In 11-hour diplomacy, the United States and Europe are trying to stop Putin from stepping up war against Ukraine
The Biden administration has concluded that a new Russian military attack on Ukraine is “much more likely,” as one senior official said, than a diplomatic decision and could come in a few days. The United States and Europe could work to prevent this through preventive surrender, which would give Putin power in Ukraine and some security control over Moscow’s former empire in Europe. This is what the Kremlin is demanding, and achieving it through intimidation may be Putin’s goal. But can the United States and Europe prevent Putin’s war from escalating against Ukraine without sending tens of millions of Europeans to control the Kremlin or leaving them vulnerable to future Kremlin intimidation?
Where the crisis stands
The United States is working to prevent a full-scale Russian war against Ukraine without abandoning the goals it fought in World War II and the Cold War: a united Europe that is no longer subject to tyrannical rule or aggression. US tactics in this case are based on a two-pronged approach: the development of “stick” weapons for Ukraine, the development of troops for countries east of NATO, and possible sanctions; and the application of “carrots” in diplomacy, including arms control and other fixed risk mitigation measures. Both tracks have progressed: the United States and NATO have put bids on the table; and weapons are flowing into Ukraine, American troops are on the move (not to Ukraine, but to NATO’s eastern ground level) and a powerful force sanctions and other financial instruments are well under way. All this is supported by the unity of the Allies as well as during the Cold War (despite German hesitation and French style).
That has not been enough. The Biden administration has hoped the “sticks” would persuade Putin to take a diplomatic path. It doesn’t happen. In a long meeting on February 10 with French President Emmanuel Macron, Putin wore on the laziness of a familiar bored boy, taking turns, according to French sources, into long monologues about the complaint. (These complaints are in the wrong place: comparing French World War I leader Georges Clemenceau, Ukraine did not attack Russia.) At a meeting the next day with British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seemed more interested. trolling, probably because he has no mandate for serious diplomacy.
President Joe Biden’s February 12 call with Putin doesn’t seem to have done much better. White House statement and something preliminary press background; Macron also didn’t call Putin earlier that day.
Next steps to the United States and Europe
What is the best American and European play at this point?
The United States can promote sticks. It should speed up arms deliveries to Ukraine while it can still. If Putin decides to launch a major military offensive against Ukraine like World War II, Ukraine’s airports may not be operational for long. If more armored and anti-aircraft systems or other equipment are sent to the Ukrainian military to support Ukraine’s protracted resistance to possible Russian occupation, the United States and other allies should get them there now. The United States and NATO countries could also step up efforts to strengthen NATO’s force position on its eastern side, either nationally or, if NATO members now agree, by activating NATO’s standby force or other NATO-led forces.
There are good reasons not to impose heavy new sanctions; they should be launched together for maximum impact and not, as the United States and Europe did in 2014, spread a piecemeal, slowly upward ladder. The Biden administration has already done a good job of making it clear that strong sanctions – the financial sector and personal sanctions against Putin and his kleptocratic district – are in place, as are effective export controls. It must step up this work by advising US, European and Asian banks and companies that the United States is serious and will not tolerate sanctions or circumvention of export controls. It must also continue to work to find more sources of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) to compensate as much as possible for the expected outages of the Kremlin. weapon against Europe and the United States, which buys a lot of Russian oil.
The rest of the diplomatic path
Despite the Kremlin’s gloomy attitude so far, there may be more room for the diplomatic path to move forward. This can have two properties. While the United States (and Britain) have bowed forward, warning Putin of the consequences if he launches a full-scale war, Germany in particular could say more and should do so now. In her public statements during her visit to Washington last week, Chancellor Olaf Scholz seemed silenced. The new German government is wrestling with significant internal disagreements, and some Social Democrats (the Chancellor’s party and the leading party in the German coalition) remain reluctant to publicize the Moscow attack. But this is an emergency. Putin would now notice a strong, not nuanced message from the German Chancellor warning that if Russia launches a major war in Europe, Germany will no longer act as an intermediary between East and West and direct new versions of “Ostpolitik,” but see and act as a threat to Putin’s peace in Europe. The German government must weigh up any domestic reaction to such a statement and the consequences of its great land war in Europe, which is now blurring as a real possibility, and Macron, who tried his best in Moscow, could make a similar statement.
At the same time, the U.S. could complement its serious arms control and other security proposals by offering them in a larger diplomatic package, perhaps offering a major conference to update the European security order if Putin resigns from the threat of a major war. It would not be difficult to outline the way forward: 2025 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The framework, which was originally rejected to give the Soviet Union legitimacy in Eastern Europe, is now seen as an early step. To disintegrate the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union itself. Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul has done suggested such an approach. The United States (or France or Germany) could propose to start negotiations when Russia withdraws from the war, with the goal of updating European security with an agreement and a major summit in Helsinki in 2025. Finland plans to hold a conference this year. The offer should make it clear that “Helsinki 2.0” is based on the principles and documents that ended the Cold War, not to the exclusion of human rights, national sovereignty and the right of all countries to decide on their own security alliances.
There are risks associated with such an approach, such as allowing the Kremlin to start trying to overturn a post-Cold War order that Moscow had already approved. But launching the Helsinki 2.0 process would take the United States and Europe to an even higher level. And it seems a better option than simply beating back the Kremlin’s demands for a final cessation of Ukraine’s efforts to NATO, a movement that Moscow would interpret (rightly) to put Ukraine under control. A great diplomatic offer like Helsinki 2.0 would have the advantage, in addition to its real potential, that it would help Europeans to gain a strong position if Putin refused to do so.
Different scales of Russian aggression
Warning: The Biden administration and many observers have described the current crisis as a binary great war or diplomatic “off-ramp.” But Putin has many options, including a no-war-not-peace approach that is constantly putting pressure on Ukraine, hoping to destroy its economy and weaken its resistance to Kremlin control by means other than full-scale war with its consequences and risks. Instead of a complete attack, Putin could order the open occupation of the part of eastern Ukraine already controlled by Russia, or he could take over Ukraine’s snake in the western Black Sea, allowing Russia to cut off Ukraine’s access to international waters, or some other aggression aimed at maintaining pressure without that it would inevitably trigger Western sanctions that are likely to harm the Russian economy.
The United States should not let Putin take the initiative. If he launches “smaller” aggressions while waiting to frustrate a strong Western response, the United States – which Europe and Britain have joined where possible, but which is nonetheless advancing – should hit Russia hard with sanctions and make it clear in advance that it is intended. .
***
It’s an ugly moment. Putin intends either to launch a major war of conquest, a la World War II, or to use the threat of war to subjugate Ukraine. Like the leaders of the Soviet Union and other invaders of the 20th century, Putin has the tactical advantages of a dictator, greater freedom of action. Democracies, despite all our current mistakes and terrible domestic challenges, have the strategic advantage of freedom and the resulting stronger economy and political flexibility. But it doesn’t make current dangers and difficult choices any easier.