Expert: Belarus and other CSTO countries will not fight for Russia in Ukraine
Will you support the CSTO state of Moscow and will you fight together with Russia for the territory of Ukraine, which Russia is annexing? Is there any chance that the West will quickly satisfy the request of the President of Ukraine for a forced position of the country in NATO? What is the probability of the reverse transformation into a nuclear?
To these questions Yuri Drakokhrust answers director and research program for the Eastern Neighborhood and Russia at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs Arkady Moshes.
– Is such a scheme realistic: Russia declares 4 regions of Ukraine its territory, Ukrainians lead the military action to de-occupy them, Russia declares itself a victim of aggression and requires the CSTO member states to support its military forces?
– I don’t think it’s Stan. This would be extremely unprofitable for Russia and would be carried out by the CSTO on the verge of philosophy and collapse. All three.
All CSTO countries, except Russia, continue to recognize Ukraine within the framework of 1991. None of these countries even admitted to the way of the Crimea to the Russian Federation. Lukashenko recently stated that he finally confessed to publishing Crimea to Russia, but the constitutional procedure was not carried out. That is why Ukraine and Belarus maintain chronic relations.
The CSTO countries that received the post-Soviet countries simply cannot agree to a revision of the 1991 borders, much less fight for it. This is unacceptable and dangerous for everyone, but first of all for Kazakhstan, taking into account the frequent occurrences from Moscow in relation to the northern regions of the country.
All the CSTO countries, with the exception of Russia, continue to recognize Ukraine and Russia within the framework of 1991, then there will be no automaticity in their actions to help Russia in its new defenses.
The second aspect is political and legal. Article 4 of the CSTO treaty is drafted as vaguely as possible. It says that assistance to the country that asks for it will be “provided”. The country that makes the request for help is presumably supposed to get what kind of help it needs. In practice, this does not happen. There are no exact mechanisms for providing this assistance, including business ones.
That is why Armenia has not received any assistance and that is why it fears that it will consider withdrawing from the CSTO. After all, there is no mechanism for providing assistance, which means that everyone who does not want to send it will find loopholes for themselves.
And the third point is that none of the CSTO members is eager to choose Russia. There are not enough funds right now.
Russia has found itself in a situation to which it has been pushing itself in recent years. She absolutized sovereignty, she said that she did not need allies.
Putin himself once said: thank God that we are not members of any unions. It really wasn’t. But this absolutization of one’s exclusion of loneliness has led to the fact that there are no small allies in Russia.
We will soon see this vote in the UN. The preliminary vote on March 2 showed that Russia supported the DPRK, Syria and Eritrea. And plus Belarus, which in the struggle was called an aggressor-usurer.
Something tells me that Russia’s allies will either abstain or not vote during the UN vote.
– But Belarus is a separate case. The other day, a strange visit by Lukashenko to Abkhazia took place, which Belarus has not recognized since 2008. The research group “Belarusian Gayun” reports that the Belarusian Railway is prepared to transport military cargo from Russia.
The dependence of Belarus on the capture of Russia, Russian missiles continue to fly from Belarusian territory to Ukraine. Will Lukashenka – legally or not – be forced to join the war with his army?
– I agree that Belarus is a separate case. And not on the occasion of the “union state”. These relations were very peculiar by 2020, and after 2020 they became peculiar and even more so.
Belarus is already participating in this war. According to the allocation of aggression, the UN can use another country to attack a third – this is already aggression.
Belarus may accidentally exclude its own and military infrastructure for the next round of escalation. This is to be expected and should be avoided. But this does not change anything for Lukashenka’s regime.
The situation would change if the Belarusian troops crossed the Ukrainian road under their own flags. But I think that Lukashenka is quite an experienced politician and intriguer. He understands that on the edge of the abyss he needs to hold on to his blue feelings so as not to fall into this abyss.
Minsk of Entrepreneurship somehow restores relations with the West. We saw this in the actions of Vladimir Makei at the UN. It doesn’t work out very well. But I believe that Lukashenka will be inclined not to send his troops to Ukraine until the very end.
And it seems to me that he has more chances to evade this than he had in the spring.
– What does Lukashenka’s visit to Abkhazia mean?
– If it happened in 2008 or 2009, it would be one resonance. To date, there is semi-recognition, the constitutional recognition procedure has not been carried out.
Should we expect recognition of Russia’s entry into the composition of the new events? I believe that again we heard the “tale of the white bull”: they say, with the facts of observation is not considered unacceptable, but legally we are considering, analyzing, etc.
I cannot unequivocally say “no” that this is not happening. But it doesn’t seem very real to me. First of all, because Russia itself does not really need it.
If a parade took place behind Belarus, at least from the side of the post-Soviet states, then it would make sense to put pressure on Lukashenka. If Lukashenka does this, it will become another reason for jokes.
– Can’t Moscow reveal its annexation of the Army and Tajikistan? They are also dependent on Russia, permanently residing there.
– Very difficult. After all, you need to squeeze everyone and along the way. The diplomatic state and state resources of Russia are not endless, and it is irrational for her to use them to achieve a non-primary goal.
It is important for her to maintain control over six territories. She may not be able to keep them. It doesn’t really matter to her.
This seems incredible to me. But if we managed to put the squeeze on Armenia and Tajikistan, nothing changes. I would change such countries as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Recognition from Yerevan and Dushanbe will worsen the situation in the world, but will do little for Russia.
– President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has officially been influenced on the territory of the country in the alliance under an accelerated procedure. How do you assess the prospects for the implementation of this initiative?
– I believe that in Ukraine the speed of admission to the alliance under the accelerated procedure is not taken into account, and I do not know anything. A number of large state assets in relation to the situation related to the war will not go out. But depending on the situation in the theater of operations, not today, but in a year or two, it will be possible to talk about some options.
If you start applying some procedures, then it will already be useful.
Before the start of the war, it was clear to everyone that none of the post-Soviet countries had any chance of joining either NATO or the EU. There was a mental map that marked the space of Euro-Atlantic value and post-Soviet speed. And between them is a high and thick wall. It was believed that the spread in Europe is tuned to any post-Soviet situation of the country to conflict with Russia and the challenge of Russia’s conflict with the West, which is assessed as unacceptable.
The June decision of the EU gives the status of a claim in the Union of Ukraine and Moldova. This mental map is completely changing. Ukraine will not necessarily join the EU in the near future, it can go through the difficult path of the Balkan countries, which does not go anywhere.
But the awarding of Ukraine the official status of a candidate member of the EU Council has changed the situation in the country.
As for the discussion, the transition of the discussion from the absolutely abstract formulations of the 2008 alliance’s Bucharest summit to a revolution in practical questions of how and when Ukraine can be admitted to NATO is already a significant step forward.
The Ukrainians took a risky step, which Berlin, for example, will irritate rather than please. They are going to discuss the practical plane.
– Vladimir Putin in all his latest speeches threatens to use weapons. According to your forecast, will this threat be realized?
– I’m not a military expert. But as far as the use of weapons is concerned, nothing can be ruled out. For too long we have proceeded from the premise that a major war in Europe is impossible, which would penetrate into Russia and change the essence of economic relations between her and the West.
We’ve made a lot of wrong predictions, thinking it’s very strong and stupid, that it can’t be in love.
If Russia continues to tolerate pressure on the front, it will greatly increase the likelihood of US tactical weapons being used.
And yet I think we are not there yet.
The decision to use weapons is a decision of a fundamentally different order than, perhaps, the decision to mobilize. As we can see, the decision to mobilize was delayed for many months.
Is Putin ready to go for it? Maybe. Does he know what the consequences are? I think he knows something better than us.
The possibilities of a non-military Western response to a nuclear attack on Ukraine are so great that we cannot even imagine them.
– Non-military or non-nuclear response?
– Non-military. I do not see the possibility of transferring troops to the front or transferring strikes against a military facility. Another sanctions policy of Ukraine is everything is possible.
Putin’s language flaunted a while ago, they say, we are not yet readers. He can now insert meaning into these words. So, the Western sanctions policy has not yet been read.
Russia may be completely isolated from anything. The emergence of nuclear threats in America may occur more frequently. But we cannot slip out of the impasse of mutually assured destruction.
To the Western response to the use of weapons in special conditions and China. We have no reason to believe that China, along with Russia, will perish in a nuclear war. If Beijing joins the policy of containing Russia, it will be a completely different situation.
I believe the US embassy application is currently working with China and India to add them to the delayed pressure on Russia to prevent nuclear weapons.
Translation from Bel. — EX-PRESS.BY
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