Aydın Selcen wrote: Istanbul offensive operation Rethinking Syria policy
Inevitably, one of the imported idioms became “litmus test.” The terrorist act that took place on Istiklal Street is truly a litmus test for both Syria and the Kurdish Question. Perhaps the awareness of the obligatory connection of these two more important events of the Six Table alliance. Doomsday, Soylu’s efforts to cover up after the terrorist attack in question are aimed at the content inside and even within the content of which he is a part, as well as the expressions used by Kılıçdaroğlu during his official and on-site visit to Kilis, in terms of telling the Kurdish voters what kind of Turkey design the Six Tables is. Consciousness and imagination: I have been going around and repeating these recently.
Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, it’s a holiday in Kilis, where he talks about his own proposals by questioning himself in Syria policy. It opens its own backbone “immediately” embassy in Damascus. In a way, it is the approach of “We consume iron, we want to come back”, from where there are similar trees in the exterior. As an example, Trump’s departure of the two Koreas with Kim was a step in concrete direction. No US president had dared to do that before. The ice breaks, it’s strong enough out of nothing. But since Trump did not open even the files that were put in front of him, and he did not have any consciousness and vision to follow up, nothing changed because the mind was only on the show.
I think the opening of our embassy in Damascus and establishing direct communication with Esat are positive suggestions. Again, the “modalities” of this, in the mouth of an externalist, are also important. If the first thing to do is to create an embassy in Damascus, it is clear that the main job of the ambassador to be appointed there will be to invite the foreign affairs office every week to listen to information about the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces in Syria, to write complaints and to give instructions to the center where he will not be contacted. Although we will start with the questions of what should be done or what should be done before making the embassy work again in Damascus, it is highly likely that our qualified bureaucracy will encounter the usual “no way” but to be faced with laying it down.
When it comes to the Syria policy, only the permissions and what needs to be done to secure the return of the Syrians sent to the list they came from, need to be taken. However, Syria policy also means the future of the Kurds across the border and Turkey rethinking its own Kurdish Question because of the Kurds across the border. If we try to motto, we can define the cross-border military operation for national security protections and protection of national interests as the displacement of the cross-border guards first by the operation. In the same context, we can define it as the inclusion of Kurds, one-quarter of our global population, who are citizens of our common republic, and one-fourth of our population, finally, into the discourse of “cognates and relatives”.
When “modalities” are mentioned, for each of the four TAF-controlled regions (Idlip, Afrin/Olive Branch, Bab/Euphrates Shield, Tel Abyad-Rasulayn/Peace Spring), in addition to Damascus, which local, regional, global interlocutors, what and through whom. and for what purpose it will be spoken. The real work starts from the top, that is, from the presidency in the current regime, by organizing a holistic, sheltered, rational, realistic and time-bound program. Contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MIT and the General Staff are received. It is determined who will sit at the helm of the negotiations and who or which institution will be the coordinating authority. Chapters are thrown out in simultaneous, progressive, creative and assertive formats. Assuming the task of supporting Syrian immigrants and border crossings at home anyway.
While all this is being done, it is necessary to get out of the consciousness that political orders (“what to do, where to want to reach”) come before merit, that the appointed, including the security bureaucracy, must move towards the will of the people, which is exposed by the elected. Another meaning of this is that the common candidate has foreign policy and national security advisers who will work closest to the election campaign rule, these people know that they will be placed in decision-making positions when the election is won, immediately after the election, the MIT and the General Staff and state vice-presidents, including the chief advisors to the presidency, and the administration. is the burden of the team.
While the new Syria policy needs to be holistic, the questions that need to be answered and the problems that need to be done are plural. If we list the first ones that come to mind: the fate of the Arab mass in Idlib, which is piling up in a shape reminiscent of Gaza and will not be able to come to terms with Assad in any way, and the jihadist control in the HTS cells there. The local Kurdish population displaced in Afrin, for the time being, is under the impression that control is being transferred from Ankara-backed jihadists to HTS, either by force or by compromise. Annotations with the SDG and the USA as a compilation. The point of view of Russia and Iran’s guiding or guiding attitudes in the channel spread with Damascus. How the reconstruction of Syria can be carried out and whether it can be carried out with the participation of players such as the UN and the EU, even if Assad does not consent to the slightest change in the BAAS order.
However, we look at the first question that needs to be answered, like the “elephant standing in the middle of the room”: How long will the TAF stay in Syria? What if, what structures will it be drawn from? Is it possible to make a balance sheet and, if any, according to the returns, the decision of the TAF to go back will give political instructions? Will the possibility of total imagination of the TAF take place in the scenarios studied? What is the cost of the TAF being in Syria? Some constraints of constraints only have to be a single build? Will Turkey take over the new Syria policy, with its organic identity and forms compatible with its formation, with the international organization and coherences it is a member, manager, candidate for, and in intense and regular communication with its enemies? Are politically and militarily weak Damascus and weak Baghdad compatible with Ankara’s national interests?
The countdown to the election continues, the time is running out fast. If our favorite team is going to play for the championship, it’s time to learn who the coach will be and what names we expect, with which players he will form the squad and how we want to play. Maybe what I wrote here about Syria policy, Answer İsmail Saymaz’s questionsby Selahattin Demirtaş “Everyone knows that the AKP cannot be successful in the elections without Kurdish votes. Therefore, it is normal for him to make some moves. The hanging abnormal is the assets of those who do not have the courage to make any moves.” It also completes his plea.
Finally, one should probably have in mind the fact that the policies to be formed in the form of a “wish list” do not automatically constitute an ultimate receptive strategy when put together. It is another fact that people will have to keep the discussions or reconciliation in their minds, with the motto “to raise the flag and never take a step back”, even though they will not be able to rely on the legitimate interlocutor in any way against their own expectations. The face of the country is organic residence taken to the West and its history is evident, as well as the purchases and tests of diplomacy in settlements with difficult neighbors living together, not cacophonic, but symphonic style. Syria is more than just Damascus and Assad.