Intervention-fire: Turkey does not dare to attack Greece and Cyprus unless we allow it
“The gap between the pompous threats and the Turkish military actions is a fact, since Turkey proceeds with military raids in cases of overwhelming superiority against the victim” Costas Mavridis, MEP of DIKO (S&D) and president, points out in his post on social media . Political Committee for the Mediterranean (photo, top, from Facebook).
“Unrestricted network”
“That’s what happened in Cyprus in 1974, after first the junta withdrew the Greek division and later the junta betrayal and the coup d’état” the Cypriot MEP emphasizes.
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Here is his post, which is titled “With the enemy within the walls but also without…”:
“With Turkey on a predetermined course for decades, its aggressive rhetoric is intensifying today with unbridled abuse and threats against Greece-Cyprus.
“However, the gap between pompous threats and Turkish military actions is a fact, since Turkey proceeds with military raids in cases of overwhelming superiority against the victim, e.g. Iraq, Syria’s Afrin, Libya…
»This is what happened in Cyprus in 1974, after first the junta withdrew the Greek division and later the junta betrayal and the coup d’état followed.
»Typically, in the cases where Greece-Turkey appeared to reach the brink of general conflict, the evidence reveals that there was no corresponding Turkish military mobilization, but a permanent pursuit to convert Turkish claims into a bilateral issue and Greece retreated.
The “lost” Simitis
»In 1976, the Turkish vessel “HORA” carried out surveys in the Aegean. Likewise in 1987 the Turkish “SISMIK”. In 1996, in the Imian crisis, Turkey faced the “lost” Simitis and as revealed by the excellent E.A. General Kambouridis who was then serving in Turkey, no Turkish camp was in war preparation.
“In all cases, the … “conflict” was avoided with an updated agreement, which was a step in Greece’s retreat. Even in 2020, with the Turkish “Oruch Reis” and the “resting” of a Turkish frigate from Greece, Turkey remained silent.
“Not even an action was attempted that would “oblige” the Government in Athens to react militarily, e.g. a Turkish landing at Kastellorizo.
»However, the policy of inaction led to legal setbacks. For example, we would be in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the infamous Turkish-Libyan monument, if Athens introduced the corrective proposal of President T. Papadopoulos to regulate the Greece-Cyprus EEZ.
“However, the question now is what we do today. And incorporated two states within the EU “unable” to regulate the EEZ between them, the defeatism syndrome remains, with Turkey aiming to turn its illegal claims into major disputes and freeze any Greek energy initiative for mining.
Substantial defensive capabilities
“In the face of a determined and defensively strengthened Greece, Turkey will avoid general conflict, thus avoiding a possible Turkish failure, with unpredictable upheavals inside Turkey, but looking for “limited” weak points.
»From the best perspective, Cyprus can, through defense capabilities and alliances, turn from a weakness into a deterrence advantage against Turkey.
“And since the EU does not have a defense mechanism for its states, the responsibility of self-protection is ours.
“Military partnerships and joint training are all very well, but deterrence is built with substantial defense capabilities and alliances by policymakers.
“With the enemy within the walls in Cyprus and outside the walls in the Aegean, Cyprus will have to join the France-Greece defense alliance within the wider European defense and security framework.”