Emomali Rahmon consumes the people does not lose vigilance. Photo from the page of the President of Tajikistan on Flickr

On the eve of the Caspian summit, which will be held in Ashgabat on June 29, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Dushanbe. The meeting with the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon will be short – a conversation and a working lunch are planned. How important it is to understand that the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) in the current Silicon realities can be a reliable partner of Russia. To the Tajik leader, perhaps the appointed one, that his latest actions are contrary to allied obligations and public interests.

The last time the head of Russia and Tajikistan embraced in Moscow at the CSTO summit in mid-May. Emomali Rahmon raised the issues of equipping the armed forces of his country and spoke about the threat from Afghanistan.

These issues will again be on the agenda. Especially on the eve of the growing danger in Central Asia in Moscow, the defense ministers of Russia and the countries of the region. It is obvious that the territory of Afghanistan can be banned by terrorists as a base for penetrating into neighboring countries and creating an extensive network of jihadist underground: there is an activation in the Russian Federation Opposition to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda organizations.

President Emomali Rahmon On June 27, on the occasion of National Unity Day, which is expected in the country for the 25th time since the end of the civil war (1992-1997), the population “does not lose vigilance.” “The biggest danger discovered during those difficult periods was the threat of the disappearance of the Tajik nation and the danger of the early Tajik state with a political map of the world,” said the leader of nations, who has been at the helm of the state for 30 years. The transfer from father to son, begun several years ago, dragged on. And there are several reasons.

The emergence of a pandemic, then the arrival of the Taliban (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation) in Afghanistan, and today – the identification of the international situation and political instability, which successfully developed the West, trying to strengthen its influence in Central Asia. Tajikistan is the best in the near future in these plans. “One can note a public increase in activity towards Tajikistan, and this is just a unilateral association that cannot but cause concern in Moscow,” Alexander Knyazev, a professor at St. Petersburg State University and an expert on Central Asia and the Middle East, told NG. . According to him, Dushanbe’s policy regarding the situation in Afghanistan is not only not considered with Russia (also in the zone of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), but also completely falls on those approaches that, on the basis of the Afghan refusal, refer to the Americans and Europeans.

As a sign of support, the United States is ready to transfer military equipment to Tajikistan. In particular, Washington decided to donate to Dushanbe American planes and helicopters hijacked by the Afghan military after the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This issue was discussed during a recent visit to the Dushanbe Command of the US Central Command by General Michael Eric Kurilla. He said: “We are capturing the territory that Tajikistan is playing in Central Asia today.” He also said that US-RT ties are “historically strong.”

According to Knyazev, the direct support that needs to be provided in Dushanbe to the Western-oriented anti-Taliban opposition creates conditions that provoke the Taliban to a confrontation with Tajikistan. And the leaders of this opposition, including Ahmad Masood – the legendary field commander Ahmad Shah Masood, known for his successful struggle first with the Soviet troops, and then with the Taliban – are taken to the presidency of Tajikistan not with the government, for Western meetings with meetings. But, the expert believes, in the event of any aggravation on the Tajik-Afghan border, the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan will quickly appeal both to the Russian 201st military base, and in general to Russia and the alliance in the CSTO. “Such a situation is easy to foresee and it is probably better to anticipate it. Just substitute, ”Knyazev believes.

We remind you that non-recognition of the values ​​of the Taliban and the need to include minority indicators in the Cabinet of Ministers are constantly articulated from Dushanbe, although, as Knyazev believes, this purely intercepts the case of Afghanistan. “As for non-recognition, there is no clear definition of what is “recognition” or “non-recognition” or any other of this or that resolution or of another country in terms of law. Recognition usually does not occur at bilateral external parties, the decision is on the fact of the presence or existence of cases of occurrence of cases of infection. With regard to the government, in connection with the upcoming arrival, one can consider the position of countries that have retained their embassies in Kabul and accredited themselves with diplomats sent to the Taliban. These are China, Russia, trade, Turkmenistan. Tajikistan is not on this list. Otherwise, all talk about recognition can be attributed to rhetoric,” the expert noted.

But during the time the Taliban movement came to power, Tajikistan sharply increased trade with Afghanistan, primarily the export of electricity. Thus, Tajikistan will sooner or later be forced to move to the more constructive and pragmatic positions on Afghanistan, which are taken by the partners of the Republic of Tajikistan – and Russia in the first place.

“Probably, this is one of the topics for discussion by the presidents of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Tashkent will host a high-level conference on Afghanistan in September at the SCO summit in Samarkand, this issue may be one of the main ones, and Tajikistan will need to decide,” Knyazev believes.

However, according to the expert, it is hardly possible to talk about some kind of direct control on the part of Russia in relation to Tajikistan. In Dushanbe, it should be understood that Russia has been and remains basically and practically the guarantor of the preservation of both the territorial territory of Tajikistan and the relatively stable one that exists in the country. “You can pay attention to the de facto neutral position of the Russian Federation regarding the long-term permanent conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Naturally, the participation of such a conflict between the CSTO member countries is not prohibited by Russia, and this is also a hot topic. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have already refused Russia’s proposals for mediation, but the fact is that there are simply no other ways to solve this problem, and something needs to be done about it,” the expert noted.

As for the presence of a threat from the radicals, during the latest special operations on the territory of the Gorno-Badakh Autonomous Region (GBAO) the threat from the radicals was eliminated. Meanwhile, according to the data, 16 people were neutralized, 220 people were detained, criminal cases were initiated against 53 people. Dozens of weapons have been seized. Locals talk about dozens of dead and hundreds of injured people around the world.

According to Alexander Knyazev, Dushanbe’s actions in relation to GBAO are aimed at achieving the priority of all authorities in the republic, at a possible proximity to the autonomous status of Badakhshan from the Constitution. “This is an action on the assumption of total unitarity and the establishment of maximum control over the entire country. It should be noted that the decrease in resistance in GBAO entails many negative consequences. First, as a counter-reaction, there is a process of radicalization among the population of GBAO, especially among young people, and in the future the basis for even greater conflict potential. Secondly – and this is the case with regard to Russia – the combination of events taking place in Dushanbe, and this may lead to unexpected consequences for the conclusion of the Russian side,” the expert said.

As for the second goal of the action, which will be followed by the completion of the earlier transition of power, according to Knyazev, Emomali Rahmon himself is not very ready for the transition. More precisely, the local political elite, in which there are tastes for splits and conflicts, is not ready for this. A significant part of this elite – and almost primarily in the power bloc – very negatively perceives the son of Emomali Rahmon as a successor. The “appeasement” of GBAO seemed to have taken place for some time, but the latent internal processes of the elite have not gone away. Perhaps this is a temporary violation of the slowness of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan in the transit process.