as is when his employment took place. [source].
SÄPO rejects the claims about Peyman’s role, who reportedly worked as an administrator with limited access to sensitive information. The younger brother, Payam, has also reportedly never been employed by the organization [source]. They instead charged Payam on suspicion of working as the link between Peyman and the Russian military intelligence service (GRU).
After his first employment at SÄPO, Peyman worked at the Swedish military intelligence service, MUST. It is currently unclear what position he held in the organization. Altogether it is said to have been of a very delicate nature.
In 2015, Peyman got a management position at the Swedish Food Agency. For several years, SÄPO suspected that there was a mole within the organization. Two years after Peyman’s employment at the Swedish Food Agency, in 2017, SÄPO, with the support of MUST and the Swedish National Authority for Signal Intelligence (FRA), began the investigation into suspected espionage.
2.0. What has happened?
On November 11, 2022, the government indicted the brothers for what may be one of the most serious espionage cases in Sweden. Fully comparable to or even worse than the Stig Bergling and Stig Wennerström cases. They are both charged with aggravated espionage. They also charged Peyman with aggravated unauthorized handling of classified information. Payam allegedly helped Peyman communicate with a GRU contact from whom he received cash and gold payments.
4 years and 8 months after the investigation began in 2017, authorities arrested Peyman and Payam Kia on two separate occasions in 2021 on suspicion of espionage on behalf of a foreign state.
Evidence shows that Peyman had access to highly sensitive material during his time at SÄPO and MUST. At one point, Peyman received an email with information about the entire organization’s staff. As the investigation remains top secret, it is unclear what information the brothers have shared with their GRU contact [source]. But the nearly 5-year-long investigations will likely be enough for a conviction. The information from the investigation points to a wide range of evidence. Among them are:
- The bank account. In March 2017, SÄPO searched Peyman Kia’s bank account. Peyman reportedly received at least $400,000 from the GRU [source; source].
- “race ski”. An interesting part of the organization is notes taken by the younger brother Payam. An encounter with “rasski” is repeatedly mentioned in the open access material. In his notes, Payam wrote: “I was right about how the meeting with Rasski could go wrong and that’s exactly what happened” [source].
- The dead drop. In his notes, Payam also mentions what SÄPO suspects to be a “dead drop” [source]that is, a place where information is exchanged without physical contact.
- “GRU”. Further on, the notes mention “GRU” several times. For example “800,000 months GRU”. [source]
- The spy camera. During their search of Payam’s residence, SÄPO found a spy camera disguised as a car key. In addition, they collected images that were traced back to 2014. [source]
- The Secret Files. According to SÄPO, Peyman often visited his office late at night during the end of his employment at MUST. During these visits, he opened many files, which were later found on his personal computer. The files were accessed after Peyman’s employment at MUST and are “highly sensitive”. [source; source].
- The public toilet. Peyman Kia allegedly passed on information about USB sticks in a public toilet. Among the 15 external devices that have connected to his computer, 6 of them are in the hands of the authorities. [source]
- The hard drive. When authorities arrested Peyman, they saw Payam throw away a destroyed hard drive, which was immediately retrieved by police detectives. [source]
3.0. A short history of Russian spies in Sweden
3.1. Stig Wennerström
Between 1940-41 Stig Wennerström served as military attache in Moscow. After serving as division commander of the 71st Division, F7, in Såtenäs, he returned to Moscow between 1948-1952 and then to Washington between 1952-1957 [source]. Wennerström reportedly gained the GRU’s interest as early as 1934 during a study visit to Riga, Latvia, but was recruited in 1948 [source]. In 1956, the Soviet defector warned Swedish authorities about 2 moles, a diplomat and a military man. When suspicions were raised against Wennerström in the late 1950s, SÄPO recruited his maid, Carin Rosén, to provide information.
In June 1963, she allegedly found several videotapes hidden in the attic of Wennerström’s home, which included very sensitive and secret material. On June 25, Stig Wennerström was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. During his “career”, Wennerström is said to have revealed the entire Swedish defense planning in the 1950s and large amounts of information about the Draken fighter aircraft project to the Soviet Union. He also exposed Swedish signals intelligence operations in the Baltic Sea, which resulted in a Swedish Tp79 reconnaissance plane being shot down in June 1952 with 8 crew members on board [source].
3.2. Stig Bergling
After completing his conscription as a coast guard, Stig Bergling served in the Swedish police in 1958. After 10 years of service, he moved on to SÄPO and the Soviet counterintelligence unit. [source]. In 1971, he worked at the Defense Staff at the Swedish Armed Forces, where he began to exchange sensitive material when stationed abroad. An example is in 1972 in Lebanon when he exchanged information about classified military facilities in Sweden with the Soviet military attaché and GRU officer Alexander Nikiforov.
After several years as a UN observer, Bergling returned home in 1975 to continue his work partly in SÄPO and partly within the military intelligence service. As a high-ranking official to very sensitive information. In 1976, suspicions of a mole in the organization led to surveillance of Bergling. By this time, the West had its mole in the Russian language KGBOleg Gordievsky, who confirmed these suspicions through his contacts at the GRU and MI6 [source]. After being informed by SÄPO, Stig Bergling was arrested on 12 March 1979 by the Israeli Shin Bet before flying home from a UN mission to Suez. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4.0 What happens next?
The Russian espionage threat to northern Europe is increasing. According to SÄPO, Sweden is a prime target for repeated Russian covert operation attempts [source]. In addition, spurred by the war between Russia and Ukraine and a Swedish NATO application, Russian attempts to destabilize Northern Europe are common.
5.0 Summary
The incident follows a pattern of Russian illegal and covert operations in the West. Although the open source information in the case is limited, Swedish human resources may likely have been exposed. There is also a risk that disinformation has affected the work of the Swedish security services and MUST during Peyman’s employment. Further ahead, it is reasonable to assume a large Russian presence in northern European countries, potentially recruited by the Kia brothers themselves. In the end, the case could become one of the worst espionage cases in Swedish history.