Turkey’s problem is not Sweden. It’s the United States. – Foreign policy
On January 23, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashed out at Sweden, whose bid to join NATO has been blocked by Ankara, saying the country should not expect any goodwill from Turkey until it fails to “show respect for the religious beliefs of Muslims”. and the Turkish people,” allows the burning of the Koran and allows “terrorist organizations to run amok.” On January 21, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar canceled the planned visit of his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, on January 27. The visit had become “pointless” after “ugly acts” in Sweden, Akar said.
He was referring to events earlier in January, when left-wing activists from the Rojava Committee in Sweden hung a picture of Erdogan in front of the city hall in Stockholm’s capital. Then, on January 21, Swedish authorities gave permission to a far-right activist to hold a protest outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, where he burned a copy of the Koran. Meanwhile, on the same day, left-wing activists protested against Turkey and Sweden’s bid to join NATO and expressed their support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. The protesters, carrying PKK flags, unfurled a banner that read: “We are all PKK.”
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU and countries such as the US and Sweden. Nevertheless, Sweden has been a haven for the PKK and its cause has been supported by leading Swedish politicians. Before he became Sweden’s Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist, who left his post last October after national elections, participated in a “birthday celebration” of the PKK in 2011.
On January 23, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashed out at Sweden, whose bid to join NATO has been blocked by Ankara, saying the country should not expect any goodwill from Turkey until it fails to “show respect for the religious beliefs of Muslims”. and the Turkish people,” allows the burning of the Koran and allows “terrorist organizations to run amok.” On January 21, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar canceled the planned visit of his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, on January 27. The visit had become “pointless” after “ugly acts” in Sweden, Akar said.
He was referring to events earlier in January, when left-wing activists from the Rojava Committee in Sweden hung a picture of Erdogan in front of the city hall in Stockholm’s capital. Then, on January 21, Swedish authorities gave permission to a far-right activist to hold a protest outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, where he burned a copy of the Koran. Meanwhile, on the same day, left-wing activists protested against Turkey and Sweden’s bid to join NATO and expressed their support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. The protesters, carrying PKK flags, unfurled a banner that read: “We are all PKK.”
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU and countries such as the US and Sweden. Nevertheless, Sweden has been a haven for the PKK and its cause has been supported by leading Swedish politicians. Before he became Sweden’s Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist, who left his post last October after national elections, participated in a “birthday celebration” of the PKK in 2011.
Several other Swedish politicians, mostly but not only from the left, have similarly participated in public events organized by PKK sympathizers. The former Social Democratic government in Sweden offered political and financial support to PKK-linked Kurdish groups in northern Syria – the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
In order to join NATO, Sweden has committed to severing those ties and changing its laws to make PKK activities on its soil illegal. The new conservative Swedish government has really been keen to win Turkey’s trust. It has publicly distanced itself from the PYD and YPG. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson condemned the hanging of the Erdogan picture as an “act of sabotage” against Sweden’s NATO bid. He also said that the burning of the Koran was, although legal, “deeply disrespectful.”
Still, as Erdogan’s statement makes clear, no Turkish government will ask the Turkish parliament to ratify Sweden’s NATO membership as long as anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim sentiment is high in Sweden. While the Swedish government has lived up to its promises to Turkey i tripartite agreement which Sweden, Finland and Turkey signed at the NATO summit in Madrid last June, the Swedish public now needs to be convinced that meeting Turkey’s demands is not the same as capitulating to “fascism”, as leftists and liberals in Sweden protest, and to stem the rise of anti-Turkish public opinion.
This will not be easy, however, as other Western countries, in particular the United States, remain committed to the Kurdish militants with whom Sweden has severed ties. As Turkey sees it, the US’s continued support for the PYD and YPG undermines the argument – which the Swedish government needs to make – that by meeting Turkey’s demands, Sweden is joining other Western democracies in a united front against terrorism.
Turkey was bound to have problems with Sweden and its pro-Kurdish stance and singled out Sweden (not Finland, which Turkey has no problem with and would ratify if it continued the NATO process without Sweden) because of its long-standing commitment to Kurdish ambitions – but it is the US’s continued support for Kurds in Syria that is Turkey’s main concern.
The fact that Sweden and Finland are the first Western nations to say that the Kurdish groups that have created a self-governing territory in northern Syria are linked to the PKK and pose a security threat to Turkey represents a diplomatic win for Ankara. But that would never be enough for Turkey. The question is not what Sweden says or does, but what the US does or fails to do on the ground in Syria that is consequential for Turkey’s national security interests – and that will determine its position on the Nordic enlargement of NATO as the US government is. Press.
The US is arming and funding the PKK-linked Kurdish militants in Syria who have been fighting the Islamic State. Their success against the Islamic State at a time when Turkey was doing little to fight the terror group is one reason the US government trusts them. But what represents a national security asset for the US is something Turkey views as an existential threat. The establishment of a Kurdish state along its long border with Syria has alerted the security bureaucracy in Ankara to the risk that Turkey could lose control of its own Kurdish region. US support for the Kurdish state has undermined Turkey’s faith in the US, which has come to be seen by many Turks as a hostile power. It is partly in response to this perceived US hostility that Turkey has developed its ties with Russia as a defensive measure.
Turkish democracy has also suffered. In 2015, Erdogan canceled the peace agreement the Turkish government had reached with the Kurdish movement after two years of negotiations. Faced with the threat of a emboldened PKK, supported by the United States in Syria, Erdogan chose to embrace the hardline policies that the military had called for and align with far-right nationalists.
Washington considers it crucial to preserve the alliance with the Kurdish groups in Syria. This alliance gives the US military a territorial foothold in Syria, a forward base that could prove useful in a future conflict with Iran. For this reason, the US is unlikely to budge and accommodate Turkey.
The Biden administration can bet that Turkey will be affected by the sale of F-16 fighter jets that Turkey desperately needs to maintain its air force. Yet not only does the sale face fierce opposition in the US Congress, but its realization would – at best – save the US-Turkish relationship from collapse. First, getting to buy the soon-to-be-obsolete F-16 would not compensate for Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 fighter jet project after its botched purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system.
The Biden administration may also entertain the notion that it will be able to either pressure or entice Turkey to accept Sweden and Finland into NATO after the Turkish presidential election in May. It can be hoped that Erdogan, if re-elected, will relent because he will no longer have to appear strong against the US for electoral purposes or, if he loses, that a new Turkish president will be eager to restore the relationship with Washington and make US bid.
Nevertheless, this is an overly optimistic view. It is a mistake to underestimate Turkey’s determination to use this opportunity to neutralize what it sees as the main threat to its national security: the PKK and Kurdish groups with links to the PKK. It would also be a mistake not to recognize that Turkey’s stance reflects the long-term strategic interests of the Turkish state, which is a broad, impartial view unrelated to electoral concerns. Therefore, it will not be affected, one way or the other, by the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.
Alternatively, the US could choose to play against Turkey, by having the prospect of a changed US policy towards the Syrian Kurds with no intention of fulfilling such a promise. This worked in 1980, when the US managed to secure Turkey’s unconditional consent to Greece’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure (which it left in 1974). Then NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, US General Bernard Rogers, gave his word to the head of the Turkish military junta, General Ahmet Kenan Evren, that Turkish military affairs in the Aegean would be accommodated, a promise promptly ignored by the socialist government that came to power in Greece in 1981, which refused to comply with the agreement. Turkey will not repeat that mistake, Erdogan has assured voters.
Turkey will continue to veto Swedish accession (Finnish accession is only blocked for now because the application was made jointly) as long as its main concerns are not addressed — and pro-Kurdish left-wing and anti-Muslim right-wing activists in Sweden will continue to give Turkey excuses to do it. But Erdogan’s outrage over these incidents is a sideshow.
In order for Sweden to join NATO, quite simply, the US must stop funding and arming the PYD and YPG in Syria.
Unfortunately for Washington, US strategic interests in Northern Europe and the Middle East cannot be reconciled. Washington will have to decide what it cares about most: the survival of the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish state or a strengthened NATO with Sweden as a member. The Biden administration must recognize that it is America’s refusal to accommodate Turkey’s legitimate security interests that endangers NATO’s unity and strength.
But the Turkish government must recognize that the United States also faces a strategic threat and be prepared to help address it. For Washington to reconsider its support for the PYD and YPG, Turkey should demonstrate that it is willing to work with the United States to counter the Iranian threat.
Unfortunately, US policy towards Turkey is colored by personal antipathies towards its president, which has put such a compromise out of reach. Nevertheless, the hard strategic interests of the US and Turkey coincide to a much greater extent than appearances suggest. Turkey must be fully embraced as a Western ally if NATO is to stand strong and united from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.