A comprehensive “Helsinki 21” agreement is needed to resolve the war in Ukraine
Comment
Ukraine is on the right Russia in danger. The Ukrainian forces have done heroically well in resisting the attack. However, now is the time to think about which special arrangements will produce lasting peace.
It is possible to win a war and lose a war – a pyrrhic victory where the losses necessary to win are devastating. How many more Ukrainians will suffer, be injured, die or leave their country permanently?
It is possible to win a war but lose the peace. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War II, helped set the stage for even more destructive conflicts.
It is probably impossible to win this immediate war completely. Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons limits Ukraine’s ability to decisively enter Russian territory.
Putin has made a murderous mistake, but he won’t be in power forever. Even he may now be looking for a way out that will allow him to say that Russia’s strategic interests have been taken into account. What arrangements could end a war that leaves his successors in power—and Russians in general—feeling reconciled? The Russian people should feel safe, respected and accepted back into the family of nations instead of feeling threatened, complained about or marginalized by the West.
A stable and lasting peace would encourage Russia to re-engage with the democratic world and eventually fully democratize itself, rather than feeling that it must increasingly trade arms and victory with internally oppressive and externally aggressive powers such as China and Iran.
Several decades after World War II Helsinki Agreement eventually helped resolve some of the remaining tensions. The parties to the agreement were NATO countries and European countries in general, as well as the Soviet Union. Several decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we need Helsinki 21 – a broad 21st century solution involving the West, Russia and its former partners in the Soviet Union. Negotiations that are much broader could actually facilitate the resolution of bilateral issues between Ukraine and Russia.
The elements of Helsinki 21 are largely derived from the legally binding agreements already concluded by the parties. In the Basel Accords, Russia committed to observe its 1991 borders with Ukraine. Helsinki 21 could bind Russia to return to these borders, including the sovereignty of Crimea.
But what would Russia get in return?
Let’s look at what Russia has asked for in the past, including the process leading up to the attack, and see what can reasonably be accommodated. We can build on what the parties have previously agreed upon.
First, Russia can be sure that the Russian and pro-Russian minorities in the peripheral regions of the former Soviet Union will be respected. They are national minorities, but there is good precedent for treaties and standards protecting national minorities. Respect for the non-Soviet “Russian world” can be a legitimate part of convincing Russian leaders and people that their cultural past is respected and its future guaranteed.
Second, Russia can be convinced that NATO does not threaten it. There are plenty of precedents for treaties limiting nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. It can be agreed that Ukraine and other states can join the EU if they wish, but not formally join NATO.
Third, Russia can be given assurances about its ability to deploy and use its Black Sea fleet, including in Ukrainian ports, as part of an overall solution that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity. There are already precedents in this regard.
Helsinki 21 would not be forced into Ukraine by other powers. It would be framed so that Ukraine and other former Soviet members would see their own overall long-term security and prosperity enhanced, rather than sold out to appease a hostile Russia. In the long term, the goal is to create a situation where Russia has lost its reason or excuse to be revanchist or expansionist.
If the basic principles of Helsinki 21 were agreed upon and a strict deadline set for the conclusion of a detailed agreement, there could be interim arrangements. They could suspend active hostilities and limit economic sanctions.
Helsinki 21 would also calm many flashpoint situations in Russia’s peripheral regions. There are a number of “former” regions in independent countries around Russia that have tried to secede and become independent allies of Russia or simply join it. Once minority rights are guaranteed, these regions would have a solid foundation to reintegrate into counties like Moldova and Georgia and Ukraine.
Military resistance to aggression is needed, but so is creative political and diplomatic thinking and initiative. The democratic world must win both war and peace.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.