What Turkey really wants from Sweden
Turkey continues to impose conditions on Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO, apparently angering Western officials and commentators and causing a renewed battle over Turkey’s role in NATO. Turkish presidential advisor Ibrahim Kalın said earlier this month that this round of alliance enlargement is unlikely to be concluded before the Turkish elections on 14 May. On Monday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned Sweden should not “expect goodwill from us upon joining NATO.” His comment comes after several anti-Turkish provocations in Sweden, i.a demonstrations of support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization, the burning of a Koran in front of the Turkish Embassy, and mock execution of an Erdoğan picture.
Part of the Western concern can be attributed to mistranslation: Erdoğan did not rule out “support” for Sweden’s accession, as much of It was reported by the Western press. “Destek” is support, and his choice of words (“hayirhahlik”) is best translated as benevolence or benevolence – a bit more nuanced than excluding support. Also absent from the current round of accession reporting has been the fact that Erdoğan similarly ruled out support last Maybut was subsequently approved the opening of the talks after obtaining negotiated concessions on key issues. This week’s flare-up is another twist in a winding road that is likely to end with NATO enlargement — at least not until this summer.
Yet Turkish skepticism towards the current applicants – primarily Sweden – does not stem from a visceral reaction to public provocations. Nor does it derive from, for that matter pure election calculus, against freedom of speech, or paranoid overreaction from Ankara to normal Swedish politics. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken have both acknowledged Ankara’s PKK concerns as real and legitimate. With over 90 percent of Turks are opposed Sweden’s accession in the current situation, it is difficult to see why the Turkish government would miss the opportunity to nail down greater Nordic cooperation against a terrorist group that it considers to be a threat to Turkish unityy.
Retrieving memo
One of the bright spots in the accession process so far has been agreement between the Turkish, Finnish and Swedish governments on a Trilateral Memorandum which describes the path to approval. The ten-point memorandum, signed in June, outlines a permanent joint mechanism to track progress, ensures ultimate Turkish support for accession, and calls (in point eight) for concrete steps from applicants to support Turkish security efforts. Some measures have been taken. For example, the anti-terror provisions in the Swedish constitution have been strengthened, the arms embargo introduced in 2019 has been lifted and at least one terrorist suspect has been extradited. But Stockholm’s progress has not met the minimum expectations in Ankara, which wants more and faster extraditions, as well as measures against public pro-PKK activity. With accession the only lever for gains in Sweden’s anti-PKK efforts, the Turks will not approve accession without more material progress.
says Sweden it cannot do all things demanded by Turkey, despite memorandum. An important difference is Sweden’s reluctance to quickly extradite around 130 terror suspects believed by Ankara to have PKK links and to have supported the bloody failed coup on July 15, 2016. Recently legal reforms will enable more effective Swedish action against the PKK, but has not yet produced much in the way of tangible results, and is likely to result in only limited extraditions. The results may improve over time on broader cooperation against the PKK from Ankara’s perspective – and the Turks understand that they will not get all the extraditions they want – but a key issue remains: the PKK affiliate in Syria, known as the People’s Defense Units (YPG) .
The current impasse is as much about Syria like Stockholm. Paragraph five of the Trilateral Memorandum obliged the applicants to treat all “affiliates” of the PKK as PKK. The previous Swedish government contained a song PKK-friendly politicianand provided up to 376 million dollars in support of the “autonomous administration of northeastern Syria” run by PKK affiliates who also receive support from the United States for the joint fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The conservative Swede government that took over in October 2022 has pledged not to support groups considered terrorists by Ankara, but it has not taken definitive steps to end support for the autonomous administration.
What to watch next
Turkey continues to favor NATO enlargement— for Ukraine and Georgia as well as Finland and ultimately Sweden — but needs more concrete measures against Syria, as well as against anti-Turkish activity within Sweden. Given the atmosphere in Turkey and Sweden created by the recent provocations, further tripartite meetings has been put on hold. Still, Erdoğan indicated after a late January meeting of the Turkish National Security Council that progress is still possible pending steps towards Swedish and Finnish fulfillment of the memorandum. Turkey seems intent on keeping up the pressure to get satisfaction on key issues, without completely derailing the process.
At the same time, Finland may attempt to join the alliance separately at some point, which has so far linked its own less contentious connection to its neighbor’s. The Turks consider Finland more engaged in security cooperation against the PKK and could force the issue by only approving Finland’s accession and not Sweden’s. At least NATO will help protect Finland and Sweden during the application process, and Moscow really has its hands full in Ukraine.
The Turkish election looms in the current impasse. PKK supporters say they use protests to “sabotage” NATO expansion, preventing Turko-Swedish rapprochement, and hurt Erdoğan politically before the election. This political warfare is complemented by Erdoğan opponents in the West, who dismiss Turkish security concerns and reinforce the stories that Turkey does not belong in NATO anyway. Only after the election – whether Erdoğan or the opposition wins – will consultation and progress likely resume. Interrupted calls under the Permanent Joint Mechanism will resume, Swedish anti-terror laws will have been in force longer and Stockholm will have a chance to refine its Northeast Syria policy in a way that is less directly supportive of PKK-affiliated organizations. In other words, after the election, the more mundane process of Sweden meeting Turkish red lines in exchange for final approval will resume. Progress is unlikely to be easy or quick, but given the mutual benefits for Sweden, NATO and Turkey, it is likely to result in final approval of enlargement.
Ultimately, prospective members must take Ankara’s security requirements seriously, and Ankara has a strategic obligation to strengthen and expand the Atlanta Alliance. Frustration is evident on both sides at present. The strongest basis for confidence may be that Ankara really benefits from a bigger and stronger NATO, given its many complicated bilateral relations with Western countries and disappointments over stalled EU membership. Turkey’s crucial role in a large, strong NATO is its strongest strategic guarantee. That is why Ankara will ultimately choose to approve the enlargement, albeit on terms that meet its security red lines.
Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.
Further reading
Picture: Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan addresses the crowd at the Century of Turkey meeting in Ankara, Turkey, October 28, 2022. REUTERS/Umit Bektas