The crisis in Ukraine is an opportunity to change diplomacy between the United States and Russia
The Biden administration is in its second year in office and has suffered severely from rising inflation, a new pandemic option and a stalled program. congress. As it struggles to save things, the administration has little room for major international conflict – especially after it finally ended a 20-year fiasco in Afghanistan.
It is this risk that is in Eastern Europe, where the administration is struggling to face Russia because of the increase in its forces on the Ukrainian border. An improperly handled conflict could potentially develop into a mediation war between the United States and Russia.
But if the regime stops treating Ukraine as a dangerous distraction, it could turn this crisis into a deep foreign policy opportunity.
The truth is that the United States has little influence over Russia, and European allies disagree on how to respond to the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive attitudes. The Russian president in his efforts to level the playing field for geopolitics Vladimir Putin threatens to dismantle what is left of the post-Cold War collaborative security architecture.
The Biden administration hopes that the threat and sending of sanctions NATO Forces heading for Eastern Europe are renouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also possible that diplomatic efforts will succeed and Moscow will slow down after vague promises to slow down NATO enlargement.
But in its own destabilizing way, Russia is actually asking important questions about the post-Cold War order. Instead of just dealing with the military crisis surrounding Ukraine, the Biden regime should seize the opportunity to persuade Russia – as well as post-Soviet and post-Soviet countries – to create a new security order that is better suited to the current era.
The first step is to acknowledge that some of the Kremlin’s major concerns are justified. Russia in the 1990s never thought that NATO forces or European Union Membership may one day extend right to its door – and it may not have been waiting for it US nuclear weapons in Europe for decades would remain.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the conquest of Crimea in 2014, and the creation of “frozen conflicts” in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere were in part attempts to correct this imbalance of power. But these aggressive actions have only reinforced the determination of Russia’s neighbors to seek Western embrace, adding to tensions.
These conflicts speak of the inadequacy of the post-Cold War order to respond to both Russia’s security concerns and the efforts of smaller countries on its borders. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which the United States, Russia, Europe and the former Soviet states are members, was largely powerless to prevent those wars or resolve ongoing territorial disputes.
The OSCE has its roots in the 1975 Helsinki Agreement, which brought East and West on the same side around security, human rights and intergovernmental co-operation on a wide range of issues. The trade in Helsinki’s city center was the recognition of the post-war Soviet borders in exchange for the Soviet Union’s willingness to intervene in human rights. It was a major achievement.
However, after the end of the Cold War, NATO’s expansion to the east overshadowed the OSCE and its mutual promise not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. It is now necessary to relaunch the Helsinki Process, which has been supported by the Russian Government in the past.
The new Helsinki process should put three Russian concerns on the agenda: the disarmament of European nuclear weapons, the reduction and eventual cessation of hostilities on Russia’s borders, and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Ukraine in the near future. In return, Russia would stop military construction on the Ukrainian border – and all parties would agree to cooperate on many other issues.
In this way, Helsinki 2.0 and the revived OSCE could bring arms control back on the table, take concrete steps to reduce military confrontation in Eastern Europe and give more power to diplomats instead of generals.
And as the overwhelming threat of climate change progresses, Helsinki 2.0 could also put climate cooperation at the heart of the new agreement. In return for the West recognizing Russia’s security concerns around its borders, Moscow could agree to launch a new program with its OSCE partners to reduce CO2 emissions and switch from fossil fuels. Helsinki 2.0 must be cooperation, not just dispute management.
Now is not the time for the Biden regime to break away from Europe to focus narrowly on internal affairs – or to jeopardize Ukraine’s mediation war with Russia.
Instead, it is time to face Russia – not by military force, but by a bold diplomatic agreement that can safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty, make Eastern Europe safer and improve the well-being of all from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
John Feffer directs Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF.org) project at the Institute for Policy Studies. He has written several books on Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author.