Sweden and Finland: From alongside NATO to within NATO
In the space of about six weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has successfully abolished 208 years of Swedish history. Sweden had been non-aligned since 1814. If NATO’s legislative bodies give their approval, this will no longer be the case. Together with Finland, Sweden would remain a full member of the alliance.
During the last decade or so, while a majority of the Finnish public turned to join NATO, Swedish public opinion remained much more ambivalent. In particular, while the Moderates, Sweden’s leading conservative party, have openly supported NATO membership, the ruling Social Democrats have been reluctant to go before public opinion. Although they made it clear that NATO membership was considered a sustainable alternative, Finnish governments also hesitated during these years to initiate a formal application process.
All this changed with Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine. And once Finland applied, Stockholm felt that it could not be the only Nordic country outside NATO.
In recent days, a senior Swedish official has pointed out to me that six weeks is really a very short time to turn around a hundred-year policy. It is true that Sweden is already well integrated with NATO. Its forces have practiced together with NATO as an important alliance partner. In addition, since the beginning of the 2010s, it has developed an ever closer relationship with both Helsinki and Washington; in May 2018, Sweden and Finland signed an agreement with the United States to increase defense cooperation between the three countries. Also during Article 42.7 of 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, it has undertaken to use “all means” in its power against all other EU Member States which become “victims of armed aggression on its territory.” In addition, Sweden spread of a military presence on Gotland in the Baltic Sea certainly increases Western deterrence against possible Russian aggression.
Nevertheless, as the official pointed out to me, the Swedish Government acknowledges that by joining NATO it will now take on the additional commitment to defend 30 – 31 when Finland joins – other countries under the terms of Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty. And its military, as well as civilian bureaucracy, which just a few months ago was not structured to function as a formal NATO ally, will now have to respond to the demands of a much faster adoption process than has guided previous rounds of NATO expansion.
Sweden has committed itself to a significant increase in defense spending. With the consent of all its major parties, it is planned to achieve NATO’s goals 2 percent of GDP in 2028. With a technically advanced, highly professional military, Sweden’s entry into NATO would strengthen the alliance’s position in northern Europe considerably.
But at the same time, Stockholm is happy to see an increased and more frequent American presence in the Baltics. Such a presence would further underline NATO’s deterrent effect in the region, especially towards Russia Kaliningrad exclavewhich is bursting with firepower including nuclear weapons.
There is, of course, the possibility that despite the enthusiastic reception that the United States and most NATO states have given to Stockholm and Helsinki, the Alliance may not necessarily accept their applications. The governments of all 30 NATO states must approve membership applications, and not all of them are as enthusiastic about the potential new entrants.
Above all, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has conditioned his approval of Sweden’s releases to Turkey about 30 members of the Kurdish extremist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). Both Turkey and the United States have branded the PKK one terrorist groupbut my Swedish interlocutor made it clear that his country is not yet ready to release these people to the tender mercy of the Turkish prison system.
Perhaps Putin’s rather low-key reaction to the Finnish and Swedish announcements was due to the fact that he expected Turkey to block their accession to the PKK issue. As with his invasion of Ukraine, however, he may again commit a serious miscalculation. Erdoğan may be happy with other forms of compensation, such as Washington allowing Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program, from which it was removed after Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 ground-to-air missiles.
Alternatively, the Turkish president can simply withdraw his veto, given Turkey’s concerns about potential Russian dominance of the northern Black Sea. In fact, Ankara has provided critical support to Ukraine – not only by its range of highly effective Bayraktar drones but also by refusing Russian warships entry into the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Erdoğan may conclude that adding the two states to the alliance improves NATO’s overall deterrent effect, on its southern flank as much as on its northern one.
Hopefully, the process of bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO will not take long. Meanwhile, the United States and the United Kingdom have issued security guarantees to both countries, even as their defense cooperation with the United States progresses rapidly. And when the two states finally join the alliance that Putin has worked so hard – and failed – to differentiate, he has only himself to blame.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior advisor at Center for Strategic and International Studies and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under the Secretary of Defense (Inspector) and Chief Financial Officer of the Ministry of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and Deputy Minister of Defense from 1985 to 1987.