Finland’s defense of ‘equality of sovereignty’ – European Council on Foreign Relations
The Finnish president’s traditional New Year’s speeches usually go unnoticed outside his own country. But this year, Sauli Niinistö’s comments led to Economic times to write a story heading “Finland insists on its right to join NATO in defiance of Russia”. The issue aroused increased interest in Finland as well, with newspapers Helsingin Sanomat takes time to explain the connection process to their readers. But is there really a Finnish NATO membership in the cards? Niinistö shortly afterwards wrote that he had not said anything different from one before statement in December, and that he would clearly signal some change in position. In fact, the President reiterated the well-considered – and heavy – words that “Finland’s room for maneuver and freedom of choice also includes the possibility of military adaptation and applying for NATO membership, should we decide for ourselves”.
Even the Prime Minister Sanna Marin maintains this attitude. And it is true that Vladimir Putin December warnings on NATO enlargement has not – much – changed the content of Finnish communications on this issue.
But the warnings have been answered and the words of the political leaders suggest how the situation can change. Niinistös 1 January warned that Russia’s latest ultimatum to the United States and NATO is in conflict with the European security order. The Prime Minister has referred to the principles of the OSCE, and the President pointed to “the sovereign equality of all states as a fundamental principle that everyone should respect” – a line that will sound familiar to Russian government spokesmen. In today’s fast – moving world, even normally slow processes can suddenly rush forward. In the case of Finland, what decisive factors can change the country’s consideration and lead it towards NATO membership?
A first obvious answer is Russia. The country is the main reason why Finland joins NATO – at the same time as it is the main reason why the country does not join. Finland’s only security problem comes from Russia, but still only Russia would react negatively to a Finnish application for membership in NATO.
This question has been around for a while. The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered one Report was published in 2016 under the title “The effects of Finland’s possible NATO membership”, written by senior Finnish, Swedish and French experts. At the same time as it predicts an initial sharp Russian reaction to Finland’s accession, it also foresees tacit consent and possible acceptance once enlargement has taken place. So even if membership is not ruled out, the report was clear that such a big change should only be a long-term move, not a short-term response.
A second answer to the question of what would drive Finland towards NATO would be a clear change in public opinion – and how politicians handle this. Domestic opinion has shown a slight increase in favor of NATO and reduced support for military freedom of alliance. Polls have was found only 24-26 percent for membership and 51 percent against. How this is expressed through the formal processes is still unclear: in the past, a referendum could have been the preferred way to decide on such a significant change. But the dangers posed by referendums, including the potential for power from a chance to intervene, are now often cited as a reason against organizing one – something that is not entirely unproblematic from a democracy perspective. Perhaps the support could be measured by parliamentary election results. One party, the center-right National Coalition, has been advocating for membership since 2006, and some representatives of the Green Party have spoken more positive about membership. But other large parties are significantly smaller for.
At present, without any political party really leading the debate, or signs that public opinion is moving dramatically by itself, it is unlikely that domestic dynamism will drive Finland towards NATO.
Nevertheless, another external actor may prove to be crucial. If Sweden were to apply for membership in NATO, Finland would quickly follow suit. But what should Sweden do? Even if Stockholm stays closer to Finnish politics than before, it would still not necessarily follow if Helsinki went first. It would be easier for Sweden to be surrounded by NATO countries than for Finland to be between the NATO member state Sweden and Russia. If it ever decides to join, Sweden may need other reasons, of a more moral and principled kind – and Niinistö’s New Year’s speech perhaps also hinted at this, with what appears to be a conscious reference to the country when he remarked that “the sovereignty of several Member States, including Sweden and Finland, has been challenged outside the Union.”
Niinistö’s insistence on sovereignty seems to have resonated, as the Swedish Prime Minister has already talked to him on the issue. The deep security and defense co-operation that has long existed between the two countries should mean that they would consult with each other before announcing such a major decision. And when they moved together, they could formulate favorable membership terms.
So while headlines suggesting a potential Finnish membership in NATO may be wrong, the subtext of the story suggests that the situation is not entirely static either.
Hanna Ojanen is a member of the ECFR Council and Head of Research at the University of Tampere, Finland
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take a collective position. ECFR publications represent the views of individual authors only.