With a glance.

• Misinformation in the cases of Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
• Swedish Psychological Defense.
• Cyberspace Solarium Commission reports misinformation.
• Agent 0.07.

Misinformation in preparation for the battle space (and a battle multiplier).

Defense one reports that the US government has called for a Russian disinformation campaign about current tensions with Ukraine.

Some background and context is probably in place. Russian President Putin has consistently formulated Russian pressure on Ukraine as either 1) a correction of the borders, as in the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, or 2) protective solidarity with the legitimate ambitions of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, as in Donbass and the nominal separatists found in that part of eastern Ukraine, or, finally, 3) a defensive reaction to an aggressive NATO expansion to the near abroad, with the attendant forward deployment of NATO forces (and especially US) forces. (Especially missiles, with the allegations normally accompanied by images of a Patriot anti-aircraft fire unit.

A case can be made for any of these, not necessarily a strong case, but a case. Russia’s concerns about the security and intrusion of threatening neighbors are historically deep. Nevertheless, there are parts of the Kremlin’s current message that can only be explained as intentional misinformation. Sputnik has, for example characterized US warnings that Russia intends to invade Ukraine as “nonsensical” (ignoring the occupation of Crimea in 2014, perhaps on the grounds that this is now an internationally accepted fait accompli, and characterizes the Donbass as a “breakaway region”). It has also refuted rather absurd claims that the United States is engineering unspecified “chemicals” in Ukraine, as well as placing tanks there:

“On December 21, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told a ministerial meeting that privately US military companies had supplied tanks with unidentified chemical components to the cities of Avdeevka and Krasny Liman, in close proximity to the breakaway region of Ukraine Donbass, for obvious provocations. The Pentagon denied that US companies are preparing chemical provocations in Ukraine. “

Russian forces have also entered Kazakhstan this week at the request of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who sought to intervene under the terms of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CSTO, Guardian reports, is an organization consisting of six former Soviet republics: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thus, the Russian forces are nominally there by invitation as peacekeeping forces. The immediate cause of the unrest in Kazakhstan has been the high cost of fuel, but the protests have also raised widespread corruption and inequality. Various Russian sources have explained the disturbances in their Central Asian neighbor to American inspiration and incitement, a statement that the White House rejects, the New York Post reports, which is ridiculous. Press Secretary Jen Psaki said:

“There are some crazy Russian claims that the United States is behind this. Let me just take this opportunity to convey it as absolutely false and clearly part of the usual Russian disinformation handbook.”

Sweden’s “Psykologiska Försvarsverket”.

The disc describes A new attempt to counter disinformation is organized by the Swedish government, a psychological defense authority that will try to identify disinformation and organize opinion against it. Agency mission the statement reads:

“The authority’s main task is to coordinate and develop authorities ‘and other actors’ activities within Sweden’s psychological defense. We offer support to authorities, municipalities, regions, companies and organizations and contribute to strengthening resilience within our population.”

The Agency presents itself as a leading player in a holistic approach:

“The purpose of the psychological defense is to protect our open and democratic society, the free formation of opinion and Sweden’s freedom and independence.

“Psychological defense must be able to identify, analyze, meet and prevent undue information influence and other misleading information directed at Sweden or Swedish interests both nationally and internationally. It may be misinformation aimed at weakening the country’s resilience and the population’s will to defend itself or unduly. influence people’s perceptions, behaviors and decision-making.

“Psychological defense must also strengthen the population’s ability to detect and resist influence campaigns and misinformation. Psychological defense contributes to creating resistance and will to defend among our population and in society at large.

“The Swedish Psychological Defense Authority works both preventively and operationally and must be able to fulfill its tasks in peacetime and in war. We must contribute to a strong Swedish total defense that prevents conflicts.”

Of course, it remains to be seen how it will work in practice. The Agency seems to be at least aware of the risk that such companies may pose to civil liberties, and in particular freedom of expression and thought. Its director Henrik Landerholm. expressly denies all Orwellian intentions. “This is not the Ministry of Truth or a State Information Board that we had during the Cold War,” he said. “We want to protect the freedom of opinion in our country.”

Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s recommendations to combat misinformation.

The US Cyberspace Solarium Commission has completed its work and is transitioning from a government commission to a non-profit organization. When it moves on, it leaves one Report to counter disinformation that recommends the US government to take measures that at least on the surface seem similar to those that inspired the Swedish Psychological Defense Agency, the Solarium Commissioners offer seven high-level recommendations, which we quote in summary form:

• Recommendation 1: Congress should set up a working group on social education, enable greater access to resources for social education and increase public awareness of foreign disinformation.
• Recommendation 2: Congress should ensure material support for non-state disinformation researchers
• Recommendation 3: Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonprofit centers that seek to identify, expose, and explain malicious foreign influence campaigns to the American public
• Recommendation 4: The Congress should create an ability within DHS to actively monitor foreign disinformation
• Recommendation 5: Congress should create a grant program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to equip SLTT governments with the staff and resources needed to identify foreign disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies
• Recommendation 6: Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and call on the Federal Communications Commission to introduce new rules to improve the transparency of media ownership in the United States
• Recommendation 7: Congress should empower a federal entity to publish and maintain transparency guidelines for social media platforms

How many of these will eventually be adopted remains to be seen, and how effective they will prove.

James Pond, agent 0.07.

Computer theater connoisseurs owe it to themselves to watch this short Xinhua video, “No time to die of laughter“, which regrets Anglo-American concerns about the security risks they see in Huawei equipment. We offer it without comment, because it does not require anyone. Except maybe yabba-dabba-doo. Listen to the whole thing.