Explained: Why Sweden is afraid of Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea
In mid-January, the Swedish Armed Forces reported that six Russian amphibious ships had left their naval base in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave located between Poland and Lithuania, and entered the Baltic Sea. Although it is not uncommon to see Russian ships moving into this area, a number of those who moved in were surprising. Around the same time, the Swedish police received several reports of particularly large drones flying above Sweden’s nuclear power plants along with other key targets. The origin of the drones has not yet been identified.
Sweden’s response to Russia’s aggressive position in the Baltic Sea was swift and decisive. Within 48 hours after the Russian ships entered the area, Sweden strengthened its military presence on the island of Gotland. Not since the Cold War had the 60,000 Gotlanders seen such a large military presence patrolling the streets.
Michael Claesson, chief of operations at the Swedish military, signaled Sweden’s willingness to defend its borders, saying that military resources would be “redistributed to strengthen operations in several different places.” To advance that sentiment, Micael Byden, commander-in-chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, warned that “Russia is ready to use military force to achieve its political goals”, adding that Swedes “should not rule out any scenario, no matter how high the risk. is. “
Why are Swedes afraid?
Sweden’s fear of Russia goes back centuries and stems mainly from conflicting expansion plans over the area that is now Finland. Russia eventually won, deposed Sweden as a European superpower and gave birth to the usual Swedish phrase Ryssen kommer or “the Russians are coming!” While Russia turned into a significant geopolitical player, Sweden became a small state, which faded in comparison with Russia in terms of population size and military strength.
When the Cold War was at its height in 1980, Sweden’s concern for proximity to Russia was heightened, which was exacerbated by the collapse of a Soviet submarine near the Swedish naval base Karlskrona in 1981. But despite this threat, Sweden remained neutral during the war, as it has been since the Napoleonic Wars. In 2010, two decades after the end of the Cold War, the Swedish fear of Russia disappeared somewhat, and its government decided to end the compulsory military service that had existed since 1901.
When relations finally seemed to be approaching relative normality, Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, which led to Sweden reintroducing conscription and re-establishing a garrison on the island of Gotland. According to its government, the reason was concerns about Russia’s increased military activity in the vicinity of Sweden.
Sweden has always been cautious about having an aggressive nuclear force at its threshold, but the concern has reached fever levels over the past six months. Russia’s potential invasion of Ukraine would have massive consequences for the EU and in the event of a physical conflict, Sweden’s national security would be significantly jeopardized. But that only explains part of the problem. Sweden’s most urgent concern right now is that Russia may try to take control of the strategically important Gotland, which is described by an American official as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Baltic Sea”.
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Gotland is located only 300 kilometers north of Kaliningrad’s naval base and faces the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the east. Given that 100,000 Russian troops are currently on the border with Ukraine, and more are passing through Belarus, there is a worrying possibility that Putin may take military action to combat what the Kremlin perceives as NATO aggression.
Recently, Estonia’s Prime Minister asked NATO allies to increase their presence in her country, while Lithuania’s Defense Minister has said that Russian troops in Belarus were a “direct threat” to its security. All three Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that an attack on one would require Allied colleagues – including the United States – to come to their defense. This is where Gotland comes into play.
To help its allies, America would quickly need to send jets across the Baltic. But if Russia took control of Gotland, it could use anti-aircraft missiles and coastal robots to make it difficult for some US forces to reach and defend the Baltics.
Although the idea that Russia is so openly antagonistic is difficult to understand, it is not unpredictable. According to a report from the Swedish Defense Research Agency, published in 2019, “Russia can, in a crisis or war, seize the island of Gotland and displace air defense systems there to close the A2 / AD ring around the Baltic states.” In this context, A2 / AD is an abbreviation for anti-access and territorial denial, a common military term used to describe Russia’s land-based coastal defense system.
Earlier this year, the German tabloid Bild claimed that according to an anonymous government official, Stockholm is on standby if Putin uses the Amphibious Warfare ships to invade Gotland. According to the official, if Putin were to plan anything against the Baltic countries, it must first take Gotland.
War games
After determining Gotland’s strategic importance, the next question is whether the Russians could seize it in a land grab. As recently as 10 years ago, a prominent Swedish general speculated that Sweden could withstand an attack for only a week without outside help. Since then, Sweden has increased its military capacity, spent over $ 30 billion and restored compulsory military service.
However, the recent clashes with Russia have not been promising. Sweden could not distort the jet when Russia simulated an attack on Stockholm and searched without success for a suspected Russian submarine in the Baltic Sea. While Sweden has increased its military spending significantly in recent years, it still spends only $ 6 billion on defense, while Russia spends close to $ 62 billion.
Somewhat promising, however, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has published a hypothetical evaluation of all Russian land grabs of Gotland, and found that the balance of power is not as skewed as it may seem. The report states that in order to guarantee success, the Russians would need to maintain a ground troop ratio of 2: 1, something that can prove difficult given that their forces are spread across the country. While Russia may have enough numbers in Kaliningrad, it “has major transport problems”, which means that Sweden may be able to strengthen the island before Russian troops go to Gotland. To change the balance of power in its favor, the report says that Russia would need to transfer troops from elsewhere and would “suffer from a corresponding reduction in the element of surprise, given Sweden the opportunity to expand its defenses.”
Sweden has also forged very strong ties with NATO, despite refusing to join the alliance. In 1994, Sweden signed the NATO Partnership for Peace program and in 2016 signed host nation support agreements that would offer alliance forces access to Swedish territory in the event of a military emergency. It already seems likely that NATO would intervene in the face of a direct invasion and that the probability is further strengthened by the fact that Russian aggression has fueled discussions in Stockholm about whether Sweden should join the alliance.
A majority in Sweden’s Riksdag is in favor of membership, but the ruling center-left Social Democrats are particularly opposed. Regardless, last week Sweden’s Foreign Minister met with his Finnish counterpart NATO’s Secretary General in Brussels for a “dialogue” on their “deepened partnership”. This calculated display of solidarity may prove to be a silent deterrent against all potential Russian aggression, but Putin has maintained his exploits in public and threatened with a sharp response if Sweden were to join the alliance.
It is unclear how far the Kremlin is willing to go to protect its access to Crimea, keep former Soviet states in orbit, and fight any perceived or actual NATO expansion. Unlike EU countries such as Germany, which is dependent on Russia for natural gas, Sweden’s energy supply is not dependent on Russian pipelines. This, together with Sweden’s hope for NATO aid, signals that the country is prepared to defend itself militarily should the situation arise. However, the cost would be the largest destabilization of Europe since World War II.