From Sweden to Serbia, Putin’s war is forcing new strategic clarity
Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin. Photo: REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo
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In normal times, democratic politicians often prefer to avoid making choices. Leaving options open and maintaining ambiguity can be useful in maintaining broad coalitions of support. But war simplifies and clarifies the national security priorities of all countries whose interests are affected. My blog two weeks ago focused on the dramatic change in German security policy as a result of Putin’s war in Ukraine. This week’s will examine two pairs of European countries and the contrasting choices they make. The first pair are Finland and Sweden, two EU members whose neutrality history means that they are not members of NATO – although this may now be changing. The other is Hungary and Serbia, whose leaders have so far been close to Putin but who are now following different paths.
When I was Britain’s Ambassador to NATO in the years following the Iraq war in 2003, Finland and Sweden were the most active and effective members of a NATO – driven program known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP). It was created in 1994 as part of an alliance that extended a hand of friendship to former opponents of the Warsaw Pact, although it was open to all non-NATO European countries. It offered practical cooperation in a wide range of areas, enabling participants to benefit from NATO expertise – for example, by holding joint military training and exercises, exchanging views on defense issues and cooperating on broader issues such as disaster planning. Joining the PfP did not guarantee that a country would be accepted into NATO, although many of the Eastern European countries that rushed to establish partnership programs in the early 1990s agreed.
Finland and Sweden both have strong military traditions and highly professional armed forces. They participated in NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and in the training mission in Iraq. When about 50 ambassadors from NATO and partner countries met around a huge table, my Finnish and Swedish colleagues always played a prominent role. But when I and others asked them why they did not just go all the way and join NATO, they reminded us that both countries have a proud tradition of neutrality.
In the case of Finland, this has its roots in the country’s dangerous position during the Soviet era. During World War II, the country heroically resisted a Soviet invasion, but only maintained its independence during the Cold War by accepting a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948 that introduced a neutral status. This became known as “Finnishization” – a word that Russian officials have recently dusted off and suggested as a model for Ukraine. As a result, Finnish leaders followed a troubled line and avoided antagonizing Moscow while building economic relations with the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was given greater opportunities to build an independent foreign policy. It joined the EU and abolished “neutrality”, but public opinion remained adamant against joining NATO.
That is changing with Putin’s war in Ukraine. There has been a massive increase in public support for Finnish membership, up from 20 percent before the invasion to over 60 percent. Prime Minister Sanna Marin has called for an urgent review of Finland’s security policy so that the Riksdag can decide the issue. The chairman of the Samlingspartiet, writes in Economic times last month, commented that “the time for the next chapter for Finland and NATO is now.” After decades of careful ambiguity, Finland can unequivocally align itself with the West.
Opinion also moves in neighboring Sweden, which, like Finland, has a long tradition of independence from military alliances. A survey showed that support for joining NATO rose from 42 percent in January to 51 percent in early March. But political opinion is still polarized. With several opposition parties anxious to start a discussion on the issue, Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson recently said that Sweden’s entry into the alliance would destabilize the situation in northern Europe. Sweden and Finland have traditionally closely aligned their defense policies. If Helsinki moved on to NATO, the pressure on Stockholm to follow would increase.
In south-eastern Europe, the leaders of Hungary and Serbia are both facing a moment of truth as a result of the crisis. Both have been closely aligned with Putin. For several years, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán tried to avoid confronting the contradictions between Hungary’s obligations as an EU member and his own close political relationship with Putin. He consistently pushed for the lifting of EU sanctions against Russia in 2014 and ruled out any prospect of Ukraine joining the EU. But he was completely wrong by Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine. With Hungarians outraged by the suffering of the Ukrainian people and the parliamentary elections on April 3, Orbán has quickly backed far-reaching new EU sanctions against Russia and welcomed Ukrainian refugees to Hungary. The contrast with the harsh measures he took in 2015 to keep Syrian refugees out is very striking.
Aleksandar Vučić is another leader facing the April 3 general election. But his political choices so far have been different. Serbia has long had deep political and cultural ties with Russia and is heavily dependent on the economy—Vučić negotiated a subsidized gas agreement with Putin last autumn. Many older Serbs still detest NATO bombings of Belgrade in the 1990s, and there have been pro-Russian demonstrations in the capital. But Serbia is also a candidate to join the EU and is therefore expected to align itself with EU foreign policy decisions. Instead, Vučić is duck and weave. Serbia voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, but refused to apply EU sanctions against Russia. For example, air services between Moscow and Belgrade have continued to provoke outrage in EU capitals. Vučić may well win his election by taking Putin’s side, but he has thrown out the prospect of Serbia joining the EU.
As the shockwaves from Putin’s war continue to spread across Europe, many countries must peek into the dusty corners of their foreign policies where ambiguities and contradictions lurk, many of them left from history. When these are clarified, NATO and the EU will be more united and determined than I can ever remember them. Not the legacy Putin intended.