Will Finland and Sweden join NATO now?
A historic shift is taking place in Finland. For the first time, most Finns want to join NATO. Across the Baltic Sea, Swedes are becoming more positive about membership as well. Triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this could lead to a major foreign policy change for the military non-aligned Nordic states. But it is not easy to take out insurance when the house is already on fire.
As many as 53 percent of Finns are now in favor of joining NATO, according to the vote carried out February 23-25 (the Russian invasion began February 24). This is a dramatic change: in 2017, the same survey showed that only 19 percent of Finns wanted to join NATO, and the figure had been fairly stable over time. Votes to join NATO were also up in Sweden, with 41 percent support in one The vote was released on 25 February, compared with 37 percent in January. Public support for membership in Sweden has hovered around 35 percent since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
It is clear that Russia’s unprovoked war is pushing the two countries closer to NATO membership than ever before. Moscow’s latest, aggressive threat to join NATO would lead to “military and political consequences“In Finland and Sweden seems to have had the opposite effect on the general public. Instead of hiding in the ditches, Finns and Swedes turn to the Alliance for Security.
During the ongoing crisis, both Finland and Sweden have repeatedly emphasized their sovereign right to choose their own national security strategy. Although Finnish and Swedish policies for EU membership and close partnerships with NATO may seem identical, there are differences beneath the surface that may affect future developments.
On Tuesday, members of parliament gathered to discuss the possibility of NATO membership, which is an explicit part of Finland’s national security strategy. Although only two out of ten parties in the Riksdag have openly been in favor of joining the Alliance, but several parties seems to change its position in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
For Finland, the shadow of history is always present. An 833 km long border with Russia means that Finland knows that it can never take its sovereignty for granted. In his New Year’s speech, President Sauli Niinistö emphasized Finland’s sovereign right to choose its national security strategy, including the possibility of joining NATO. He then quoted Henry Kissinger: “Whenever avoiding war has been the primary goal of a group of powers, the international system has been handed over to its most ruthless member.”
Finland’s historical memories are not just about the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s concession and the Munich Agreement, which left Czechoslovakia in the hands of Nazi Germany. The Finns have not forgotten Soviet demands for their land and ports in 1939, while secretly preparing for an invasion, which Moscow launched in November of that year.
Those lessons were repeated by Prime Minister Sanna Marin this week. In response to Russian threats of “military consequences” if Finland and Sweden join NATO, she said: “We have shown that we have learned from the past. We will not let go of our room for maneuver. “
In Sweden, the situation is different. The Social Democratic government prefers to emphasize that freedom of alliance has served Sweden well for more than two hundred years and that security policy should not be changed drastically, especially not in an unstable environment. Politically, NATO is a polarizing subject. The government does not want to refer to the option of joining NATO in the country’s national security doctrine, even though a majority of parliament has demanded it since December 2020. Parliament is also divided over actual membership. Four parties are against NATO membership, and although four others are in favor, they do not have a majority of seats. With national elections in September, polarization is likely to prevail.
Given the traditionally greater support for NATO membership in Sweden compared to Finland, the assumption in the region has long been that Stockholm would lead the way towards joining the alliance. Now it seems that the initiative may come from Finland instead, as is evident from the many public appearances in recent weeks by senior Finnish officials where the NATO alternative was discussed. Even more Finns (66 percent) are in favor of NATO membership if Sweden were to join the Alliance.
Given the two countries’ close defense co-operation and positions on NATO, applying for membership at the same time would be the preferred option. But even if it would not be optimal for Finland to take such a step without Sweden, Stockholm should have no illusion that any hesitation on its part will prevent Helsinki from choosing its own path. Given the rapid development, this may happen sooner rather than later.
Of course, NATO must agree to admit Sweden and Finland, something that will require consensus among the thirty existing members. Sweden and Finland are two of six Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOPs) for NATO – a group that also includes Ukraine – which is the closest form of partnership with the Alliance. But Sweden and Finland are generally considered to be in a class of their own among EOPs due to the sophistication of their military, the stability of their democratic political system and their critical geography of the Baltic Sea, which bridges NATO’s Nordic and Baltic members.
Most observers believe that Swedish and Finnish applications to join the alliance can be easily accepted, a conviction supported by the inclusion of the two countries at the extraordinary NATO summit on 25 February. In fact, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised this issue during a recent Atlantic Council event which states:
– If they decide to apply, and it is a 100 percent Finnish and Swedish decision, then I think it is possible to make a quick decision and that they can join quickly. Ultimately, this must be a political decision, but given the high level of interoperability between NATO and Finland and Sweden, given the extent to which everyone meets NATO standards, it should be possible to allow them into our alliance fairly quickly. “
What a quick process would look like to decide on Swedish and Finnish membership remains to be seen. It would certainly eliminate the process of the Accession Action Plan that has been used to admit all NATO members since the 2004 enlargement round and which would probably apply to a country like Kosovo, which has already asked for an accelerated membership against the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Stoltenberg’s comments indicate that there is already an informal thinking about how this would work. If all parties informally agreed on the way forward, we estimate that it should take about a month to submit and process the applications and plan a vote. The ratification process in the thirty allied capitals would inevitably take much longer. In the meantime, the United States and the United Kingdom can issue interim security guarantees to Sweden and Finland. Washington, Stockholm and Helsinki have an existing trilateral defense cooperation that could be broadened and expanded for this purpose.
Events on the ground in Ukraine are likely to determine whether and how soon Sweden and Finland apply for NATO membership, and how easily the Alliance can recognize them. But with the contours of European security irreversibly changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the line of thought in both countries – especially Finland – is becoming clearer every day. From Moscow’s perspective, the result may be another undesirable consequence of its unnecessary and ruthless aggression.
Anna Wieslander is director of Northern Europe and head of the Northern Europe office in Stockholm for the Atlantic Council’s European Center, as well as a former official in the Swedish Ministry of Defense.
Christopher Skaluba is Head of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He has previously been Director General of European and NATO Policy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense.