Strasbourg court shattered Bulgarian law on surveillance and wiretapping – Novinite.com
Laws in Bulgaria which regulate wiretapping and surveillance are of poor quality and cannot guarantee that the interference with the privacy of citizens meets the criteria of a democratic society.
This observation is made by the European Human Rights Court (ECHR) in its decision not only on the legislation of our country but also on the practices of use of Special Intelligence Device (s) (SID), Lex.bg reported.
The ruling is replete with examples of scandals and abuse of SID over the past 10 years. And after examining the SID and the law on electronic communications, the Strasbourg Court came to the devastating conclusion for our country – that “surveillance in Bulgaria, applied in practice, does not yet meet the minimum guarantees against arbitrariness and abuse “.
The case before the ECHR was filed by two lawyers – Mihail Ekimdzhiev (in collaboration with the Association for European Integration and Human Rights) and Alexander Kashumov (Access to Information Program). This is the second time that Ekimdzhiev has applied to the Strasbourg court for wiretapping and surveillance in our country. In 2007, on his complaint, the ECHR found serious problems with the storage of data collected by SIDs, as well as the lack of a mechanism to establish whether it had been illegally wiretapped or monitored. It is because of this first decision, after long vicissitudes, that the SID Control office was created.
Now Ekimdzhiev and Kashumov have asked the court to review the whole process – from its settlements, to requests for the use of SIDs, to judicial authorizations, inspection of SID Control office, and the possibility of claiming compensation in the event of illegal wiretapping.
Here is what the Strasbourg Court’s conclusion says today:
“Although noticeably improved after being examined by the Court at the request of the Association for European Integration and human rights and Ekimdzhiev, laws governing secrecy surveillance in Bulgaria, implemented in practice, still do not meet the minimum guarantees against arbitrariness and abuse required by Article 8 of the Convention in the following respects:
a) the internal rules governing the storage and destruction of SID the materials are not made available to the public;
b) the term “objects” in art. 12, s. 1 of the 1997 law is not defined in such a way as to ensure that it cannot be used as a basis for the indiscriminate use of the IDS. (Here, the Strasbourg court recalls the case of the former president of the Sofia municipal court, Vladimira Yaneva, who authorized the use of SID against the information system of the Ministry of the Interior. Yaneva did not been condemned for this reason, but because of the legal duration of SID allowed. According to the EHCR, the example is revealing that the Bulgarian courts interpret the concept of “object of SID”Too wide.);
c) the excessive length of the initial authorization of surveillance for reasons of national security – 2 years, considerably weakens the judicial control to which surveillance is subject;
(d) the procedure for authorizing the use of SIDs, as is the case in practice, does not ensure that control is used only when it is “necessary in a democratic society”;
(e) there are a number of gaps in the legal provisions governing the storage, access, verification, use, disclosure and destruction of surveillance The data;
(f) the supervisory system as currently organized does not meet the requirements of sufficient independence, competence and powers;
g) the conditions for informing citizens that SID was used against them are too narrow
h) special means of protection – the claim under Art. 2, par. 1, point 7 of the Law on State and Municipal Liability for Damage, cannot in practice be applied in all possible scenarios, does not guarantee the verification of the justification of each case of use of SID, is not open to legal persons and is limited in terms of disposal.
These inadequacies in the legal regime seem to have had a real impact on the functioning of the underground. surveillance system in Bulgaria.
Recurring secret surveillance the scandals suggest abuses which appear to be due at least in part to inadequate legal safeguards. “
/ OFFAews