“The history of military populism in Portugal is long. It is ingrained, it cannot be devalued.”
Still in 2019, José Pedro Zúquete was one of several believers in the “exceptionalism The researcher and university professor at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) at the University of Lisbon even gave an interview taking this position. However, after being challenged to write a book on the subject, he went to research. And what, made him change his mind.
In the book “Populismo – Lá Fora e Cá Dentro”, published this month by the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation (FFMS), Zúquete amends the position. In an interview with Renaissancesays that “as I studied the past, more came to my mind a feeling of déjà vustrangely familiar: narratives, phrases, slogans, denunciations of populism and radicalism, which bore an irresistible resemblance to the present”.
Populism in Portugal already existed before André Ventura. For example, Basílio Horta’s CDS and Manuel Monteiro’s were similar. “If people who read the book section on Manuel Monteiro, if they don’t bring to mind how Ventura and Chegar talk about political parties, it’s because they don’t,” he says.
In just over 260 pages, it reviews the history of populism abroad, but also of this phenomenon in Portugal. Can you be sure about the topic?
Here in Portugal, for a long time, there was a kind of consensus that still remains: if more or less until the arrival of Chega on the scene there was no populism in Portugal, that there were no populists or populist parties. This was called Portuguese exceptionalism, Portugal was an exception to other countries [europeus]. And it was like an idea that people adhered to, sometimes without thinking about it too much. It was like that and that was it.
In fact, I myself was part of that consensus. I remember I even gave an interview in 2019 saying that. But it was wrong.
How did you find out?
My road to Damascus… when I was challenged to write a book on populism by António Araújo [responsável pelas publicações da FFMS], I went to look behind the scenes of this consensus, searching through all kinds of archives, newspapers, videos, etc. And I came to the conclusion that populism has always been present in Portugal. As I studied the past, more and more came to my mind a sense of déjà vustrangely familiar: narratives, phrases, slogans, denunciations of populism and radicalism, which bore an irresistible resemblance to the present.
Do we live, as he writes, “chained by the obsession of the present”?
Let’s see: I think that all generations tend to see their own time as special and unique. I think we are no different from other generations. What is most special about our generation, let’s say, has to do with the same communication technologies, with the internet, with social networks, in which everything that is not fast is seen as slow. I think we’ve lost a little bit of the past.
This past would be useful to recall facts such as: D. Miguel I, still in the 19th century, can be seen as one of the first populist governors of Portugal. In the book, he says that the monarch traveled the country, visited places “forgotten by power” and was welcomed here. The lack of proximity between the rulers and the population of certain areas of the country is still a contemporary complaint.
Yes, there are echoes. One of the basic characteristics of populism is a notion of proximity to the people, to the people. Miguel, the crowds of others, he was different from monarchs, who wanted more for distance. In this perspective, you can also see a populist or protopopulist trait if you want.
The current President of the Republic also travels regularly to various locations in the country…
Yes it’s true. But in the book I make a distinction between the commonplace – populism as an ideology and a practice of combating elites in the name of politicians, a united and sovereign people – which is what interests me.
Obviously, this led me to paths that can even be controversial. Like the case of Sá Carneiro. Or the question of Humberto Delgado. We tend, these days, to see negative populism as just a phenomenon. And when we say that someone was a popist, people are almost offended. But Humberto Delgado is someone who has done so much for the country. Or Sa Carneiro.
I didn’t write the book against populism. In other words, I have no accounts to settle with populism. In a way, I went looking for a common thread and discovered, shall we say, that there are three main types of populism: [em Portugal].
It speaks of military populism, the regenerator and the local.
Exactly. First, military populism. It is the one that was most successful in the 20th century english. It is populism in uniform, the man who is above parties and politicians. He is the military leader as a representative of the people, as a son of the people who will then fulfill his mission against certain elites. This is military populism and has been present since Sidónio Pais, Humberto Delgado, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Spínola.
Military populism was very successful in the 20th century, but then waned. I think the most successful populism right now is what I call regenerative. And why is it regenerative? It is the populism of the garments of purity. It is a populism that presents itself apart from parties and politicians, largely for the moralization of the political space. It has different levels of intensity and can aim at reform or the restoration of the political system. And it can be either left or right, or beyond left and right.
Finally, there is local populism: that of rolled-up sleeves. The local populist who cultivates a lot of proximity to the people, does work for the local people and thus differentiates himself from distant, idle elites, or even seen as enemies. In this populism, there is a long speech against Lisbon’s elites.
A single exception in this case is Alberto João Jardim, who is on the border between local and regenerative populism.
Because of the size of Madeira?
And your own speech. The issue of the Fourth Republic, of reimbursement of the country, which is sometimes heard as a novelty of Chega, is not: this is very much present in the speech of Alberto João Jardim and in the regenerating populism of Madeira.
Let’s talk a little more about military populism before the regenerator. In the book, he says that one of the lieutenants of the revolution defended Spínola for the position of President of the Republic, in the post-April 25 period, in famous Costa Gomes, because he was “a great figure to speak to the masses”.
Being a military coup that later turns into a revolution, it is evident that it is necessary to interact with the masses. And guide like determined masses. Spinola was the practical choice. Even the way he dressed [sempre como uniforme militar]the bearing, the authority, the prestige he had.
A comparison of Spinola with the present occurs to me. Perhaps it will not make sense. He was also responsible for the Duration and Melo task force, while in uniform he was for the Privacy and Melo task force.
What went through my head also passed to me. If Gouveia e Melo ran for political office and was successful, if he managed to mobilize the Portuguese people and be elected, he could be a kind of renaissance of military populism in Portugal. Definitely yes.
He has this profile. And the history of military populism in Portugal is a long one. It is ingrained, it cannot be devalued. I think there is a possibility of this military populism being reborn in Portugal. The fact that at this moment, right after the 25th of April, military populism has waned does not mean that in the present and future it will not play a role again. It is possible, it is possible.
So, following the path of comparisons, I have another one. The Democratic Renewal Party when it was born was seen as the “partisanship of eanism”. Is Enough that of “venturism”?
Let’s see: there was a founding nucleus of Chega. André Ventura was not the only founder of the party.
Many of the people who were with Ventura left the party. Very few. There is always a purity of origins, a romanticism when creating a political party. And then political practice is extremely cruel, because it can be extremely pragmatic. And those who do not fit into this more pragmatic policy can quickly be excluded or exclude themselves.
Chega clear is a very unipersonal partisanship. Although, since he went to Parliament, we have tried to give representation to other people. But this is a process that at this point is still very embryonic. And we don’t know how successful it will be.
Speaking of success: the CDS is the party with the most names referred to as populist in your book… and the one that just recently stopped having parliamentary representation. He talks about Basilio Horta, Manuel Monteiro and Paulo Portas.
In Portugal, memory is very short. People forget that when Basilio Horta appeared he was seen – and in the way he appeared, a candidate of the rupture, who attacked from top to bottom the great figure of the regime that was Mário Soares – as the incarnation of evil. We cannot forget that Basilio Horta was declared a white supremacist by Mário Soares. He was denounced as a neo-Nazi in the pages of Socialist Action. But this story like this. And now it is very interesting, after 30, 40 years, to see Basilio Horta as a senator of the regime. It reminds me a bit of Almeida Garret: “he made himself a baron”. But this is common.
As people who read the book section on Manuel Monteiro talk about the way they didn’t bring the party and the head, they talk about how Ventura and the political leaders, it’s why not and because the political parties, it’s because they are not responsible . I think it is all too evident that a lot of variety is easily found in André Ventura today.
In any case, the reaction against Chega is different from that of CDS Manuel Monteiro and Paulo Portas.
Why?
One of the reasons has to do with the fact that a Portuguese society has the. There have been demographic, cultural changes. We are a much more multiethnic society. This generated new sensibilities, new taboos. There are topics that cannot be as safe as they were 20,30 years ago. There are phrases and comments from political leaders that would currently generate huge media or political upheavals.
So, does saying that there is no populism in Portugal become a populist position?
In this last decade there was so much talk that Portugal was not populist. It was an exception. Have you noticed how Portugal was always an exception? Portugal was an exception in populism, there was no populism in Portugal. Portugal was an exception in the success of the radical right, there was no radical right in Portugal. They say that Portugal is a success in terms of emigration and multiculturalism. And the question I pose at the end of the book: what if this exception is wrong? as consequences what?
There is potential for a more identity-based populism in Portugal to begin to succeed, as there are demographic, cultural, social changes in Portuguese society. To witness the emergence of a more identitary and non-Protestant populism, as feared so much: politicians, arriving, some procedures, minority. It may arise in defense of the physical, rooted, territorial Portuguese people, this type of populism is still not well-liked in Portugal. I think that the present day can continue to witness this and once again there goes a Portuguese exception down the water.