Sweden’s enormous opportunity to rethink its role in Nordic defence
This is the latest in a series of regular columns by Robbin Laird, where he will address current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise both in the United States and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives from the past should inform decisions made today.
Of four Nordic countriesSweden faces the longest journey towards a new regional defense strategy – but also has an opportunity to undergo significant, smart transformation for a modern age that sees finally join The NATO alliance.
It has the longest journey due to its unique and long tradition of neutrality in European defense, and its subsequent historical experience in navigating political blocs in Europe. It has a significant chance for innovation as it can rebuild its defense forces within a broader context and perspective while relying heavily on indigenous defense enterprises that the country has yet to fully exploit.
The legacy of Swedish neutrality was seen in the Swedish experience of the Second World War. In John Gilmour’s insightful book, “Sweden, the swastika and Stalin,” he concluded of the Swedish approach: “Sweden carefully looked after its own interests and despised the leadership of the self-interested and apparently untrustworthy combatants. The responsibility for Sweden rested in Stockholm and nowhere else. “
What has changed is that Stockholm now sees its own interests as best served by enlightened participation and leadership in the two key alliances that shape modern Europe, the European Union and NATO. It is a coincidence of timing, but perhaps a sign from history, that Sweden will take over the presidency of the European Union in 2023 – the same year that should see them formally join NATO.
RELATED: Norway should be at the center of the change in Northern European defence
Sweden faces a double challenge. How can it lead work for a significant strategic rethinking of the defense of the region and Europe as a whole? And can it do so by being bold in thinking through what this really means in terms of a redesigned power structure?
After the end of the Cold War, Sweden allowed its forces to be drawn down to very low levels. As Stefan Hedlund noted in an article from 2019 about Swedish defence: “The end of the Cold War brought about severe downsizing. Defense funding fell to just one percent of GDP in 2018, the lowest level of all the Nordic countries excluding Iceland. The rationale for these cuts was derived from abandoning the traditional doctrine of territorial defense. Armed invasion was no longer seen as a credible threat.
“Although Sweden continued to make significant military contributions to international peacekeeping, its ability to defend its territory has been seriously impaired. Sweden’s elaborate system of hardened defenses, once built to protect the very long coastline, was demolished. Air Force bases with hardened bunkers were closed. The Navy lost its anti-submarine warfare. Ground forces were cut, with artillery and air defense units almost completely wiped out.”
Despite the historic slowdown, Sweden began to rethink its defense posture and structure in the wake of the initial Ukraine crisis in 2014. And it was clear that the Swedish leadership woke up to the fact that being neutral does not mean that one can avoid being drawn into every conflict between Russia and other European states, given the nature of the new combat systems, and that the Russians are lowering the nuclear threshold in their declaration strategy and force acquisition. Neutrality can be nice – but not if your community is thwarted by military action sweeping through the region.
Notably, since 2014 Sweden has had an increasingly robust international/partner-engaged strategy tied to NATO members, even before its formal membership application earlier this year. For example, in 2017 the Swedes held exercise Aurora 17, which was the largest Swedish military exercise in more than 20 years and was clearly intended as an exercise of Swedish defense capabilities against a larger, more sophisticated adversary. France, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Germany and the United States – all NATO members – joined Finland in participating in the exercise.
The Aurora 17 exercise meant that a revival of Sweden’s approach to total defense was triggered and involved some 40 Swedish authorities in addition to their Ministry of Defence. And in the run-up to applying for NATO membership, a key element has been an emphasis on developing their total defense or whole nation strategy, including the return of conscription. The total defense concept includes cyber defense, mobilization-enhanced approaches and how reinforcements can operate from Swedish territory.
RELATED: Danish “mother ships” can help tackle the Nordic assortment challenge
There are several areas of innovation for which Sweden will be key players in a more integrated approach to Nordic defence.
The first will obviously be operations with Norway and Finland in the north, also working with non-Nordic allies. In particular, under recommendations from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Michael Bydén on 1 November, among them was to strengthen the Swedish presence in the north and find innovative ways to support the force’s operations with allies in the region.
One of his recommendations lies behind every serious Swedish defense thinking: “Developing a Nordic dimension is particularly important because conditions in northern Europe require joint and coordinated defense concepts. Sweden must take a special regional responsibility because NATO’s defense concept is based on regionally existing capabilities. The armed forces require that the Nordic countries belong to the same operational area and are led by the same command structure (Joint Forces Command).
A second focus area is clearly power mobility. It is not enough to just have a ground force operating as a hedgehog on its own territory – how will the ground forces act with allies in the forward defense of the region, especially the Baltics?
A third is to change the way the Air Force and Navy work together. The Air Force has historically provided air defense for a small naval force. As the Air Force and Navy operate at greater distances, how will combat air and combat ships be equipped differently, or platforms develop differently in the future? (Here Saab’s participation in the UK led Project Tempest could not only lead to changes in the Swedish air force but also in allies.)
The Swedish Navy has been focused on operating in the Swedish archipelago, forward operations in the Baltic Sea and along their west coast focused on controlling the inlets/outlets to the Baltic Sea. As it is built to play a broader role in providing strategic depth to the region, the navy will share more maritime defense interests with Denmark and Norway and could look to collaborate on their shipbuilding strategies.
And as the Baltic Sea sees greater cooperation between the NATO allies that would now encircle the area (Finland, Sweden, the Baltic States, Poland, Germany and Denmark), how will they work together to deal with the Russians operating from the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad ? How will Sweden relate to shipping and defense and security in this disputed sea that borders Russia and directly confronts Russian maritime interests in the North Atlantic? Here, the potential cross-border cooperation around joint ISR and command and control could lead to significant innovation involving maritime unmanned systems, both USVs and UUVs, plus even more significant ways for the two types of maritime unmanned systems to work together.
There is a lot to think about, and Sweden has to do it while balancing the need for careful thought with speed. If handled correctly, Sweden can leverage its unique location and strengths to help shape a broader lethal cyber defense and security framework with its allies in the region. Finding ways to innovate in linking land, air and sea assets into a cross-border force and a cross-border force that can operate from security operations to advanced can bring significant innovation to the region, while demonstrating the kind of innovation in multiple domains. which could serve as a model for other NATO states.