Putin may start negotiations – Friedman on whether Ukraine will win the war
Lawrence Friedman: One option for Putin would be to assess general mobilization, but he does not want to do that (Photo:REUTERS)
in the next few weeks, we will begin to understand whether Ukraine can take the initiative and impose its advantages on Russia
“Despise the enemy strategically, but respect him tactically”
Mao Zedong
In my first column after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, I argued that Vladimir Putin had made a huge mistake and that Russia would not be able to win. I came to this conclusion in part because Moscow apparently failed to achieve its first objective when it took advantage of surprise on February 24. I was cautious about how to develop the situation on the battlefield, the problems with the Russians starting to learn Ukrainian tactics and capabilities.
In my second post of February 27th, I was more impressed with the incompetence of the Russian military and tried to explain why this continues to affect the Russians’ combat performance.
I believe that Putin is pointing out the failures, because this whole venture was started on the basis of the false impression of Ukraine as a country that has neither a legitimate government nor a national identity, and therefore can quickly collapse. that first day he planned to overthrow the Ukrainian government and replace it with a puppet one. Also, if this plan had succeeded, the Ukrainians would probably have continued their struggle against the Russian occupation. But we can imagine that if Zelensky were killed or kidnapped, the Russians would tell this docile government to call in Russian forces to remove him. “Nazi” usurpers in Kyiv, although, of course, the invitation would have retroactive effect. This is what happened in Afghanistan in December 1979, when the Soviet Union removed one leader in Kabul and replaced him with another, which subsequently required a military intervention that was already in the works.
The survival of Zelenskyi and his government was the first serious setback in the implementation of Russia’s plans. Their narrative was further undermined when those who were supposedly freed showed enthusiasm for the occupation. This sent a vital signal to Ukraine’s supporters in the West that the Russians would face serious opposition. Zelensky soon developed his own powerful narrative that more weapons are needed to win over Russia. (“I don’t need taxis, I need ammunition”). The need for more and better weapons and ammunition has been her clear and consistent message for the past four months.
The meaning of victory
I also emphasized in that first text that ““victory” is a political rather than a military concept. By March 25, when the Russian Defense Ministry announced it was withdrawing from northern Ukraine to focus on Donbas, a new definition of Russian victory was needed, one that would inevitably be less concrete than the original definition and more blurred. This spillage has not dissipated. The goal most in line with recent operations is the capture of Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson regions with the aim of their possible annexation and Russification. But the Russians are not only far from it (Part of the Donetsk region is still in the hands of Ukraine, and Russia’s position in the Kherson region is strongly contested), but a clear capitulation of Ukraine is also necessary for this to serve as a basis for declaring victory. that time won’t be anytime soon.
Denial of Russia’s victory is not equivalent to Ukraine’s victory
On the contrary, Zelensky made it clear what he meant by political victory. At a minimum, Russian forces should withdraw to their positions on February 23. It is desirable to return Ukraine’s enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk. In principle, Crimea should be returned, although in the political and military sense it will be possible at the cost of great efforts.
To get all of this out of Ukraine’s reach and to cement Russia’s gains, Putin could offer a ceasefire based on the current balance of power. This could be a clever propaganda move, although the proposal would be rejected. The military prospect for the Russians is thus a wobbly conflict that stumbles and drags on for some time without a final conclusion. This poses great challenges for Russian forces, as they must deal with a growing insurgent movement in the occupied territories and a long line of defense against Ukrainian forces. They hope and expect that a negotiated peace may still be reached, not because Ukraine is capitulating, but because its Western patrons will tire of the war and the heavy toll it is taking on their economies.
In this, as in his first gambit on the first day of the war, Putin underestimated the resilience of his opponents. The longer the war lasts, the more the pressure on the West to end the conflict will increase. However, at least the position of the West has strengthened in recent weeks, especially after the visit of European leaders to Kyiv on June 16, and then during the meeting of the European Council, G7 and NATO, where loud statements of support for Ukraine were made. Such a commitment was made that the defeat of Ukraine now looks like the defeat of NATO.
A protest denying the victory of Russia is not equivalent to the victory of Ukraine.
A prolonged war means difficulties and delays in economic recovery, as well as the risk of weakening international support and pressure to reach a compromise. Western countries are presciently preparing for the long term. They can also note the escalating problems facing the Russian economy. But they’d prefer it not turn into a competitive endurance test. That is why, along with the strengthening of political support for Ukraine, there was also a strengthening of military support. New equipment is vitally needed to arrive after a difficult period of combat operations for the Ukrainian armed forces, when they acutely felt the lack of firepower.
Will it be enough to turn back time?
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