NATO must complete the deal with Sweden and Finland quickly
Like each of the other four countries that are members of the European Union but not NATO – Austria, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta – Sweden and Finland have previously had good reasons to remain non-aligned. Sweden’s policy, like Switzerland’s neutrality, dates back centuries and was once part of the country’s raison d’être. Finland was a response to Soviet threats during the Cold War, a retaliation for remaining nominally independent.
But at a time when Putin is attacking Ukraine, Europe and the entire international order with his bombs, atrocities and lies, neutrality is no longer an option. That is why all six countries should irrevocably stand on the side of the Western world. This step is most urgent for Finland and Sweden.
Finland shares an 830 km long land border with Russia. And both it and Sweden collide with Russia in the Baltic Sea. In fact, the Scandinavians are therefore already in the front line. They need NATO’s protection under Article 5 – the one that says an attack on one is an attack on everyone.
The two Nordic countries would in turn strengthen NATO, where the alliance is weakest. Its most vulnerable members are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other side of the Baltic Sea. They are almost cut off from the rest of the EU and NATO by Russia’s enclave in Kaliningrad. The only land border between Lithuania and Poland is a 65 km long strip, called Suwalki Gap, between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which in practice is Putin’s vassal state.
Without Sweden and Finland, the three post-Soviet Baltic republics, which also have significant minorities of ethnic Russians, would therefore be difficult to defend against an attack from Russia. But with the Scandinavians, who both have first-class armies already coordinating closely with other Western militaries, the Baltic Sea would become a defensible NATO lake.
The best counter-argument is that a Finnish and Swedish membership would almost dare Putin to become even more aggressive, possibly escalating even to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Putin apparently attacked Ukraine – like Georgia in 2008 – to prevent NATO from expanding. So he would fight to explain to the people he fears most – ordinary Russians, who must tolerate him in power – how he would accept the exact opposite result, another NATO enlargement. He has to do something.
Therefore, like most bullies, Putin has sent out his subjects to drop threats that are not so veiled. Dimitry Medvedev, the current deputy chairman of Putin’s Security Council, has said that “there can no longer be any question of a nuclear-weapon-free status in the Baltics – the balance needs to be restored.” He failed to mention that Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave is already well stocked with missiles and nuclear weapons. So nothing new there.
And yet Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO would cause what realists in international relations call a “security dilemma”. Broadly speaking, it describes situations in which states escalate or go to war because they consider all other alternatives to be worse. In this case, Russia can reasonably conclude that it would lose a conventional arms race with an enlarged NATO, so that a preventive attack is the least bad option.
But in another way, that argument is similar to the familiar and unconvincing argument – in playgrounds or in world politics – of not provoking bullies. Putin has proven that he will never stop threatening or attacking others, if he thinks he can get away with it. For example, his new war strategy in Ukraine is apparently to conquer a land bridge along the entire Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea so that he can next connect with Russian separatists in Moldova.
The Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic – no country in Putin’s perceived “sphere of interest” will be safe until he understands that he opposes superior power and the determination to use it. NATO must therefore show strength and will, not shyness.
The more immediate problem is how to survive the line between the Swedish and Finnish applications and their membership. Article 5 enters into force only when they are included. Even if NATO speeds up its process, each of the 30 member nations must still ratify the accession. For the three countries that joined NATO in 1999, the process took 20 months, 18 for the seven countries that followed after 2004.
This is the time when Putin would be most tempted to punish the Scandinavians, with attacks somewhere in the spectrum between cyber warfare and a tactical nuclear weapon released to show off. It is therefore incumbent on Finland, Sweden, NATO and all 30 members to work together to eliminate this no-man’s land of the time.
So NATO and all 30 of its allies should prepare right now, as if the applications were already formal. The Allies should then give the green light at their summit in Madrid on June 29, where the 30 legislatures give their immediate approval, preferably the next day.
Extraordinary times require extraordinary measures. The Western world trusts that NATO protects it from bullies. It credits the alliance not only with military prowess but also with procedural agility when it comes to. NATO could not send a stronger message than to become a club of 32 people on June 30, 2022 – just four months after Putin began committing the worst of his many atrocities.
More from this author and others on Bloomberg Opinion:
How is Russia’s fortress economy really doing ?: Clara Ferreira Marques and Scott Johnson
Mariupol may be the thermopylae of the 21st century: Andreas Kluth
Why NATO should welcome Finland and Sweden: The editors
This column does not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial staff or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He was previously editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt Global and writer for The Economist. He is the author of “Hannibal and I.”
More similar stories are available at bloomberg.com/opinion