Sweden, Finland and NATO: Farmers in Erdogan’s bid for re-election in the midst of a broken domestic economy?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed world politics and is reminiscent of the strained international relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The ongoing conflict has increased the popularity of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), and now two non-NATO countries – Finland and Sweden – have decided that it is time to put aside their history of neutrality and strive for membership and protection. of the alliance.
For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the invasion of Ukraine has been a response to NATO’s expansion to include countries that were part of the former Soviet Union and a message to the United States that such expansion is not welcome. However, Putin made a serious mistake when he chose to implement a weak plan, believing that his forces would take over Ukraine immediately. Putin’s move towards Ukraine is also a message to non-NATO countries bordering Russia. Undaunted, Finland and Sweden have moved forward with their plans to apply for NATO membership. However, both countries have faced an unexpected obstacle. Turkey’s leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has expressed strong opposition to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, claiming that both countries are safe from terrorist organizations fleeing Turkey.
The world is quite familiar with Erdogan’s policy, which is based on seeking leverage to protect its own interests rather than the interests of the country as a whole and to maintain its position in government. Erdogan has strategic goals inside and outside Turkey and aims to achieve several goals with one act. Before interpreting Erdogan’s features in terms of his plan for the forthcoming 2023 elections in Turkey and a message to the European Union (EU), the United States and Russia, it is important to understand the impact of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization in Turkey and the Democratic Union (PYD) in Syria has about domestic policy in Turkey.
How threatening are the PKK and PYD to Turkey?
The PKK is a separatist terrorist organization operating in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and northern Iraq. The group has been active since the early 1980s and Turkey has lost more than 40,000 people in its fight against the PKK. The group was official appointed as a terrorist organization of the United States in 1997. The PKK has supporters in Turkey and in EU countries. However, the PKK has recently been the perpetrator of several small-scale attacks in Turkey. The terrorist organization has not been listed as a top-10 terrorist organization in terms of most incidents in the US State Department Appendix to statistical information Report since 2017. The group has not been the perpetrator of any remarkable attack in the last decade. On the other hand, Turkey reports thousands of terrorist incidents annually, most of which Erdogan attributes to supporters of Fethullah Gulen, a person whom Erdogan continues to accuse of trying to overthrow his regime. Erdogan, for example, has claimed that Gulen was in some way responsible for December 17-25, 2013, corruption and bribery scandals who unearthed solid evidence against the Turkish president, his family and his inner circle. Erdogan further claims that Gulen was involved in suspected July 15, 2016, coup attempt. Outraged at both incidents as a potential threat to his power, Erdogan relentlessly retaliated against Gulen and his followers by declaring the group a terrorist organization, using weak terrorist accusations with little evidence against all members of the group, and imprisoning almost all of them.
The PYD is a pro-Kurdish group operating in northern Syria, where the United States has focused on fighting the terrorist organization ISIS and sees Kurdish groups as the only reliable American ally. Therefore, the United States supports the PYD-affiliated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and provides the group with logistical support. However, the United States and Turkey have engaged in confrontations over the presence of armed Kurdish forces in northern Syria because Turkey sees Kurdish groups as the PKK’s military branch and therefore a threat to security in Turkey. Turkey justifies its stance by claiming that Kurdish groups are trying to establish a separate Kurdish state. Turkish leaders cite as evidence several attacks each year in which Kurdish groups have directly targeted Turkey by launching rockets from northern Syria and several attacks on Turkish military forces stationed north of the Turkish border in Syria.
Obviously, the PKK is not as strong or as big a threat to Turkey as it once was, and the PYD is only a limited threat to Turkey. These facts lead to a puzzling question about Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US: What does Erdogan want to achieve by blocking Finland’s and Sweden’s offer to join NATO?
European Union
Erdogan’s approach to EU policy has sometimes yielded the results that the Turkish leader wanted: to dump the problem of Syrian and Afghan refugees living in Turkey on the EU’s neighbors with whom Turkey happens to have developed tense relations. Through various methods of blackmail, Erdogan has been able to “persuade” these countries to open their borders to and receive the refugees. The tactics have not been what Erdogan might have wanted. Most EU leaders have locked their doors for Erdogan and have refrained from standing on the same stage with him; But given Erdogan’s relationship with both Ukraine and Russia, leaders in several EU countries have been motivated to talk to Erdogan about getting Putin to end the war in Ukraine. Erdogan accepts such talks because he wants EU leaders to see him as an important world leader who defends the interests of EU countries. In addition, Erdogan has called on Sweden to lift the defensive arms export restrictions it imposed on Turkey in response to Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria in 2019. Erdogan’s blackmail and blackmail strategy, if successful with an EU country, is likely to be implemented to get what he wants. have from other EU countries.
United States
The United States also appears to be a target for Erdogan’s manipulative behavior aimed at extorting concessions from other countries and serving its own interests. When Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in mid-May to discuss bilateral relations, Cavusoglu presented Erdogan’s agenda: “persuade” the United States to go through the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, end its support for Kurdish groups in northern Syria, lift sanctions on Turkey under section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and end the ongoing Halk Bank investigation. Erdogan’s demands stem from his dissatisfaction with the Biden administration and his inability to melt the ice between two countries. Erdogan is particularly annoyed by the Biden administration’s refusal to end the Halk Bank investigation. During the Trump administration, Erdogan was allowed to exercise at least some degree of influence over the case. However, Erdogan understands the value of repairing relations with the United States. Doing so could create the momentum needed for Erdogan to improve his country’s relations with the West. This momentum and improved relationships may not come true. So far, the Western world has been heavily critical of Erdogan’s authoritarian regime and actions such as imprisoning journalists and destroying the country’s democratic constitution. A smiling face from the West, Erdogan probably knows, could increase his chances of victory in the upcoming presidential election.
Russia
Russia has been another trump card for Erdogan to use against the West. Erdogan’s goal is to send a message to the Western world that he can change Turkey’s direction and lean towards Russia when tensions arise between Turkey and the United States. Erdogan is well aware that his authoritarian regime will not find a comfortable place in the Western world and will instead be criticized for destroying democracy. Erdogan’s response to such criticism is usually to visit Russia, where he will surely find solace. So far, Erdogan has used the Russian card effectively. Erdogan knows that his attitude to blocking Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO makes Putin happy, and that if Putin is satisfied, Erdogan will be seen more positively in Putin’s eyes.
Domestic policy
When Turkish voters go to the polls in the upcoming 2023 election, Erdogan’s political future will be decided. It is a critical choice for a man who abhors losing an election and despairs of what the future holds for him if voters reject his bid for re-election. A relaxing life in retirement would not await him after violating the human rights of thousands of Turkish citizens, being the subject of solid anti-corruption investigations and being responsible for funding and sponsoring jihadist groups operating in conflict areas.
Erdogan’s domestic policy is based on the consolidation of power within himself through three distinct acts. First, Erdogan is working to send a strong message to the people that his leadership in the country is an assurance of Islamic freedom for his followers, who for many years have complained about the pressure of a secular system. The people who fall for this message strongly believe that under Erdogan’s rule, mosques will be open and women will be allowed to wear headscarves in schools and government institutions. Second, during the first years of his presidency, Erdogan used economic development projects to send a message that Turkey and its citizens are prospering economically thanks to his leadership. Third, Erdogan is working to create a foreign policy message that portrays him as a powerful leader who can defy all of Turkey’s “Western enemies”. An example of this message in practice is Erdogan’s stance on NATO’s expansion. In order to gain support from Turkey’s nationalist voters, Erdogan emphasizes his opposition to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
Faced with an uncertain outcome in the upcoming 2023 election, Erdogan knows that with the economic situation in Turkey, he can not play the card because the economy is booming to gather voter support for his re-election. All Erdogan has left is his political Islamist identity and a tumultuous attitude towards the world. Erdogan’s strategy of not focusing on the economy may serve him well in his attempts to return to office, as Turkey’s nationalist voters increasingly tend to agree with Erdogan’s approach to foreign policy.
Finally, the world will look at whether Erdogan can succeed by openly playing his trump cards in the arena of international politics. Putin’s threat to veto NATO expansion is likely to force Finland and Sweden to knock even higher on NATO’s door, which in turn will create more influence for Erdogan to get what he wants from the EU and the US. The world will also look to see how much the EU and the US will give up on Erdogan’s vested interests. If Erdogan succeeds in beating several pigeons with one bean, other authoritarian leaders around the world will emulate the Turkish leader’s strategy and launch a new game book on international politics with instructions on how authoritarian leaders can achieve their goals at the country’s and country’s expense. the people who live there.