Chinese influence in Albania – CEPA
This report is part of #CCPinCEE, a series of reports published by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) that analyzes Chinese influence efforts and operations in Central and Eastern European countries.
The aims and objectives of the malignant impact of PKK
China seeks closer relations with Albania as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s mega-project to expand the reach of Beijing’s influence overseas, making it a central actor in the Western Balkans and eventually across Europe. For this purpose, Beijing follows a long-term strategy in Albania that goes through four overlapping phases.
In the first phase, the Chinese Communist Party is trying to consolidate an expanding presence in the domestic economy by promoting Chinese exports and investment. The goal here is to make Albania’s economy increasingly dependent on China, especially in sensitive industries, eventually allowing Beijing to influence Albanian politics. In the second phase, Chinese state actors focus on building the necessary foundations to allow China to exert political influence over Albanian political and business leaders, making China an important political actor in the country. Although the Chinese approach to Albania was initially focused on the economy, Beijing’s efforts to move to a new phase of engagement with Tirana have revealed the political dimension of China’s business model and its objective to make Albanian policies in line with Beijing’s interests. The third phase of China’s strategy is the broad reach of Albanian society, from the bottom up and from the top down. The objective of this phase is to promote a positive image of China in Albanian communities, to promote Beijing’s political and economic model and, above all, to shape local narratives about Tirana-Beijing relations. The fourth and final phase focuses on efforts by the Chinese authorities to gain a higher public and media profile, introduce new angles and coverage content, and influence local perceptions to a much greater extent.
China has entered Albania’s economy and politics through large investments in air transport, energy, agriculture and mining, creating new avenues for leverage. Beijing’s economic influence in Albania derives from lending, investment and trade, including collaborations with key economic players and networks. These relationships in turn create dependencies through which China gains systemic influence. According to the Bank of Albania, Chinese FDI accounts for 2.27% of all FDI in Albania, compared to Serbia, where Chinese FDI is 15.7%, and North Macedonia, with 3.37%. Also, in 2020, China became Albania’s third largest importer. It exported $47.5 million and imported $13.1 million worth of goods and services from Albania in November 2021, for a trade surplus of $34.4 million. according to the statistics agency of Albania.
Beijing also pursues a granular cultural strategy through language-focused courses at the University of Tirana’s Confucius Institute and a planned Chinese cultural center in the Albanian capital. The center will have a much wider offer of activities and will focus on cultural interaction, making it an excellent tool for the Chinese authorities to establish links with cultural and civil society groups. China also organizes study tours, academic exchanges and cultural events to cultivate relationships with particular individuals and institutions.
China has gradually created a framework for media interaction and cooperation to spread Beijing’s narratives through traditional and social media. In 2019, the Chinese and Albanian state radio and television companies reached an agreement that allowed Albanian public television to broadcast some Chinese programs for free. More informal cooperation occurs through Chinese-funded trips, training, exchange programs and donations for Albanian media professionals.
As part of Beijing’s multi-layered approach to Albania, Chinese state actors are also expanding their formal and informal cooperation with municipalities across the country, mainly through a twinning project. Tirana and Beijing have been “twinned” since 2016, with five other cities in Albania developing such links. Under this policy, Beijing uses sister city connections and local authorities to influence the central government.
Sources: The World Factbook 2022, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2020), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/; World Bank, World Bank Group, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/home; “Friendship Groups”, Parliament of Albania, received on June 27, 2022, https://parlament.al/Strukture?kategori=1002&strukture=1041
Achievement of PKK tactics
While Albania’s embrace of Chinese investment has made China Albania’s third largest trading partner, giving Beijing leverage over the Albanian market and control over resources that provide a competitive advantage, Albania has resisted becoming China’s second economic hub. in the region. The Albanian government excluded China from its investment plans in the Port of Durrës as well as from its 5G network. In fact, China’s efforts to further its economic influence in Albania have hit various political obstacles because Albania is anchored in traditional Western institutions and alliances.
While cultural diplomacy once played second fiddle to economic diplomacy, it has become one of China’s most powerful tools. This change has yielded significant results; Interest in the history and culture of China, especially in the Chinese language, has increased among young Albanians who are learning Chinese at the Confucius Institute.
China’s media policy – to increase coverage of China-related news and produce China-friendly content – is succeeding and has won over many young Albanians. A 2020 study counted more than 1,000 China-related articles published in the country over five years. Nearly half, 47%, portrayed China in a positive light, 38% were more negative and 15% were considered neutral. This increase in China-related content is largely due to Beijing’s strategy to cooperate with local analysts and columnists. So is the shift in focus: Articles evaluating China’s political and economic model and its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic have replaced articles on China’s oppression of Uyghur Muslims, a sensitive issue for a Muslim-majority country like Albania. When China invests in local media and analysts, neutral or negative reports disappear.
A series of regular public opinion polls suggest that China’s investments in image-building have paid off handsomely. From 2019 to 2020, the share of respondents to the Albanian Security Barometer national survey who said China had a positive impact on Albania’s security more than doubled, from 23.5% to 54.9%. In 2022, with the question slightly changed, 76.6% said they did not think China represented a threat to Albania’s security, compared to 19% who said they did.
Audience and target populations
Attempts by Chinese authorities to influence Albania’s political and business elite to further Beijing’s foreign policy objectives follow a common and predictable pattern. China’s soft power efforts are directed primarily at key leaders in business, politics, government, academia, the media, and non-governmental organizations. The most vulnerable to China’s narratives are the oldest Albanian intellectuals, who had many contacts with Beijing during the Mao-Hoxha years. The memories and heritage of this period predispose this group to welcome China’s presence in Albania and to help create an older pro-China generation. Although this group does not influence political decisions, its influence in specific parts of Albanian society, including academia, gives it the power to advance Tirana-Beijing cooperation. The education and training of post-1999 Albanian leaders in Western institutions makes them less vulnerable to Chinese manipulation, although this may change.
Some well-known politicians in Albania have also insulted the West and addressed China. Specifically, President Ilir Meta and former Prime Minister Sali Berisha have carried out political, diplomatic and personal attacks on the American ambassador in Tirana. Both men have influence over a wide base of supporters. Local Albanian figures who see their political interests in an alliance with Beijing rather than the West can function as local mouthpieces for Chinese interests.
Chinese authorities have also worked to identify citizens who would be most vulnerable to Chinese Communist Party narratives circulating in the Albanian media. In particular, they seek those who have been lost in the midst of uneven economic development and modernization, are disillusioned with local politics, or are frustrated with the mixed results of integration with the West. Overall, however, much of the public doesn’t seem particularly susceptible, even if polls register some success for China’s slow-and-steady influence operations.
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Conclusion
Overall, there is no doubt that China’s structured strategy in the context of the 16/17+1 initiative has played a central role in building closer contacts between Tirana and Beijing. It has made progress among specific social groups in Albania, offering alternative versions of political, economic and geopolitical realities. However, China still sells better in other countries in the region, such as Serbia and North Macedonia, than in Albania. Albania remains anchored in its traditional pro-Western orientation, trying to avoid any kind of political penetration that could lead to excessive support for Beijing.
By: Edward Lucas
The Chinese Communist Party has an opportunistic approach to Central and Eastern Europe. But success has been limited.
August 2, 2022
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