Will Sweden join NATO? – Bålverket
An internet provider in Stockholm launches a shortwave radio station to broadcast independent news, in Russian, deep into Russia. At the same time, buildings all over Sweden have been illuminated in yellow and blue, not to honor the Swedish flag, but as a support for the Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression. Although Swedes are used to draping themselves in the colors of the sun and the sea, they have historically been less enthusiastic about the navy and whites of the NATO flag. That may be changing.
The balance of power in the Swedish parliament means that the decision on whether Sweden should formally apply for membership in NATO currently lies with the Social Democratic Party, the governing party in Sweden for most of the last hundred years that currently holds the prime ministerial post. The fact that the Social Democrats even discuss NATO membership as a realistic alternative reveals a historic shift in Swedish politics. Since 1992, the cornerstone of Swedish security policy has been to reject military alliances in favor of a firm belief in the UN and multilateral dialogue to resolve international crises. In the unlikely scenario of an attack by a foreign aggressor, there has long been an assumption that someone else (most likely NATO, in which Sweden participates through the Partnership for Peace program) would hurry to help the nation’s defense. Ten years ago, the Swedish Armed Forces’ former commander-in-chief was Sverker Göranson. stated that Sweden could defend itself for about a week.
Russia’s latest attack on Ukraine seems to have thrown conventional Swedish wisdom aside in favor of a serious debate on NATO membership. Just a few months ago, this would have been unthinkable. Would Sweden actually be able to join a military alliance that is, after all, controlled by the United States?
Consider the historical context in which this change has taken place. Olof Palme, revered by many as one of Sweden’s greatest modern prime ministers, criticized the United States for actions taken during the Vietnam War. He drew parallels between the Hanoi bombings and Babiy Yar, where the Nazis murdered tens of thousands of Jews during the Holocaust (and where, more recently, the Russian Federation has been the accusedof targeting missiles). When NATO expanded on 21st century, the then Prime Minister Göran Persson welcomed the expansion at the same time as he confirmed that NATO membership for Sweden was simply not on the table.
Nato-skeptical feelings – and more specifically US-skeptical feelings – have been in line with public opinion. SOM Institute, a university-affiliated public research center, has asked the question of NATO membership to the Swedish public since 1994. That year, only 15 percent of Swedes thought it sounded like a good idea. Around the turn of the century, after the fourth and fifth rounds of NATO enlargement, the proportion of Swedish support for NATO membership had increased slightly to just over 20 per cent. A significant change in public opinion is obvious around 2013, the year when Russian fighter jets flew within 100 km from Stockholm, when almost 30 percent of those surveyed answered that they thought membership in NATO was a good / very good proposal. In 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea further increased tensions in Swedish-Russian relations.
In an admittedly fluid situation, last vote shows that about half of Swedes are now in favor of NATO membership. Although it is difficult to attribute changes in public opinion to specific events, the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine is the only obvious reason for the rapid change in public opinion.
Whether Swedish politicians will choose to join NATO is still a very open question. The immediate answer was no: In a partial response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government held a two-hour emergency cabinet meeting to discuss Sweden’s attitude to foreign and security policy, after which they made a statement corresponding to Sweden. do not change their attitude towards NATO. But that may change if public opinion continues to change.
There seem to be three, perhaps not mutually exclusive, alternatives that are being seriously considered in Stockholm. The first is NATO membership, which has received significant support from the group of four liberal-conservative parties formerly known as the Alliance. The third largest party in parliament, the nationalist Sweden Democrats, which have traditionally been seen as the friendliest against Vladimir Putin’s Russia, have changed their minds and declared their readiness to support NATO membership if the situation so requires. On the other side of the political spectrum, it remains to be seen where the Social Democrats end up, while the Left Party and the Green Party remain committed to Sweden’s traditional politics. The second option is to seek security guarantees and closer cooperation within the existing EU structures. French President Emmanuel Macron and his government have shown ambition to strengthen Europe on the world stage, which includes closer and stronger ties in the field of foreign and security policy. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Danish government announced that it would hold a referendum on June 1 to abolish its EU defense opt-out. Almost simultaneously, the Prime Minister of Sweden Magdalena Andersson and the Prime Minister of Finland Sanna Marin held a summit after which they presented a joint letter to the European Union, reminding its members of the responsibility to provide assistance should a member be attacked.
The third alternative is to remain neutral, or non-aligned, and to restore the Swedish national defense to a level that would frighten a potential intruder. To partially achieve this goal, the Swedish government has announced its intentions to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP. That proportion happens to be in line with what Sweden would need to spend if the country were to join NATO.
Whether Sweden ultimately decides to apply for membership in NATO also depends on what the eastern neighbors in Finland come to in their forthcoming debate on NATO. A Finnish application for membership would most likely tip the scale in favor of Sweden submitting its own. If the Finns decide to join, Sweden would probably choose to seek security guarantees elsewhere.