The siege of Budapest was one of the most devastating city battles of the Second World War
At first, the Red Army seemed to be just encircling and starving the city
On October 15, 1944, the attempt of Governor Miklós Horthy to jump out in October collapsed due to poor preparation and internal betrayal. On October 16, the armed coup carried out with German help put Ferenc Szálasi, the fantastic leader of the Arrow Cross Party – Hungarist Movement, at the helm of the country. Despite his catastrophic war situation, Szálasi and his followers fanatically believed in the ultimate victory of Nazi Germany.
The Arrow Cross government, formed on October 16, 1944, ordered the enlistment of men between the ages of 14 and 70 in the armed service, raised the amount of military contributions payable to occupying Nazi Germany, and Szálasi promised to put one million people at war. At the time of the Arrow Cross coup, the Soviet Red Army was already within the country’s Trianon borders, the battle of the Great Plain unfolding in the area of Debrecen and Hortobágy, and one of the largest armored battles of World War II was coming to an end.
German and Hungarian forces were unable to arrest the depressing Soviet army groups in terms of numbers and technology, and were forced to evacuate the Trans-Tisza by the end of October. By mid-October 1944, the first armored wedges of Marshal Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian front were already on the border of Kecskemét, barely 100 kilometers from the Hungarian capital. With the failure of Horthy’s attempt to break out and the support of the Germans, the country finally became a battleground as a result of an Arrow Cross coup.
The first formations of the Red Army crossed the Trianon borders of Hungary in the area of Battonya and Makó on September 23, 1944,
and a month later they were already on the border of the Hungarian capital.
In such a military situation, which was extremely favorable for the Soviets, the question of the fate of Budapest arose.
General Rogion Malinovsky’s army, who had been promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union a month earlier, on September 8, was originally intended to leave the Hungarian capital as soon as possible, taking advantage of the momentum of his army group, and over. in the direction of Ostmark (Austria), further develop the offensive that has been ongoing since the summer.
Stalin, head of Soviet headquarters (Stavka), dictated by the Soviet-Hungarian ceasefire agreement reached in Moscow on October 11, 1944, even after the failure of the Hungarian escape attempt
at first he was thinking of some kind of political solution.
For Stalin, reaching the Austrian region as soon as possible was the top priority, so he did not reject the suggestion of General Antonov, Chief of Staff of Stavka, to unleash the main blow to Vienna by bypassing the Hungarian capital and using the momentum of the Red Army.
Antonov believes that Budapest and its starvation will be enough to acquire the city, so he considered the long-running local war with serious losses unnecessary. However, due to the rapid advance of Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian Front, Stalin changed his mind.
Stalin thought he could take the Hungarian capital out of the procession
Stalin expects that the rapid arrival of the Hungarian capital can convert the majority of the Armed Forces to the Soviet side, and thus the ceasefire agreement of October 11 will become feasible.
Stalin therefore ordered Malinovsky on October 28 to try to take Budapest out of the procession.
The Soviet dictator believed that five days might be enough to occupy the Hungarian capital. However, Marshal Malinovsky doubted this because of the rapid advancement, he had difficulties in recruiting, and on the other hand he considered it necessary for his armies, who had been fighting continuously since the summer, to rest for a while before continuing. But it was not advisable to argue with Stalin, the massacre Soviet dictator, so the marshal, despite his better convictions, ordered the launch of an offensive operation against Budapest on October 29, following the commander-in-chief’s instructions.
However, the attack of the 2nd Ukrainian Front from the Kecskemét area on the defensive position established in the foreground of Budapest, on the German Attila line, meets fierce-Hungarian resistance.
On November 2, Malinovsky’s mechanized units were only 15 kilometers from the border with Budapest.
Some of his units occupied Ferihegy on November 3, and even reached the introductory section of Üllői út, but strengthened the Soviet forces a little beyond the Attila line. With this, it became clear that it would not be possible to carry out the revenue of the Hungarian capital.
Therefore, at the end of November, Stalin commanded Marshal Fyodor Tolbuhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front from the Belgrade area to Hungary to strengthen the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which was preparing to take over Budapest. Tolbuhin’s army group was ordered to encircle the Hungarian capital from the west, moving north from the southwest. However, Malinovsky did not want to share with Tolbuhin the glory of Budapest’s income, so on December 4 he carried out a violent crossing of the Danube in the Ercsi area.
Although the Soviet units involved in the operation suffered heavy losses, they managed to build a bridgehead on the west bank of the Danube.
The next day, December 5, Malinovsky launched an attack in the north,
and on 9 December it occupied Vác and Balassagyarmat. Stavka drew up a new war plan in mid-December to coordinate the fighting activities of the two Soviet army groups. According to this, the higher units of Marshal Tolbuhin attacked in the direction of Székesfehérvár, closing Buda from the west, while Malinovsky’s army bodies at Esztergom close the gripper around the Hungarian capital.
Tolbuhin’s offensive captured Bicske on December 24, defeating the tenacious resistance, and Malinovsky successfully closed the Soviet siege ring around Budapest the day after Christmas.
Hitler ordered the meaningless defense of Budapest “from brick to brick”
At first, even Ferenc Szálasi thought about making Budapest an open city. “I would consider it necessary to keep Budapest only from the point of view of starting offensive operations from this area. If this is not the case, the evacuation of Budapest must be carried out.. “-danger out of the archer” national leader “(mass murderer) in one of the steering seats.
The German Land Defense Headquarters, OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), considered it important to keep Budapest with Stavka because of the Danube defense line. But when the 3rd Ukrainian Front broke into Transdanubia and established a bridgehead on the west bank of the Danube at Erchin Malinovsky, recognizing the danger of encirclement,
at that time it was already proposed that all German forces be withdrawn from Budapest,
and a new and well-defended facial line will be built in the Transdanubia region.
However, Adolf Hitler did not want to hear about the abandonment of Budapest, although Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, chief of staff of the OKH, strongly urged the Führer that the defense of Budapest posed a serious threat similar to the Stalingrad disaster. Since Stalingrad, Hitler has maniacally refused to abandon or withdraw any territory in lieu of military service, regardless of what led to the unnecessary encirclement and destruction of entire German armies.
Already on December 1, before the official visit of Ferenc Szálasi and the Arrow Cross government delegation to Berlin, the Nazi dictator ordered the protection of Budapest “from brick to brick.”
on the one hand, he tried to dazzle the Hungarian “national leader” with the lying tale of miracle weapons,
on the other hand, he told Szalasi that there could be no question of declaring Budapest an open city, as it would launch an operation in early spring that would “drive the Russians back to Asia”.
However, the unscrupulous Arrow Cross leaders, who were afraid of Hitler’s promises, apparently left the capital threatened with siege as a fortress (Festung) before Christmas, apparently in the spirit of the “heroic outlook on life” and for the protection of “Budapest Fortress”. Pfeffer von Wildenbruch appointed SS-Obergruppenführer (Lieutenant General), placing under his command the 9th SS Mountain Corps and all German and Hungarian units stationed in Budapest.
Seeing the massive Soviet siege operation unfolding before Christmas 1944, Commander-in-Chief Hans Friessner, commander of the Southern Army Group, suggested to Hitler on December 19, like General Guderian, that he ring the German withdrawal from Budapest before another Soviet ring. Hitler’s response to Colonel Friessner’s suggestion was to replace the general with immediate effect.
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