Sweden has a chance to transform European security – even before it officially joins NATO
Sweden’s decision to become a member of NATO reflects a monumental change in the European security environment. But while twenty-eight NATO countries have voted to approve Sweden’s accession to the Alliance, the Nordic country’s bid may be in jeopardy. Last week, the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Sweden not to expect “benevolence” for his bid after protests near the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, since Sunday floated the idea to approve Finland’s NATO membership but not Sweden’s. Regardless of whether it is a final decision or not, the Turkish president’s statements show how much Sweden’s membership depends on Turkey – and Turkey’s decision is unlikely to be finalized until after the country’s elections in May.
Nevertheless, in the meantime, Sweden can significantly increase European security during its presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) – a role it took on in January and will hold until June – by ensuring that the EU plays a role , as described in recent times Joint declaration on cooperation between the EU and NATO, which complements and reinforces NATO’s actions. Sweden can exercise its presidency’s agenda powers to drive the debate forward on a fully resourced EU security and defense budget aimed at three crucial goals: mobility, sustainability and protection of critical infrastructure. Each of these goals is a prerequisite for defending Europe – but none of them has yet been sufficiently achieved.
The EU has long asserted the importance of European defence. As the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell has is described, the EU’s history has been “full of plans and initiatives to strengthen the EU’s security and defense policy.” But, he added, “most have come and gone.” Rather as a comprehensive study of the EU itself concluded“years of defense underutilization … have led to an accumulation of gaps and deficiencies” in the group’s collective military capabilities.
But after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, European nations have begun taking steps to improve their defense capabilities. The EU itself has provided useful support through its peacebuilding fund which has replenished national arms supplies to Ukraine, and the EU is legislating a five hundred million euro fund to support joint procurement. But responding to the threat posed by Russia requires much more significant action. Sweden should use its presidency to focus on significantly improving Europe’s capabilities through the establishment of an EU security and defense budget aimed at three central elements of collective defence.
1. Mobility
NATO’s defense against a Russian attack will require moving large numbers of NATO forces. According to NATO Force Model, the alliance will provide “well over” one hundred thousand forces in less than ten days and around two hundred thousand forces between ten to thirty days. These are very significant requirements, and NATO must ensure that it has the mobility capability to deliver forces within the required timeframe. With the alliance’s current capabilities, NATO is unlikely to meet these demands.
The shortcomings can be deduced from the EU’s latest “Military Mobility Action Plan 2.0.” The new plan acknowledges that with Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU “has learned the importance of moving military aid as quickly and smoothly as possible.” But what the plan does not do is describe how far over a hundred thousand forces could be moved in ten days, nor how around two hundred thousand forces could be moved in ten to thirty days – even though this is what the new NATO Force Model calls for.
Sweden should ensure that the EU’s implementation of the new action plan for military mobility is, in Borrell’s words“result oriented and avoid[s] our usual European tendency to go for conceptual or institutional discussions.” To achieve the necessary results, first of all, sufficient funds will be required.
Within the framework of the original mobility plan, the European Commission proposed a budget of approx 6.5 billion euros. That proposal was, however reduced to 1.69 billion euros in the adopted budget, far short of what would have been necessary before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and even less now. The new action plan does not address this shortcoming, stating only that the Commission will “consider” strengthening the military mobility budget “within the overall review of priorities in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework.” Given the changes in the security environment, even the number of 6.5 billion would be insufficient. Sweden should use its presidency to build a consensus that the budget be revised sharply upwards to support what will be needed to meet the requirements of the NATO force model.
2. Durability
Here, too, sufficient resources will be crucial. The Russian war in Ukraine has underlined that a European defense against a Russian attack could result in an extended conventional conflict. But for European forces to effectively engage in such a conflict, the EU must close what it is called one of the “most acute capacity gaps” — insufficient stocks of military equipment. While the EU is resupplying these stocks, they should ensure that they include anti-armor capability and man-portable and medium-range air defense, unmanned aerial vehicles for both detection and attack, long-range fires and precision-guided munitions.
Nations are increasing their own spending, but the EU has the financial capacity to provide additional resources – even if the current one planned fund of five hundred million euros because joint procurement is far from sufficient. Sweden should advocate for the inclusion of a sustainability initiative in the EU’s security and defense budget that will provide additional resources to nations so that they have the conventional capacity required for a protracted conflict.
3. Resilience of critical infrastructure
The EU recently issued key directives requiring nations to improve the resilience of their critical infrastructure – a set of directives focused on Cyber security and the other on physical threats. However, the implementation of the directives will require significant fiscal expenditure. For example, the cybersecurity directive tells nations to adopt “cyber hygiene practices” such as “zero trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management.” Similarly, the directive tasks national data security incident responses with “incident management” – not an insignificant job during conventional conflicts, as evidenced by effort required to respond to Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine. In order to achieve the required levels of cyber security, Sweden should therefore advocate a budget that provides supplementary financial support to comply with the new directives, rather than leaving the responsibility solely to nations.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has required Europe to change its approach to security and defence, which amounts to what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calls a Zeitenwende– a turning point. That Zeitenwende applies as much to the EU as to Germany. Meeting the new demands of Europe’s security architecture will require establishing an EU security and defense budget that supports mobility, sustainability and resilience. Sweden’s presidency can help the EU reach that goal.
Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board member of the Atlantic Council. He is a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Further reading
Fri 6 January 2023
How allies Sweden and Finland can secure northern Europe
Edition Card
Past
NATO is approaching its ninth round of enlargement. The inclusion of Sweden and Finland – two solid democracies and defenders of the international rules-based order – in the alliance will strengthen the core of the transatlantic community.
Image: Ministers pose for a family photo during the second day of the first informal ministerial meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, January 27, 2023. TT News Agency/Jessica Gow via REUTERS.