Fitch Ratings points out that many factors, including Turkey’s vulnerability to high inflation, do not degrade its credit rating.

Fitch downgrades Turkey from BB- to B+, proceeding at the same time as Egypt and Bahrain to four smaller segments of “investment approximate level”. The rating company also said that Turkey is negative.

More frequent and intense political stress periods have increased Turkey’s high level, low foreign liquidity and weak policy security security.

Configured by Fitch, IDR’s in-training trainings are listed as follows:

• More frequent and stronger than policy periods of stress have raised concerns about Turkey’s high inflation, low foreign liquidity and weak policy security. Magnify the macroeconomic and maintenance risks of policies for downsizing from those with security measures that can be targeted, Fitch says.
• In addition, Turkey’s implementing policy; (including deep coatings) can fix inflation in high use, can be used at the public exchange rate value and can be used on the surface can be used on the reel and domestic view surface view. This situation may also rekindle the pressures on international reserves.
• How to use trainings in conjunction with a strategy for training for training as practical aids will support the training of broader trainings with a strategy for teaching ‘train for use’. It will not be possible for the appreciation of the lira to be too high to nominal interest rates, like the new mechanism, which is a natural person, and the Turkish wound is widened in the country. Exchange rate difference will be paid. 313 billion TL accumulated in fear of protection from February 9th. These figures correspond to 5.8 percent. This mechanism, which is considered together with the tax, is expected to start.

“HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TRUST”

• In Fitch’s view, the capacity to improve the new car in a sustainable way is somehow the goal of high and rising elevation. In addition, if this instrument Fails to reduce domestic exchange demand, maintaining exchange rate stability without the use of interest rates will require additional capital Flow measures similar to the new Practice REQUESTING the sale of 25 percent of export proceeds, as well as measures to prevent new exchange intervention of loans or non-exchange of loans granted. . These policy responses could have a negative impact on confidence for the homeland.
• Turkey’s foreign exchange liquidity buffers are low compared to its peers, and this situation is risky due to its high currencyization, the structural structure of international reserves and its security from the transit route from peers. After the broadcast area in November and later, the net reserve reserve of 114 is reduced in the training staff.

“INTERNATIONAL RESERVES WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE”

• With the recent declining currency volatility and the infusions of currency dollars, they were able to support improving their ability to do business and induce a schooling. The plan may focus on the short-term risks to the bank’s economy, the people and those targeted in the near future. However, it risks economically if deeply negative reel policies and rising inflation stifle rising depositors’ confidence. In this unfavorable scenario, official reserves will be pressured to be in foreign exchange swaps and currencies, a centralized view from one of the elements in the structure of banks.
• Turkish banks are opposed to international currency volatility, with high external debt payments, high impact from above (41 percent of loans in foreign currency) and high budget dollarization (61.5 percent). Additionally, Fitchs estimate that 10 percent depreciation erodes industry common equity Tier 1 by about 50 basis points, although the agency will improve itself to make it fit for growth above an industry.

FOREIGN POLICY

• On the domestic front, the rally and the lira continue to rise in support of the final government in 2021. We expect the general elections to be held in June 2023 to greatly converge foreign policy.
• Geopolitical tensions eased over the past year and re-adjusted with the countries of Turkey. However, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 plan in 2019 has not resolved key US foreign policy solutions such as those in the Eastern Mediterranean to exploit the YPG. Its evolution with Russia, Turkey’s support and arms sales to Ukraine are due to this day.