Winter campaign
Russian-Ukrainian war is becoming the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II. At the current rate, it will surpass the more than 140,000 deaths in the decade-long wars in Yugoslavia. According to the US estimate, military losses (killed and wounded in action) are more than 200,000 soldiers. This number does not include the needless and inexcusable deaths of countless civilians. Economically, the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that a trillion USD is needed to rebuild his nation. According to conservative estimates by Reuters, the figure is closer to 310 billion.
As the conflict drags on for ten months, what initially seemed like a three-day rush to Kiev has slowed to a slow, grinding war of attrition. The front lines, with the major exceptions of Kharkiv and Kherson, have remained mostly static. In the Kharkiv region, Russians settled on the outskirts of the city of Kharkiv since the beginning of Moscow’s “special military operation”. In mid-September, the Russians withdrew from the area, realizing the hopeless situation. Their advantage in artillery and air force could not offset the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Ukrainian army.
In the beginning of November, General Surovik too, the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, ordered a withdrawal from Kherson City. Kherson is one of four regions annexed by Russia after unrecognized referendums in September. The retreat sparked shock and outrage among the Russian domestic public, as Kherson was the largest city captured since the offensive began in February. The Kremlin had even installed billboards in Kherson City boldly declaring, “Russia is here, forever.” It turns out that eternity is less than a year.
The Ukrainian government declared Kherson as a major turning point in the conflict, the capstone of progress in the Kharkiv region. For them, it meant a change of pace in their favor. It also gave the beleaguered Ukrainian public a much-needed morale boost. The Russians, on the other hand, gave up their geographically strategic position on the coast in their quest to enter Ukraine at the expense of their hinterland. Why did they do this?
The answer is twofold. First of all, we need to understand that Kherson City is located on the left bank of the Dnieper River. It was Russia’s only foothold on that side of the river. Using American HIMARS missile systems, the Ukrainians destroyed all the bridges connecting the Russian-controlled right bank to the city on the left bank. This wreaked havoc on Russia’s ability to deliver troops to the left and forced the use of makeshift pontoon bridges.
Second, the Russian high command feared that the Ukrainians would destroy the Nova Kakhovka dam, located upstream from Kherson City. The ensuing wave would have completely flooded Kherson City and severed the already strained supply lines, leaving more than 30,000 Russian troops stranded at the mercy of the Ukrainian military. With these reasons in mind, Surovik ordered a retreat.
As mentioned earlier, this conflict has turned into a war of attrition. This means that the outcome will not be decided by one or two decisive battles. It depends on the combatants’ ability to weaken the combat capability of the opposing army. Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson and Kharkiv were wise tactical decisions. Although Surovikin hurts Russian pride, he admits that Russia can take back land, but cannot resurrect life.
Currently, the Russian workforce in Ukraine is significantly weaker than the number of Ukrainian army troops. According to estimates, a 3-1 advantage in favor of the defenders. Conventional military wisdom dictates that attackers must have a 3-1 advantage to succeed. But this logic is based on peer-to-peer conflicts. Russia dominates Ukraine in almost all other areas, economic power, military power, technology and materials.
The Russian high command is acutely aware of its shortcomings. Their primary goal is to achieve the objectives of the special military operation. Ensuring that Ukraine never joins NATO, so that the Ukrainian government recognizes Crimea and all other annexed territories as Russian territory, and the vague “denazification of Ukraine”. The preservation of lives is therefore of paramount importance. Not because of any particular empathy or compassion for the common soldier. But because the success of the operation depends on it.
The withdrawal of Kherson and Kharkov has shortened the front line. In the southern part of Ukraine, the front line runs mostly along the Dnieper River. As you can imagine, guarding the banks of a river, in some areas more than a kilometer wide, requires far fewer troops than defending open fields. The Russians used surplus troops from the shortened lines to reinforce the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions.
In the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russian high command fears that the Ukrainian army will try to retake the occupied city of Melitopol. If the Ukrainians succeed in this feat, the Russian land bridge to Crimea will be cut, splitting Russian forces in half and cutting supply lines from the Russian mainland, leaving the Kerch Bridge as the only rail and road link between Russia and the Crimean peninsula. At the beginning of October, the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) launched an operation that destroyed parts of the bridge in Kerch. The Kremlin has ordered the bridge to be repaired by July 2023.
A successful Ukrainian attack on Melitopol would shift the balance of power on the battlefield in favor of the AFU and force Russia to rely on the already vulnerable Kerch Bridge and sea transport to deliver troops to the Crimean front. The logistics and maintenance network of the Russian army is based on railways. Thus, any transition to maritime transport would reduce efficiency, leaving tens of thousands of soldiers in the Crimea region undersupplied and at risk of being captured by the AFU. The Russian high command cannot allow this to happen, especially since securing a land bridge to Crimea is one of Putin’s main goals in this conflict.
On the Donetsk front, Surovikin uses reinforcements effectively. Most of the fighting rages in and around the city of Bakhmut. Russia seems to be making slow progress in the region. Many military analysts have stated that Bahmut is a support for the AFU defense lines in the Donetsk region, and that if it falls, Ukrainian forces will be forced to retreat to defense lines in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the only remaining major cities in Donetsk.
The owner of the infamous Russian private military company Wagner Group has described the fighting in Bakhmut as a “meat grinder”. Other commenters have expressed similar sentiments. A grave war reminiscent of the First World War is underway. Images emerging from Bakhmut show trenches with dead bodies and soldiers knee-deep in water, surrounded by a hellscape of destroyed infrastructure and broken trees.
So what will Ukraine do with the troops from Kharkov and Kherson? This is where Russia’s widely reported and condemned airstrikes on Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure come into play. During the last month, up to 70 percent of Ukraine was without electricity. Ukraine relies on its railway system to transport troops. A large part of the railway system in Ukraine is electric. Russian airstrikes have hampered Kiev’s ability to redeploy troops to frontline areas and disrupted supply lines, which, like Russia’s, are mainly by rail.
Russia is not only targeting electrical infrastructure to delay the deployment of troops. The Kremlin is waging a brutal campaign to destroy the morale and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people. December 1 officially marked the beginning of European winter. Temperatures in Ukraine are currently in the negative Celsius range. A lack of reliable electricity puts hundreds of thousands of people at risk of hypothermia.
So far, the Ukrainians have managed to fix their power grid and keep it afloat. But the system is approaching its breaking point. Satellite images show that the Russians are massing bombers at their airfield near Ukraine, preparing for another devastating strike. Is this the straw that breaks the camel’s back?
Belarus and Western Russia are reported to have over 300,000 troops. Are the Russians waiting for winter to harden the muddy plains and swamps of Ukraine before a winter invasion? Will we see another use of Belarus as a staging ground for Russia’s invasion of northern Ukraine? Only time will tell, but the next few months will be crucial in determining the future of this conflict.
Keval Marimuthu
Keval Marimuthu is a Trinidadian student of international relations and political science.
He is very interested in understanding the root causes of geopolitical conflicts and their effects on the international system.
Keval is currently studying at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad and Tobago.
HT
This is an “Outlook” opinion column. The views and opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of The Helsinki Times. This column has not been verified and HT is not responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statements in this article.