Erdoğan’s problem is not with Sweden and Finland, but with Turkey’s Western vocation
At a historic summit this week, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will adopt a new one Strategic concept, the first in 12 years, which guides the Alliance’s policies in an increasingly insecure European security environment. In all cases, looms over this is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s objection to membership for Sweden and Finland. Early expectations that Erdoğan would allow himself “to be persuaded, persuaded and eventually rewarded for their cooperation“has not materialized. A last-minute attempt to negotiate a breakthrough last week also failed, leaving NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to put his hopes on one.”soon as possible”Following the summit resolution on the stalemate.
Erdoğan’s irreconcilability is widely attributed to domestic policy considerations, including a desperate need to divert attention from the plight of Turkey’s economy and to strengthen his declining voting rating by playing for rampant nationalist and anti-Western sentiments. However plausible these statements may be, Erdoğan’s own displeasure with Turkey’s long – standing Western vocation, symbolized by its membership of NATO as well as the Council of Europe, is also behind them. He instrumentalises the question of Swedish and Finnish membership in order to weaken this vocation, if not break it, in order to eliminate the remaining institutional controls of his one-man government.
It is important that the United States and its NATO allies avoid policies that would be on Erdoğan’s agenda until the national elections – in June 2023 – before they completely write off a Western-oriented Turkey. This could keep alive the prospects for a Turkey that can rebuild its democracy and economy, and to better serve the security interests of its own and the transatlantic alliance, in fleeting times.
What is behind Erdoğan’s opposition to Swedish and Finnish NATO membership?
Erdoğan first announced that he did not see NATO membership bid of either Finland or Sweden positively, on the grounds that they had become “secure house“For terrorists. This was a reference to the presence and activities of individuals and organizations with links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Gülenists, in general recognized for being the perpetrators of the coup attempt against him in July 2016. The message came on May 13 and may initially have been an attempt to divert attention from two events around that time: an political ban for opposition politician Canan Kaftancıoğluwidely credited with defeating Erdoğan’s preferred candidate in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral election, and the violent intervention of the Israeli police during the funeral of the slain Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, over whom Erdoğan chose to remain uncharacteristically silent. He then intensified their objections by adding that “all forms of arms embargoes“, especially by Sweden, against Turkey’s defense industry goes against” the spirit of military partnership under the NATO umbrella. “
Erdoğan has since made it clear that he will not easily relinquish his veto unless these objections are raised. A plethora of diplomatic activities followed to address what Stoltenberg on several occasions defined as Turkey’s “legitimate“Concern, without concrete results. The stalemate seems to be due to different definitions of “terrorism” and Erdoğan requirement on extradition of persons including Swedish citizens and a Member of Parliament. It goes without saying that direct material support, as emphasized by several experts and earlier Turkish diplomats, provided to the PKK – recognized by Turkey, the United States and the European Union as a terrorist organization – is really problematic and needs to be addressed. The complication stems from a definition of terrorism in Turkish law that goes beyond criminalizing participation in acts of violence and violates fundamental freedom of expression. This loose and often aggressive formulation of the terms terrorist and terrorism is regularly used by Erdoğan and members of his government to silence and oppress its critics and opponents.
Erdoğan’s uncompromising stance contrasts with the earlier years of his leadership in Turkey, when he seemed committed to liberal democratic values and when Ankara – with great American, Finnish and Swedish support – began its accession process to EU membership. Turkey achieved its greatest integration with the transatlantic community and shared peacekeeping responsibilities on behalf of NATO in its neighborhood and persistently supported NATO enlargement including the “open door” policy..
Erdoğan has since transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential system with virtually no controls and balances in power. Growing authoritarianism and oppression of critics and opponents has become a crucial face for the country, with the condemnation of civil society activists Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaşformer leader of the main Kurdish political party, along with the likelihood that Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, who likes higher voting ratings than Erdoğan, may well get a political ban as well.
NATO has become another target for Erdoğan’s vitriol as he accuses the West of Turkey’s growing economic mismanagement and political isolation. This goes back to the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when MPs from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) claimed NATO involvement without presenting a shred of evidence, and even called it a “”terrorist organization. ” This statement has been periodically raised by the government even though Erdoğan has personally avoided it. Still, Erdoğan’s close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and a relentless diplomatic struggle over those with Washington has deeply damaged Turkey’s credibility as a NATO ally. The skepticism about Turkey’s place in the alliance was further exacerbated by Erdoğan’s threat of deportation 10 Western ambassadors, seven of them from the Allies, for asking him to carry out a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and release Kavala. Instead, Erdoğan chose to categorically dismiss The ECHR Decision and the Council of Europe initiation of disciplinary action against Turkey.
This persistent anti-Western and anti-American narrative has found a receptive mood in a Turkish citizen who has been deprived of access to alternative discourses. Unsurprisingly, in recent years the Turkish public has perceived a greater security threat from the United States than from Russia (see Figure 81-83 here). According to Metropoll, an opinion polling company, 65% of those surveyed in April 2022 did not trust NATO; in January, 39.4% preferred closer relationships with China and Russia compared to 37.5% who prefer closer relations with the EU and the US
The geopolitical realities limit Erdoğan and NATO
But despite the anti-Western sentiment that Erdoğan has aroused, he is still spectacularly shy about breaking ties with NATO. His intermittent meetings in recent years have not reached a point where he can afford to announce Turkey’s abandonment of the alliance. The loudest thing he can say at home is when he remains silent when he suggests that Turkey should leave NATO, because his political ally Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party, boldly advocated last month. For Western audiences, he even repeated in a new one paragraph in The Economist his commitment to NATO and its expansion. Erdoğan’s ambiguity as to whether he is willing or able to break Turkey from NATO and the wider Western world shows the limits of his power and offers an opening for political consideration.
The Turkish president has ended up in a place where he has to negotiate his discomfort with the Western world and all that it represents with reality in place. The geopolitical situation around Turkey – and specifically Russia’s war against Ukraine – exacerbates the country’s economic diseases and negatively affects its national security. Near 58% of the Turkish public still believe that NATO is needed for Turkey’s security. Erdoğan’s objection to Sweden and Finland joining NATO is a symptom of his aversion to the values represented by Turkey’s own membership of the Alliance and other Western institutions, in particular the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. These values and institutions are an obstacle to his one-man rule as well as his ideological goal of eventually breaking Turkey’s traditional Western vocation.
But NATO also needs Turkey, as emphasized by a former commander of US forces in Europe who remarked, “I do not even want to think about NATO but Turkey.” Turkey’s future in NATO will largely depend on the outcome of next year’s elections. The opposition has repeatedly expressed its commitment to reviving Turkish democracy, although so far in foreign policy they have either remained out of sight or felt compelled to follow Erdoğan’s nationalist line. Until then, it is important not to write off Turkey.
With regard to Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO, it can be expected that the two sides will eventually meet in a pragmatic solution. In the event of a failure, key members of NATO, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, appear willing to extend Sweden and Finland bilateral security guarantees. Ultimately, keeping Turkey in NATO once again – just as it did 70 years ago when it first joined the Alliance – would serve as a channel for mutually reinforcing Turkey’s Western vocation and its democracy while promoting transatlantic security, especially in such challenging times as NATO’s new strategic concept is intended to address.