Finland and Sweden apply to join NATO: What is the next step?
It has forced several European countries to fundamentally re-evaluate their threat environment and defense needs. An early example of this was in Germany, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated the need for an epoch-making change, a Time consuming, in the country’s security policy. This week has something that is considered even more unthinkable before the invasion of Ukraine with Finland and Sweden at the same time applying for membership in NATO. The fact that the two long-standing neutral Nordic countries are trying to join the transatlantic alliance shows how deeply Russia’s aggression is changing Europe’s security landscape. Below, GMF experts from Ankara, Brussels and Washington give their views on what Finland’s and Sweden’s application to join NATO will mean for transatlantic security and alliance dynamics.
Erdoğan will not go empty-handed
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklıdirector of GMF’s Ankara office
Sweden’s and Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership is welcomed with enthusiasm across the Atlantic, but Turkey could ruin the party.
In an unexpected move, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that he does not favor the two countries ‘membership of NATO on the grounds that they are havens for terrorist organizations targeting Turkey, specifically the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. (PKK) and its offshoots. Both Sweden and Finland reject this claim but remain open to discussions with Turkey on the subject.
It would be a mistake to dismiss Erdoğan’s stance as motivated solely by domestic policy considerations or to expect him to return empty-handed. Turkey has real concerns and is likely to delay the forthcoming NATO enlargement unless these concerns are addressed by Sweden and Finland.
Erdoğan plays a two-tier game here. At the international level, he aims to further weaken the PKK. In Turkey’s view, separatist terrorism is the single most important security threat and if others agree it is not relevant to its calculation. Humiliating the PKK has been, and remains, a priority for every government in Turkey since the 1980s.
At the domestic level, he aims to present himself as a strong leader who can protect Turkey’s interests internationally in a way that his predecessor could not. According to Turkish Perceptions of the European Union 2021 Survey implemented by the German Marshall Fund in the United States, 67.9 percent of Turkish respondents believe that European countries want to divide and disintegrate Turkey, just as they did with the Ottoman Empire before. In addition, 70.1 percent believe that European countries have contributed to strengthening separationist organizations such as the PKK in Turkey. As such, Erdoğan’s criticism of Sweden and Finland will easily resonate with the Turkish people.
It would also be a mistake for Ankara to underestimate the scale of the decision to delay a historic NATO enlargement and the negative reaction it would face from any NATO ally at a time when Turkey is trying to bridge the gap between itself and its western region. allies.
Turkish, Swedish and Finnish diplomats, with the support of other allies, can and should find a common ground to address concerns about Sweden’s and Finland’s attitude towards the PKK and ensure that NATO enlargement can continue without delay. Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO is so important, including for Turkey, that this problem will probably be solved through dialogue and empathy. But it does not go away on its own.
A strategic plus – with some political twists
Ian Lesser, Deputy CEO and CEO of GMF’s Brussels office
The prospect of NATO membership for Finland and Sweden is an operational blessing for the Alliance. Both countries add significant military assets and expertise. Their membership would create much-needed strategic depth, essential for the defense of the Baltic states and aviation and shipping in the region. As long-term NATO partners, interoperability will not be an issue. Stockholm and Helsinki, by virtue of their history and geography, have always been well placed as centers for intelligence and analysis of Russia. One of the many lessons learned from the Ukraine War so far has been that formal security guarantees play a role. Having Finland and Sweden “in” removes all uncertainty about their place in Europe’s collective defense.
Even in broader strategic terms, the benefits of this new enlargement are obvious. The alliance gets a much longer border with Russia. However, in relation to the increased ability to defend alliance interests in the air, sea and cyber domains, including in the north, net exposure should not be a problem. And transatlantic partners were already interested in Finland’s territorial defense.
After some initial outrage, the reaction from Moscow has been relatively subdued by Russian standards. Ironically, there has been more follow-up criticism from Turkey. Ankara’s concerns have little to do with the alliance strategy itself. They are driven by bilateral disagreements with Finland and Sweden over their generally critical views on Turkey’s views on Kurdish rights, the rule of law, media freedom and regional policy (and a specific concern about alleged tolerance of Kurdistan Workers’ Party activities). These issues are, of course, on Turkey’s bilateral agenda with other alliance members. But the ratification of membership for Finland and Sweden has given the country an opportunity to present its views in a very visible way, in the light of a critical presidential election next year. The Turkish challenge to a cherished – but unevenly observed – tradition of not importing bilateral issues into NATO decisions will be of deep concern to its allies. It is a political dispute that also counteracts Turkey’s own interest in alliance cohesion. Going forward, Turkey will be heavily exposed to Russian pressure and security risks in the Black Sea, as well as the Caucasus and the eastern Mediterranean. All sides now have a strong strategic interest in removing this political obstacle to Swedish and Finnish membership.
What can NATO learn from Finland and Sweden?
Kristine Berzina, senior fellow and head of the geopolitical team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy
The decision by Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO is an incredible development in European security, but also long-awaited steps to codify a security and defense position that has emerged over decades. Russia may want to portray the northern Baltic Sea in terms of Cold War neutrality, as standing apart from NATO. But Finland and Sweden are EU member states, have been close partners with NATO for years and are members of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, which as recently as this year has been training together. Finland, Sweden and NATO view the world in very similar terms, and when it comes to many aspects of total defense and hybrid threats, the two countries have much to learn from the alliance.
Why is there this adaptation of the security outlook? The history of Russia’s aggression is not forgotten, especially in Finland, where the success of the Winter War protected the country from the occupation of its southern Baltic neighbors. Russia’s threats and heavily armed presence are still very much present in the Baltic Sea region. It can be uncomfortable for NATO allies focusing on threats in the south, such as Spain and Italy, to think of Russia’s forces and missiles in Kaliningrad, wedged between NATO members Poland and Lithuania, and to contemplate the very small distance that separates this Russian territory. at. from Gotland in Sweden. But Finland and Sweden have faced this threat for decades and promised to protect themselves and build capacity to counter this ever-present, unreliable neighbor.
Finland and Sweden joining the alliance will make the Baltic Sea region and the whole of Europe more secure with new capabilities, closer coordination and faster decision-making. The two countries have developed approaches to total defense, or overall security, based on their societies to provide resilience, situational awareness and cohesion in times of peace, tension and war. The desire to break down barriers between government institutions and use the ingenuity of their people are lessons that all NATO members should learn.