Sweden strengthens its defense thanks to Russia (NATO membership next?)
Russia’s military build-up on Ukraine’s border – and its subsequent bullying demands on NATO – have not gone unnoticed in Sweden. Despite the fact that Sweden is not part of the alliance, Sweden is close to its members and may one day apply for membership.
Russia has demanded that NATO guarantee that it will never accept Ukraine as a member and is on record opposing a possible addition of Sweden (and Finland for that matter).
So, what if Moscow demands that NATO freeze Sweden forever?
Sweden takes no chances. It remembers the night of 2013 when Russia staged one sham attack with nuclear weapons in the wee hours of Good Friday. The Swedish Air Force, on low alert during the Easter break, did not react. However, NATO distorted two Danish jets from a base in Lithuania to intercept the Russian planes.
Since then, Sweden has tried to turn around years of low defense investment. Its latest defense budget – an increase of 40% by 2025 – represents the largest increase in defense spending in 70 years.
Sweden change defensive position also reflects a renewed commitment to combat preparedness. In September 2019, the naval command moved back to its old underground headquarters for the Cold War at Muskö, designed to withstand a nuclear attack. Its air force and army lines also recently moved from Stockholm to more remote, scattered places.
Swedish defense planners are particularly concerned about the vulnerability of the strategic island of Gotland. Located halfway between Sweden and Latvia in the middle of the Baltic Sea, analysts worry that Russian troops based in nearby Kaliningrad in the event of a war with NATO would occupy the island and deploy air defense and maritime weapons platforms.
Russia recently deployed another “Landing Ship Tank” vessel (LST) to Kaliningrad, which further aroused Swedish concern. In response, Stockholm quickly deployed a 150-strong task force to Gotland. Swedish officials stated that Russia’s recent military activity in the Baltic Sea, “deviates from the normal picture.” They perceived an increased threat and promised to “operate in the air, at sea, under the surface and on the ground in different ways and in different geographical locations.”
The Russian LSTs has since left The Baltic Sea for the Mediterranean, however, remains the strengthened Swedish presence on Gotland.
Sweden is wise to continue to strengthen the defense on Gotland. The island, together with Finland’s demilitarized Åland and Denmark’s Bornholm, are key aspects of the broader regional security picture.
Both Finland and Sweden would be critical in any future NATO effort to defend and, if necessary, liberate the Baltic states from Russian aggression. Of course, Moscow has included the importance of Åland, Bornholm and Gotland in its contingency planning for the Baltic Sea. It would be irresponsible for the United States not to do the same.
Of course, the United States should prepare contingency operations to defend the Baltic states that do not include support from Finland and Sweden. But it should also actively encourage the two nations – already close friends – to formally join NATO. Both countries could contribute a lot to the alliance, so their additions should be enthusiastically supported by the other members. In the end, of course, it is up to the Swedes and Finns to decide whether they want to apply for membership, but NATO should outline a policy that encourages both countries to join the alliance.
Russia’s preventive expression of disapproving doubts gives Stockholm and Helsinki a break. But none of the nations should automatically expect NATO members to come to their aid in the event of future Russian aggression. No matter how close or friendly non-aligned ties may be, membership has its benefits.
Daniel Kochis is a senior policy analyst specializing in European issues at The Heritage Foundations Thatcher Center for Freedom. Luke Coffey is the director of Heritage’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies.