“A historic change”: how Sweden and Finland went their separate ways to NATO | NATO
IIn the words of Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, Sweden and Finland submitted their historic NATO membership applications this week “hand in hand”. But they have not traveled the same way to the Alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.
Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine – ostensibly intended, at least in part, to prevent NATO expansion – has ceased to do the opposite, as the Nordic neighbors have abandoned decades of military alliance in a seismic shift in Europe’s security arrangements.
Each had very different grounds for staying out of the alliance until now, their neutrality based on different geographies, history and national identities. Both made the same decision this week, but what went into it was not the same.
Finland’s neutrality, experts say, was just working, the only possible way to deal with the fact that the country shares an 830 km (1,340 km) border with Russia, gained independence from Moscow only in 1917 and twice repelled all the red. The army threw at it during World War II.
“Finland’s security policy has always been completely pragmatic; we have only chosen what is best for us, without any real ideological considerations, says Minna Ålander, expert on northern Europe at the German Institute for International and Security Issues in Berlin.
She said the approach was based on “good relations with Russia and maintaining a high level of security. Well, since February, the first one is no longer valid.”
For Finland, the membership talks were about security: Russia had become an unreliable and brutal neighbor, and only NATO’s collective defense would suffice.
It was a big step. These bitter Finnish-Soviet conflicts – especially the 1939-40 Winter War, in which a Finnish army was more than three to one and incurred five times as many casualties as it incurred – are a central part of modern Finland’s history and remain a source of lasting national pride.
But Finland was eventually forced to relinquish 10% of its territory and in 1948 signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. “We had to accept that it was the greatest regional power,” said Henrik Meinander, a historian at the University of Helsinki. “But we were proud that we had avoided occupation. It was a very functional approach; we understood that the West would not defend itself. And it continued after we joined the EU. But we have always been prepared for things would get worse. ”
In fact, experts point out that if neutrality – which after EU membership in 1995 succeeded in military freedom of alliance – has been a fundamental part of Finland’s foreign and security policy for 73 years, things are a little less clear in practice.
“A lot of conscious work has been going on since the 1990s to make this moment possible,” said Ålander. The Finnish military, with a combat force of 280,000 troops and a total of 900,000 reservists, has a high level of military interoperability with the alliance, and a so-called “NATO alternative” to enable rapid accession when the time comes.
As early as 1992, while negotiating to join the EU, Helsinki bought 64 US-made combat bombers Hornet aircraft, a clear indication of the direction it was heading, Meinander said. But “politically, culturally, symbolically – this [Nato application] is still a big move, he says.
Finnish politicians speak of a “moment of national awakening”. Even in January, when Russian troops gathered at Ukraine’s border, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said it was “very unlikely” that Finland would join NATO during her tenure. But when Parliament voted on the issue this week, only eight of its 200 MEPs protested.
A dramatic change in public opinion has led the way. Last year, a survey showed support for NATO membership in Finland at 34%. Last week it was 76%. – So yes, I think we can say that it is seismic, said Ålander. “Logically, yes; something we have prepared for, and worked towards the possibility of, absolutely. But I do not think anyone will tell you that for Finland this is not a historic change. “
The change in Sweden is just as monumental, says Gunilla Herolf, senior associate research fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute. “We have maintained a doctrine for 200 years,” she said. “It’s a big thing. It means something to people. It becomes an identity issue.”
Ask Swedes about three things that define their country, she said, and many may answer “hunt moose, eat fermented herring – and freedom of alliance”. With Finland as a buffer against Russia, Sweden, which has not fought any wars and has not joined any alliances since 1812, was able to shape its neutrality along more idealistic, ideological lines.
“We were protected behind Finland, which, unlike us, never felt safe,” said Herolf. “We had the luxury of being able to say what we liked.” So during the last two centuries, but especially since 1945, Sweden created an enviable space for itself: peace, nuclear disarmament, international mediation, support for newly started democracies around the world.
It became part of the national self-image – and especially of the identity of Sweden’s powerful Social Democrats, who won every election for 100 years. Many on the left still feel that NATO’s nuclear deterrence will increase tensions, make the country less secure and cost it its prominent role in global disarmament.
Herolf stated that even Sweden “has not always acted as a neutral or non-aligned country should”. It sent military aid to Finland during the Winter War and during the Cold War it had secret security contacts with Britain and the United States – to the point that they built runways much longer than its plane needed, to receive American jet planes.
She does not buy the Nordic arguments that Finns are by nature more pragmatic than supposedly idealistic Swedes. “I am not sure that Sweden would have acted differently from Finland if it had been in Finland’s geographical location,” said Herolf.
But it was not, so it cut its military in the 1990s and ended conscription, before taking it back and increasing defense spending again from 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. Still, many in Sweden – where about 55% now support NATO membership – at least feel that the decision has been hasty.
Many also regret that, albeit for understandable reasons, it was Finland – Swedish territory for a full 600 years – that led the dance. “Finland’s quick decision, like the Swedish debate, hijacked,” Ålander said. “Sweden cannot be the only Nordic country outside NATO.” The exposure, Herolf added, would have been too great.
Hence, finally, the “hand-in-hand” method: a recognition of the neighbors’ strong mutual security dependence and cooperation in spite of these different national narratives. In any case, Finland is “very grateful that Sweden, despite the ideological obstacles, has taken this step”, said Meinander.
None of the countries expects major consequences. Russia has stopped exporting electricity to Finland and is about to do the same with gas, but both account for less than 10% of the total supply and have been replaced. Beyond that, Ålander said, it would be “disinformation, cyber attacks, maybe some airspace violations. We are ready for that.”
When it finally came to that, she said, Russia – despite its many previous threats – essentially acknowledged what everyone already knew: Finland and Sweden were a lost cause for Moscow the moment they joined the EU. “Many people were really surprised at how calmly Russia has taken it,” she said. NATO accession feels like a very big thing in Finland and Sweden; maybe it should not.