NATO will need a transition plan if Finland, Sweden requests to join
The Prime Ministers of Finland and Sweden have indicated that Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked and brutal attack on Ukraine is shifting the political balance in both nations in favor of both countries applying for NATO membership. They have seen in Ukraine that countries without a collective defense pledge under Article 5 are vulnerable. The choice must be theirs to make, without any pressure from NATO members.
Should they make the sovereign decision to apply for NATO membership, the period between their application and the final approval of all NATO members, including legislative measures, could be difficult. Putin will do everything he can to directly threaten the candidate countries and derail the process more broadly. The Kremlin has already warned of a military response, including the deployment of nuclear and hypersonic weapons to the Baltic Sea region should any of the nations decide to apply. (Lithuania was fast with point out that Russia already stores nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad exclave.) If they decide to apply for membership, Finland and Sweden should therefore cooperate with the alliance countries in drawing up a transitional plan to protect them during the transitional period.
A jointly developed transition plan can have several related parts.
The Alliance would need to speed up its acceptance process for these two NATO partners. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty requires all 30 NATO nations to approve new members, which has previously taken up to two years. Traditional preliminary steps such as an intensified dialogue and an action plan for membership would be unnecessary given the high degree of military interoperability that already exists between NATO and these two advanced nations. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who has already expressed his support for their application, should design mechanisms to encourage rapid approval. As Putin will pressure individual NATO nations to pull their feet, countermeasures must be taken.
The United States could be an example in this accelerated process of acceptance by seeking rapid ratification by the Senate. The benefits of NATO enlargement have already been widely discussed. There should be strong bipartisan support from the Senate. President Joe Biden can begin this process with a powerful speech noting that both nations are Western democracies that are serious about defense and are already working militarily with NATO. Finland spends about 2 percent of its GDP on defense and has an impressive comprehensive security concept of the kind that has worked well for Ukraine. Swedish defense spending is lower but rising and has an impressive defense industry. Together, these two nations fill a strategic geographical gap along the alliance’s border with Russia.
Interim security guarantees may prove necessary as Russian pressure increases. Both nations are EU members and are thus covered by Article 42 (7) of its Lisbon Treaty, which obliges all members to “assist and assist by all means” in the event of armed aggression. The EU could strengthen this obligation by officially noting that in the meantime, the commitment would be seen as an EU equivalent to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
Other measures can be taken to strengthen interim security guarantees. For example, the United States may extend interim security guarantees through the President’s statement, joint resolution, or even a clause in the Senate’s instruments of ratification. Northern Group and Nordic-Baltic Eight Group, which both include Finland and Sweden, may consider strengthening interim commitments.
Given Russia’s current military invasion of Ukraine, it is unlikely that Moscow will move a large number of ground forces to the Baltic Sea region. But if they shift forces, there are several options for countermeasures. Given both nations’ involvement in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, it may be attractive to move part of the JEF forward. Both nations have also participated in NATO’s Response Force, which is already on high alert and ready for deployment. In addition, US ground forces would also be available. Naval and air operations should also be considered, including for Baltic Sea naval exercises and a Nordic-Baltic air defense zone, as Russian air and naval forces are more available for relocation. Such conventional deployment of forces could also be a response to further nuclear threats from Putin.
Another alternative that could be adopted very soon is to accelerate defense cooperation during the 2018 trilateral Finnish-Swedish-American defense cooperation agreement called “Declaration of intent. ” Measures can range from improving strategic planning; accelerating arm transfers; strengthen intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cooperation; and add multilateral exercises.
Finally, in this plan, one can consider eliminating some of Russia’s concerns. For example, Finland could theoretically control the sea passage to St. Petersburg, and it is geographically close to Russia’s nuclear and naval bastions on the Kola Peninsula (as well as NATO member Norway). The declaration can be designed to reduce Russian fears in these areas, as long as such confidence-building measures are reciprocal. No such insurance should in any case make Finland and Sweden other leading NATO members with undue restrictions on the deployment of forces.
NATO should also be ready to explain why rapid acceptance of Finland and Sweden is justified, while several NATO members are not willing to accept Ukrainian membership. The main reasons are that both nations are EU members while Ukraine is not, and that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states that new members must “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”, which is difficult for Kyiv to do while partially occupied. of Russian troops. .
Hans Binnendijk is a prominent fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has been head of NDU‘s Institute for National Strategic Studies and as NSC senior director of defense policy and arms control.
Barry Pavel is Senior Vice President of the Atlantic Council and Head of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He has served as NSC senior head of defense policy and strategy.