In preparation for Vladimir Putin’s forthcoming meeting with Joe Biden, the Kremlin published a set of demands for European security, including a ban on NATO expansion and the deployment of offensive weapons near Russia’s border. The background to this march was Moscow’s growing military pressure on Ukraine and its resentment over NATO accession to 14 Central and Eastern European countries between 1999 and 2020.

For Sweden and Finland, the Russian demands give extra cause for concern. For 30 years the traditionally neutral duo has approached NATO, without applying to join the US-led alliance. December 24 Maria Zakharova, Spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that if Sweden and Finland became members of NATO, “this would have serious military and political consequences”.

From a Swedish and Finnish point of view, such warnings looks alarming as an attempt to limit the foreign and security policy choices of democratic, independent states. The question is whether Russia’s truculence can strike back by making Stockholm and Helsinki one day seek security in a formal NATO membership and the alliance’s Article 5 clause on mutual defense.

At the moment, it seems unlikely. A Finnish government defense report, published in September, kept open the possibility of applying to NATO. But in reality, Finland’s political parties are divided on the issue and the public is showing it no great enthusiasm for full NATO membership.

It is a similar story in Sweden. In December 2020 a parliamentary majority arose for the first time to adopt a “NATO alternative” in the Finnish style. But when Magdalena Andersson, the Social Democratic prime minister, set up her government’s policy on November 30, she said explicitly: “Sweden will not apply for membership in NATO.” Andersson nevertheless made it clear that “Sweden is deepening its defense co-operation with Finland and other Nordic neighbors, within the EU, with the United States and in partnership with NATO”.

This cautious statement also illustrates how far Sweden and Finland have changed their defense and security positions since the Cold War. Sweden, neutral since the Napoleonic Wars, maintained that attitude despite incidents such as the “Whiskey on the Rocks” section. 1981, when a Soviet submarine of whiskey class ran aground near the Swedish naval base Karlskrona.

Finland’s neutrality was more restricted, the result of a so-called friendship treaty signed under Soviet pressure in 1948. Acutely aware that their country had formed part of the 19th century tsarist empire, the Finns learned to live with their unusual status, during which they had limited room for maneuver in foreign policy but could develop into a prosperous democracy, rather than being transformed into a communist satellite state in Eastern European style.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sweden and Finland signed the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994, shortly before joining the EU. And in 2016, they signed on host nation support agreement with NATO, which offers alliance forces access to Swedish and Finnish territory in the event of a military emergency. In short, there may be little need for Sweden and Finland to become full NATO members, as it already seems almost inconceivable that the alliance would stand aside if they were attacked.

What lessons do these events have for Ukraine? Not many, unfortunately. In Putin’s eyes, Ukraine is simply not a legitimate state in the way that Sweden and Finland are. The challenge for Biden is undoubtedly to bring Ukraine into NATO – a goal that, in any case, many NATO allies are lukewarm about – but how to get Putin to accept Ukraine’s inalienable right to national independence.

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