Whether the Belarusian cargo will leave the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda is one of the main intrigues of the new 2022 in the Baltic Sea region. The likelihood that Belaruskali will leave Lithuania is quite high, but there are also alternative options.

Minsk missed the moment to work on the reorientation of the Belarusian cargo traffic from the Baltic to Russia, while there was time and opportunity, and now it simply will not have time to do this if Lithuania closes transit at once, writes Rubalt.

In Lithuania, as in Latvia, talks about sanctions are popular in the political arena. At the same time, it is not always taken into account that the local business, and not only the Belarusian one, will in many cases suffer from the sanctions bans.

For example, in Lithuania, the transit freeze is a powerful blow to the railways. There is a threat of a crisis in the huge transport and logistics system. And, naturally, the traffic volumes will fall catastrophically.

The Lithuanian neighbors – in Latvia – had something similar almost 10 years ago. Then the railway workers’ union even drew up an angry appeal and asked the Belarusian state media to publish it.

Estonia is generally more cautious. This country has been trying to attract transit flows both from Belarus and to Belarus for a long time, without much advertising. This is done not by the state, but by private capital. Usually checked with a private port in Sillamäe.

The only problem is: Latvia and Lithuania can impede the delivery of goods by land. So the Estonian option, if Minsk faces new frictions with Vilnius and Riga, is not the most reliable one.

Strategically, the problem could have been solved several years ago. Russia is actively developing Ust-Luga and, in general, the port infrastructure of the Leningrad Region and St. Petersburg. Minsk was offered to transfer freight flows there. But Belarus played the role of a situational player, trying to get a discount or some other benefit.

In fact, there is one here, and it is expressed in three words: reliability, stability and predictability. That is, this story is not about a shorter transport arm. This is in many ways a political moment. In this chess game it was clear for a long time that the Baltic states cannot be strategic structures of Belarus, but Russia can.

And against the backdrop of the 2020 crisis, when there was a sharp deterioration in relations with the West, Minsk itself suddenly proposes to transfer to Ust-Luga. Although in the recent past he adhered to a wait-and-see attitude. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko in September 2020 told the Governor of the Leningrad Region Alexander Drozdenko that a port could be jointly built in the region.

Then, one package of sanctions began one after another. It became clear that if not all transit, then at least a substantial part of it from the Baltic countries should definitely be taken to Russia. Sometimes there were ideas from Kiev about the development of a river corridor to the Black Sea. This is not a new idea and there are many nuances in its implementation and, again, there is no guarantee that Ukraine does not begin to give preference to politics to the detriment of business.

And now the situation is as follows. Many Western companies are forced to come in the near future to curtail relations with Belarusian potash workers and other generators of freight traffic. Belarus needs to transfer almost all of its exports to Russia or through Russia. For potassium, this is again Ust-Luga.

But it will not be possible to redirect all cargoes at once. If preparations had started a few years ago, today everything would be simple and fast. Such large terminal operators in the ports of the Leningrad region as Ultramar and EuroChem are not yet able to provide Belarusian potash transit through Russia. There is also Murmansk, but it is definitely too far away. The economic sense is lost. Russia will not agree to large discounts on rail transportation to this remote port for Belarus.

BPC received permission from the US government to trade potash on the global market in the first quarter of 2022. But then what? The transit through Lithuania to the cell can actually be closed. No matter how the interested persons in the Baltic republic itself oppose, they are unlikely to stop the movement in this direction. A vivid evidence of this is the desire of the “Lithuanian Railways” to return the advance payment to “Belaruskali” for the future transportation of its products. The decision was made at the level of the prime minister. Everything is more than serious.

It remains that the problem of the Belarusian potash transit will be solved jointly with Russia. Another question is, by what effort and how quickly. The problem is that time is running out for Belarus anymore.

belmarket.by