Sweden’s A26 sub offers insights into naval warfare to China – Asia Times
Sweden’s Saab is gaining momentum to build the next generation of A26 Blekinge-class conventional submarines (SSK), with a forward-looking design that anticipates capability requirements for future seabed warfare.
This month Naval News reported that Saab laid the keel on the first A26 SSK for the Royal Navy, the soon-to-be RSwN Blekinge, in Karlskrona, southern Sweden at the end of June.
The report said Sweden plans to build two Blekinge submarines, due for delivery in 2027 and 2028 respectively. However, the Swedish Navy is considering whether five new boats would be enough for its security needs as its three Gotland SSKs will need to be replaced in the 2030s .
The A26 prominently features a unique Multi-Mission Portal (MMP), or enlarged torpedo tube in the center of the submarine. The MMP can accommodate swimmers, diving equipment, and manned and unmanned underwater vessels for special missions.
Commenting on the A26’s unique function, Naval News quotes naval expert HI Sutton as saying that recent incidents in the Nord Stream pipeline and the Crimean bridge show the importance of having a seabed warfare capability.
That, Sutton says, opens up the possibility for the A26 to launch and recover remotely operated vehicles/autonomous underwater vehicles (ROVs/AUVs) like Saab’s Sabertooth in defense and offensive missions.
Saab advertises Sabeltanden as a powerful yet lightweight inspection, maintenance and repair (IMR) platform. Its small, tether-free operation and maneuverability ensure easy and safe access in and around complex underwater structures.
The source states that Sabertooth can use different toolkits and be powered via fiber cable or through water communication. Saab also claims that Sabertooth can swim autonomously to the docking unit and remain there 24/7 for six months, eliminating the need for surface ships.
ROVs/AUVs such as the Sabertooth and similar models may have been involved in the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline explosion and the Crimean Bridge explosion in September. Meanwhile, China may have taken cues from the incidents in planning a possible attack on Taiwan’s undersea internet cables in a blockade scenario.
Military sabotage is the leading hypothesis behind the Nord Stream 1 explosion. Whoever was behind the explosion may have used combat divers, self-propelled mines or underwater drones to plant the explosive charges that cleared the underwater conduit, The Economic Times reported.
Citing an unnamed military source, The Economic Times states that an attacker could operate an underwater drone from a submarine stationed several nautical miles from the target. The military source said that since the pipeline is a fixed target, it would not be too difficult for a remote attack.
An underwater drone attack is also one of the leading hypotheses for the Crimean Bridge explosion, for which no party has yet claimed responsibility. This months Molfar’s open source intelligence community The report says a US underwater drone may have been responsible for the explosion.
The source says camera footage from the bridge shows a white object between two pillars moving with the water. Ukrainian forces picked up a special operations water drone at Sevastopol in April.
In both cases, It was reported by Asia Times that the American Seafox ROV/AUV may have been responsible for the explosions. The Seafox carries a 1.4 kilogram shaped charge capable of punching a hole through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, although for the Nord Stream 1 and Crimean Bridge blasts it may have carried larger or even multiple explosive charges.
Given these incidents, China may have taken elements from Sweden’s A26 submarine, as evidenced by its latest SSK. Asia Times has previously reported that on China’s Type 39 C/D, which has several design similarities with Sweden’s A26, most notably its angled sail design. However, it is unknown if the Type 39 C/D design is a pure A26 copy or is the result of common design requirements.
As with the A26, China’s Type 39C/D can also operate ROV/AUV. In China’s case, it could be used to tap or cut off Taiwan’s underwater cables should China force a blockade of the self-governing island. Such a blockade could aim not only to starve Taiwan of energy supplies but also of critical information and communications.
The use of submarines to cut or tap underwater cables is not a new practice, although this highly specialized capability remains within the purview of leading military powers. For example, submarines such as Russia’s Losharik spy submarine and that USS Jimmy Carter wear special equipment for that mission.
It is likely that China could equip its Type 39 C/D with specialized ROVs/AUVs capable of severing or exploiting Taiwan’s extensive undersea cables to cut off the island’s access to external information, collect sensitive military intelligence, and cripple Taiwan’s communications with the United States and its allies.
As with leading military powers, China is known to use ROVs/AUVs for military purposes. Asia Times has previously reported that on China’s use of ROVs/AUVs to collect oceanographic data in support of submarine operations in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. They can also be used to cut or tap Taiwan’s underwater internet cables.
In August, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University published a report notes that almost all Internet traffic goes through underwater cables. It also highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s submarine internet cables in the event of a Chinese blockade of the self-governing island. As of August 2022, Taiwan was connected to 15 submarine cables, which go ashore at three landing stations in New Taipei, Toucheng in the north and Fangshan in the south.
These points roughly correspond to the locations in China Naval exercises off Taiwan in Augustlaunched in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island. Asia Times has previously noted that such exercises are not just for show but mark the first phase of China’s “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland through a blockade it can extend indefinitely.
While China’s exercises in August were intended to signal its displeasure and ability to blockade Taiwan at will, it may choose to escalate by denying air and sea traffic to Taiwan and cutting its undersea cables.
China may choose to adopt a squeeze-and-relax approach to Taiwan, a strategy of military exercises equivalent to blockades with a tighter military noose that increases the threat level.
Since submarines are expected to be China’s workhorses in enforcing a blockade of Taiwan, its Type 39 C/D could be equipped with its version of Saab’s Sabertooth ROV/AUV to cut or plug Taiwan’s undersea internet cables, which would affect the US and its allies including South Korea and Japan.