Turkey and the argument of Greece at the NATO Summit in …
By Alexandros Drivas
NATO is no longer what it was until 23/2/2022. We have to admit that multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are evolving as they follow the same evolution of international politics. If international politics is the whole, then NATO is a subset of it, and so it is in the image and likeness of the world we live in, and it was already very different from what it was during the Cold War. Today, the accelerator of developments is the war in Ukraine. Countries that have in mind what Putin had, are “inspired” or even think of such wars. Other countries that think like Ukraine (maintaining the status quo) are trying to avoid a preemptive war against them and thus avoid a future that will resemble the gloomy present lived by the Ukrainian people. There is a “Russia” in NATO which has been building its own vision for 12 years. While Putin was building the “Russian world” as he sees it, Erdogan saw and still sees himself as a Sultan. A completely inappropriate treaty for a NATO member state.
The Greek-Turkish conflict is taking place within NATO. To put it more precisely, Greece is a NATO-based ally with Turkey. Ankara is plotting Greek sovereignty and Greek territorial integrity. We were both in NATO when the great tensions started, when they ended in the barbaric invasion of Attila in Cyprus, when the crises of 1987 and 1996 took place, and of course, when a year ago (1995) the Turkish National Assembly voted the casus . belli against any attempt by Greece to exercise its sovereign right to extend to 12 n.m. Today, Turkey sees in Greece a careful attempt to use at some point what is unthinkable for Ankara. The extension to 12 n.m. is a legal right (inalienable) for Greece, as it is also necessary at some point in the future to put an end to an anomaly (correct irrationality) of International Law so that some are the miles by Sea and others by Air (world originality).
Turkey’s aggression against Greece must be considered at several levels. The internal factor is present especially as we approach the elections in the neighboring country, however Greece can not influence this factor. Greece can neither reduce the nationalist climate, nor the superiority over nationalism, nor reduce the economic bleeding of Turkey. The method by which Greece must examine Greek-Turkish, needs the separation of factors based on its own influence on them. Any “preference” for a political figure in Turkey is marginally naive, as the socio-political conditions in Turkey have a framework for any aspiring leader in Turkey. Overall, the Turkish political system does not tolerate “national defeats”, so resorting to extreme nationalism will always be attractive in the neighboring country, until at least such a change in foreign policy comes to force the Turkish political system to reject nationalism on its own. . In other words, the “Turkish political system” factor is not influenced by Greece to the extent that Athens cannot expect positive changes from a different government in Turkey. However, Greece must keep in mind an aspect of Turkey’s domestic policy that influences Greek-Turkish issues. This aspect is “Erdoganism”.
Turkey’s political system after 2002 is very different from what it was before Erdogan came to power. Erdogan, as much as he is an opponent of the united opposition on the road to his elections, has not ceased to be a model of climbing and succeeding in power. Fanaticism leads to the militarization of Turkey’s foreign policy and this makes it less compromising.
So, what should Greece put in the NATO Summit knowing that Turkey has created as a line of defense an uncompromising agenda towards the West (including the Greek-Turkish ones)? First, to set precisely this dimension of the ever-shrinking elements that could prove that Turkey is a democracy that respects the rule of law and human rights. This may be a project that we are a little interested in in Greece, as the others are our priorities in Greek-Turkish, but the Western community respects such arguments much more, especially now that the war in Ukraine brings to the core of the debate the defense of the West against of authoritarian. schemes. The second argument that Greece has to make concerns all the similarities of the Turkish positions in Greek-Turkish with the corresponding Russian positions for Ukraine. More specifically, it is not possible for an organization such as NATO not to condemn the right to defense, especially when it threatens a NATO member country. In addition, phrases such as “demilitarization” and “gray zones” are strongly reminiscent of Russia’s position on a neutral Ukraine. At the same time, the illegal resolution of the Turkish National Assembly of 1995 with which the exercise of sovereign right of Greece with an extension to 12 n.m. becomes a cause of war. The momentum is not good for Turkey, when countries like Sweden and Finland receive historic claims for their place in the world, marking a shift from the other to neutrality. The third argument concerns the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Greece must openly support the two countries and demand Turkey’s anti-allied stance. Without giving reasons why Turkey is doing so, the simple complaint is incomplete. Turkey wants to facilitate Russia while at the same time launching a blackmail in the West, trying to get the green light for an invasion of Syria but also to insult the political culture of Sweden and Finland, naming these countries more or less as countries fostering. terrorism. Turkey’s relations with Hamas, as well as with other terrorist organizations, violate the entire NATO statute. Fourth, the report by Greece that Turkey has carried out an illegal invasion and occupation of Cyprus will bring great embarrassment to Turkey. It is the only NATO member state that illegally holds the territory of another state. Turkey’s attempt to seek refuge in the unhistorical “we carried out a peace operation in Cyprus” will bring it even closer to Russia’s argument for Ukraine, which it refers to as a “special military operation” aimed at protecting Russian-speakers. We must realize that our arguments have been enriched and renamed with what is happening in Ukraine. Fifth, Greece must contribute to NATO ideas for implementation regarding the mechanisms of the organization itself. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization suffers from policies like those of Turkey precisely because it does not provide for the expulsion of a country. Both the EU as well as NATO must follow the dual organizations and a multilateral organization can be open only if it is clear and has specific criteria. The debate on Turkey’s future in NATO has opened up to very important reservoirs of thought in the world and in the background, it is also being discussed by politicians of NATO member states. Sixth, Greece must have on the NATO table that there is no way to negotiate with Turkey if Turkey itself does not respect in practice the procedures set out in international law. The dialogue between Greece and Turkey will be fruitful only if Turkey follows legitimate practices and ceases to be a state of unrest. With this argument, Greece secures two good negotiating positions: First, it puts our allies in charge for them to continue the precautionary pressure on Turkey in order to cancel the active threats against Greece. Secondly, it avoids the convenient for G.G. of NATO which was a substanceless dialogue and which simply closed the window for serious pressure and possibly sanctions on Turkey.
It is good to learn from the mistakes of the investigators after the summer of 2020 but also from what we finally did not see after the dinner of March 2022. The dialogue must be done on time and the time for a serious dialogue is always the one that offers content. As long as we talk to Turkey under this regime, then the invocation to the international community becomes inactive as they themselves will consider possible pressure on Turkey as a bad practice that will threaten the continuation of the dialogue.
Greece in the last month that is doing very well in preventing Turkey. The deterrent in international relations starts with the statements and we have already realized as much as Turkey that Greece will respond “overwhelmingly” according to the word used by the Greek Prime Minister himself. Prevention must continue not to be that form so that we can not put it into practice in the field. At the same time, Greece must internationalize with maps the irrational and illegal demands of Turkey, to respond to Turkey succinctly and decisively to any frenzy and nationalism of the Turkish political system, but securing the always very useful (international law) position of the defender. The fact that we are not challenging Turkey should be in exchange for what we will do in Turkey to dare a challenge. The climate for Turkey is particularly difficult after the Berlin Pentagon and Greece must take advantage of it as after the NATO Summit, Turkey is likely to return to the threats.
In any case, for Greece it should not be a question of whether Turkey will finally do something in the summer or in the winter. Our issue is that Turkey knows that Greece is building a strategy that leads to the expansion to 12 n.m. The defense agreements with the USA and France, as well as the armaments of Greece until 2030 show that Greece is preparing properly. We will hardly avoid tensions in the next eight years and so we have to assess. At the NATO Summit, Greece must have arguments with a depth of time and not with a depth of the summer of 2022.
* Mr. Alexandros Drivas is an Internationalist