The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the Russian side is temporarily withdrawn from inspection activities under the Treaty on Reducing the Risks of Offensive Arms (START), signed in Prague in 2010 by Russian and US Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, their facilities, trial inspections. Now events can be saved in the most saved way.
The very fact of the presence of infection is about the confidence of the Russian side in its rightness. Moreover, questions are excluded that the US will agree with Russia’s position on the need for search, in particular, with the appearance of future inspectors on US territory in the face of the emergence and restrictions on air traffic, including from US allies. By the way, in accordance with the provisions of START, if there are inspectors for specific inspected categories “inspection aircraft, commercial flights, and open skies aircraft” – the last option cannot cause a sad smile in connection with the consumption of the United States, and then Russia, in the Sky Operation Treaty back in 2020-2021.
In general, inspection activities under START have not been carried out since the spring of 2020 due to the pandemic COVID-19-19. At the same time, despite some mutual recognition of commitment to expanding START, the parties have repeatedly admitted that counterparties comply with the rules of self-commitment, “ceilings” of 700 deployed carriers – that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers (TB) – and 1550 conditional nuclear warheads on them, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed carriers, were successfully reached on time in 2018, and START was extended until 2026 in early 2021, becoming the first Russian-American foreign policy “acts after Joe Biden’s personal position.
The pinnacle of the negotiation process: on the 30th anniversary of the signing of START
On July 31, 1991, in Moscow, the President of the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace, President Mikhail Gorbachev and the United States George W. Bush signed the START-1 Treaty. This infection ceremony is March 12, 1985.
What has changed in August 2022? Perhaps the key element of the Foreign Ministry’s statement is an indication of the existing contradiction between Russia and the United States in relation to the procedure for resuming the inspection after the “covid” pause. American restoration inspections without prior noticesending about the intention to conduct an inspection on our territory in the coming days. Russia, on the other hand, would like a comprehensive solution that takes into account developments not only in the epidemiological, but also in the political sphere.
Without an inspection, both parties are not obliged to offer their views, as well as with the implementation of agreed devices and devices, with confidence in the detection of information sent by counterparties in the data registration protocol, including the status (deployed / undeployed) of certain delivery vehicles, the number warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, on the characteristics of tuberculosis, on the progress of production, the expediency and expediency of carriers.
In addition, for Russia, the problem of the irreversibility of the results due to the inclusion of part of the SLBM launchers on the Ohio strategic nuclear submarines, as well as part of the B-52 heavy bombers converted for especially non-nuclear loads, is still relevant. By and large, as far as one can judge, the Avangard missile system with a hypersonic glide wing is of great interest, and in the short term, both the Sarmat heavy ICBM and our mobile group of ICBMs. In addition, there will certainly be questions about the new production Tu-160M2, and possibly also about the modernized Tu-22M3M, which are currently not considered TB in the terms of the Treaty. At the same time, within the scope of the START, new systems will have time to manifest themselves and may become the cause of a strategic triad. Of course, the promising Sentinel ICBMs and the Columbia submarine will most likely appear across the ocean towards the end of this – they start to meet. However, the promising TB B-21 can “make it in time”. Of course, the counting rules (1 TB corresponds to one nuclear warhead) allow you to worry a little less about the occasion in this part, the bombers are clearly visible on satellite images.
At the same time, the main problem in application is that there is always a threat of this nature: the lack of information about the probable confrontation when planning the possible use of force and military construction in general leads to an increase in the assessment of the results of detection and, as a result, an overexpenditure of resources for their results, as well as the detection quite strange views on methodological attitudes – and attitudes too. Moreover, the situation is especially unpleasant due to the tendency to “mirror” both in domestic and (if not more to a greater extent) in the threats of stressful cultures: if we don’t know what this “thing” is from the other side and why it might be needed, we begin to proceed from our ideas about beauty, or, much more often, about stress. Of course, such a problem exists in the current conditions, but without inspections, incidents can significantly worsen.
There is a prompt solution to all the problems voiced in the Russian market, at the moment it is not necessary. At the same time, there are no loud statements from the US side, and the excessive resolution of the issue of suspicion of inspection activity makes complaints on both sides. This approach, for example, through the decisions of a bilateral consultative commission regulating inspections in the current conditions (we repeat – both in the epidemiological and political parts), would begin to implement the START adaptation regime to current realities. However, the likelihood and possible sharp test in the United States, first of all, at the level of Congress and undesirable fighters against control over the consequences in general and cooperation with the Russians in particular. Such developments could endanger terrorism and START itself.
Moreover, perhaps Washington will decide that its total regime, which is coming out today: the parties are reduced by benefits, the loss of technical means (satellites) is approaching verification. The absence to date of actions that impede the work with individual technical means gives hope that the Treaty will naturally survive. The statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry underlines the standard of our country in maintaining the START.
It is possible that some reassessment of the role of inspection activity in the field of development control will be carried out.
As assessed, the party in monitoring the situation with increased sensitivity to increased offensive influences in another person, adjustment of taste sensations in sensations (possibly sufficient) It is possible that in the case satisfaction the current state of affairs with New START in Moscow and Washington, a window may open slightly, more precisely, the possibility of switching to multi-level control over serious consequences, based on an assessment to assess the logistical complexity Given that the expected events are present at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Threat of Use of Weapons, can be expected in this discussion and “third” countries (both nuclear and non-nuclear).
On the other hand, practice shows that, unfortunately, the suspension of emissions in the field of spending control, with the best of intentions, has led to their collapse more than once, at least partially. , to some extent, and the above-mentioned Treaty on the operation of the sky). And in the observed situations, even the smallest (including unilateral) steps can include recommendations for controlling functions, or, more broadly, identifying the possibility of a situation of emergence and trust, giving impetus to more serious achievements.
The American administration (in its current state), as far as one can argue, is interested in maintaining START and restoring the inspection regime. At the same time, there is a risk that the Russian position may be used to increase pressure on Moscow as a “troublemaker” in the nuclear sphere and will be on a par with existing narratives about growing nuclear threats in the context of a military operation on the territory of Ukraine.
The main “variable” remains the continued belief that emissions control in general and the New START in particular are servants of national security feelings in both Russia and the United States. I would like to believe that such an understanding, as well as sanity and composure, are among the decision-makers in both Moscow and Washington.
Post-nuclear nuclear world
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If the surrounding citizens do not embrace the nuclear danger, the elites also tend to ignore it and dismiss specialists with their calculations and calculations as boring freaks.