Communist leaders were afraid of Gorbachev in Slovakia – Domestic – News
In the spring of 1987, Gorbachev visited Prague and Bratislava already with a reputation as a reformer, having ruled the Kremlin for two years. What was the atmosphere like?
Gorbachev’s visit raised huge positive expectations in the overwhelming financial society. He received a reception comparable in post-war history only to the visit of the first cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin in 1961. In Prague and Bratislava, Gorbachev was greeted by crowds comparable to those after November 17, 1989. I remember being with my six-year-old son at shoulder part of the crowd in Bratislava from the current presidential palace to the lower part of the SNP square. I remember the slogan from Prague: “It’s bad luck, it’s bad luck that Gorbachev is not Czech”. At the same time, however, Gorbachev’s policy caused concern among conservative forces, which were tied to the document Crisis development in the party and society after XIII. KSČ congress.
is there evidence of this?
As an example, I will give the texts of strict secret messages from the XII. ZNB reports that are in the Slovak National Archives. In information no. 4 of the XII ZNB report of March 27, 1987 states: “In connection with the upcoming visit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, increased activity has been noted by our citizens, who expect that this will bring about a turnaround in our policy and that aspects of the reconstruction of the Soviet Union will move more. company in our conditions.” In information no. 5 of April 3, 1987, finally, that the arrival of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is “continuing to be the center of interest of our citizens in all areas of social life.”
During the visit, Gorbachev’s split in values became apparent. He, because of the great interest of the USSR, but also because of the prestige of the empire,…, refused to admit the political error of the CPSU and the guilt of the USSR for the invasion and its consequences for Czechoslovak society.
Peter Weiss
It is formulated in the expectation of the citizens that “after the visit there will be an exchange of several officials, among others the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic for ideology and foreign relations” (that is, the hated Vasil Biľak), that the visit “will contribute to a more intensive promotion of the Soviet experience in the Czechoslovakia, as deep and the all-round democratization, which is talked about so much at the meetings, has not yet found a proper breeding ground here,” that “a possible process of democratization in our country could lead to a revision of the Dubček period, and therefore the current party and state leadership, crystallized in 1968/1969, has allegedly concerns about further developments.”
Gorbachev came to Slovakia in Bratislava. Therefore, do the archival documents specifically mention the situation in the capital of Slovakia?
In Information no. 6 talks about “the continuing interest in this visit on the part of ordinary residents of Bratislava, as well as some right-wing persons. They express the expectation that with the realized visit of the highest party representative of the USSR, conditions in the Czechoslovakia have changed according to the model of the Soviet Union.” In addition to recording criticism from various environments that the mass media did not publish the specific date of the visit, which prompted citizens to think that the welcome to have the date of the visit only selected persons will participate who “provide a guarantee that they will not disturb the welcoming ceremony and will not have provocative speeches at the party”, this information also states that the dissident Miroslav Kusý, in terms of the participation of persons, compared the welcoming of the general secretary of the KSSZ Central Committee with the May manifestation “with that difference. , that on May 1, workers are said to be forced to attend the demonstration, but on Gen. secret. Please add the ČV KSSZ voluntarily.”
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Before the arrival of Gorbachev, was the leadership of the KSS also afraid of an active manifestation of resistance by a part of the citizens against the political situation?
About the real concerns of the leadership of the KSS, information from the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior addressed to the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KSS, Jozef Lenárt, dated April 6, 1987, in which it is detailed how on April 1, 1987, at 02:30, Rastislav Sarnovský, a student of the 4th year of the Gymnasium on Metodova Street, was detained. who was caught writing the following signs in various places in Bratislava: “Dubček, call me”, “We are waiting for Gorbachev”, “Vasiľ has already arrived” (alluding to the fact that Biľak was originally a tailor by profession), “Welcome Mikhail”.
The information further states: “In addition, it was discovered that he is named together with his classmates Igor Hanuliak, Ľubica Zlochová and Dömeová, from 30.3. to 1.4. they distributed leaflets printed by a children’s printer in Bratislava with the following text: “You want will you also contribute to speeding up the implementation of democratization ideas from Moscow into practice? Come with us on a small unofficial walk through the city, where you will use banners to express your support for Comrade Gorbachev’s reform policies. Be sure to come, in these days the voice of the people is important.’ A total of 14 leaflets with the new wording were found in Bratislava and another 157 pieces were seized in Dömeova Street.” The information can also be read: “On April 3, 1987 in Bratislava, opposite the PKO and on the supporting castle wall on Židovská street, inscriptions were found in the words ‘We want Gorbachev’ and ‘Vivat Gorbachev’. Since the inscriptions were in inappropriate places, they were removed.”
Does it sound paradoxical that ordinary citizens are taking advantage of Gorbachev and, on the contrary, Slovak communist leaders would probably prefer not to see him in Bratislava?
It would be a simplistic statement simply about this contradiction only as the political schizophrenia of the leadership of the KSS in its approach to Gorbachev and his policy of glasnost and perestroika, even though schizophrenia was clearly there. On the one hand, the habit of following the leadership of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic in everything it does is manifested in the KSČ for decades. This iron habit was interrupted only in 1968. After the loss of the temporary sovereignty of the Communist Party of Ukraine due to the violent suppression of the reform movement by the troops of the Warsaw Pact, the occupation of fifteen years brought a re-consolidation of this habit.
After all, the normalization set was a way of its creation and consolidation of its power, it is almost totally independent of the leadership of the CPSU, not to mention the dependence that was given by the de facto geopolitical position of the Czechoslovakia as a satellite state of the USSR, a great power that formed one pole of a divided world in a state of cold war . two social systems. On the other hand, Gorbachev started doing things that gradually broke the world of neo-Stalinist dogmas and political practice, into which the members of the leadership of the Communist Party, or The KSS was voluntarily or less voluntarily returned after 1969 under the slogan of overcoming the crisis and not allowing a new one, and whose form and irreversibility was, so to speak, sanctified by the document Lessons from crisis development in the party and society.
Gorbachev’s policy and its style ideologically and intellectually, materially and psychologically undermined everything on which the policy of the normalization leadership was built, including its ideological basis – the document “The Lesson”. And this despite the fact that he was only trying to reform the system he inherited. After all, Gorbachev himself understood that the only way to promote socialist-oriented reforms was to “create a party striving for democratic socialism”, that is, social democracy, only in 1990.
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Is it possible to judge with hindsight why Gorbachev did not condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968?
During the visit, Gorbachev’s split in values became apparent. Because of the great power interests of the USSR, but also because of the prestige of the empire, which, after all, has nothing to justify to the victims for its imperial acts, as well as the promise he made to the representative of the normalization leadership of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic, he refused to admit the political error of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the guilt of the USSR for the invasion and its consequences for Czechoslovakia. company. And in particular, at least a hint to show their sympathy for the revival process of 1968. The team actually supported the normalization leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia and actually delegitimized Dubček and the personalities of the Prague Spring of 1968 and their efforts for a political return and active support of Czechoslovak reconstruction.
In order to understand Gorbachev’s thinking, I will quote a passage from his interview with a classmate from Moscow university studies, Zdenek Mlynár, from the book Reformátori nebáva šeráčí. Mlynář reproachfully remarked: “When you came to Prague in the spring of 1987, the whole nation expected you to say at least something later in Germany.” Life will punish those who come late. That in some way you will show your sympathy for the Prague Spring, which you actually had. I even dare to say that in Czechoslovakia at that time a large part of the society placed higher hopes in your policy than in any other socialist country at that time.
When Gorbachev replied that he was surprised by the slogans on the streets calling for him “to stay there for at least a year” and that it “made a huge impression on him”, Mlynár recalled: “Well, you see, and you told these people that they should be proud for what they have achieved in twenty years, that 1968 was a mess, but the ‘hard time’ is behind us, and that ‘you were with us’ in that hard time! Yes, they were, even with their tanks! How could you follow this way – that’s what I thought at the time, and I still don’t understand to this day, no matter how much pressure the conservatives in the Soviet Politburo put in at that time.” many did. Let’s start thinking together now and move on.
I invited them, so to speak, to rebuild. And don’t forget, Zdeněk, that already in March 1985 I unequivocally renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and stood up for the principles of equality, independence, non-interference and for the full responsibility of the leadership of each Commonwealth state for the conditions in its own country.” Mlynár’s reply was harsh: “Miša, I I don’t doubt your good intentions, but your words had the opposite effect on people, you disappointed terribly, your words sounded like a blessing of the past. And I challenge people to take the path of reconstruction – but under the leadership of proven ‘normalizers’, quite obvious burials of the Brezhnev era, which you condemned at home as an era of stagnation… which you did not know that without condemning the intervention, without the political rehabilitation of the Prague Spring, there was no is it possible to do your own reconstruction policy in Czechoslovakia?”
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Gorbachev replied: “No, what can I say to you? That was the opinion of the Politburo at the time. It was approved, this position was specially discussed. At that time, the Prague leadership demanded that I directly support the events of the end of 1968. I refused that. However, you are right when you talk about the ambiguity of my statement… at that time I could not take such steps, neither in domestic nor in foreign policy, as I did later. Gorbachev argued that he had refused Husák’s repeated requests to “directly take over the guarantee of the Cadre Questions” on the grounds that “they should decide for themselves in such a way as to facilitate the continuation of the changes.”
He repeatedly emphasized that “we have never encouraged internal development processes, that would be a return to old practices.” To Mlynár’s remark, “it is right that you did not give orders, but at the same time you had a terrible legacy from Brezhnev in front of you at the time, and therefore an obligation to do something about it”, Gorbachev responded: “We could not give orders. But “perestroika” worked, and as it turned out, it was much stronger than the “hand of Moscow”. And we passed the real test – we did not allow interference. I think that we created a unique precedent, the importance of which has not yet been appreciated on its merits.” However, Gorbachev was vague in his interview with Mlynár.
Why?
In the record of his negotiations with the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Károly Grósz, on March 23, 1989, in Moscow, there is also this Gorbachev assessment of the events of 1968: “The Soviet leadership has recently analyzed the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and continues to maintain the opinion that, what happened there was a counter-revolution with all the peculiar features of such an event. Periods were necessary in Czechoslovak events, but Dubček’s regime was not sufficiently accessible to openly counter-revolutionary forces to gain ground through them.” His closest collaborator, Alexandr Jakovlev, actually the second face of perestroika, declared to foreign journalists shortly before November 1989: “My sincere belief is that in August 1968, anti-socialist forces were preparing a civil war.”