A year without war. How Russia saved Karabakh from complete collapse
Shushi could remain under the control of Karabakh
On November 10, 2020, with the mediation of Vladimir Putin, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan stopped the hostilities. This happened at the moment when Armenia lost the strategically and very important city of Shushi (Shusha – from the point of view of Azerbaijanis), and the threat hung over Stepanakert (Khankendi – according to Baku), and therefore over the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the estimates of the Armenian analyst Hrant Mikaelyan, the loss of the NKR’s immunity amounted to 72% of the territory of the one the proclaimed republic held back at the beginning of the Second Karabakh war.
Mass consciousness is an infantile phenomenon. In any country of the country, it is like a child, the lowest rated effectiveness in analyzing events. Mass consciousness is always driven by emotions. At the same time, in a state of frustration, the mass consciousness inevitably raises questions, the answers to which are given either by their own state or by foreign states.
Lost more than 2/3 of the territory of the NKR. relegated to the background. Despite the obvious attempts of individual Armenian intellectuals, he found himself pushed to the periphery of discussions within Armenia, as the question “who is to blame?”
The answer was quickly prompted by individual Armenian media, pro-Western politicians and Western-funded NGOs. Of course – Russia. “If we are allies within the framework of our status as a guarantor of our security, then why did they not intercede for us?” – something like this can be used to reconstruct the first part of the public response when identifying the perpetrators.
If we investigate the conflict rationally, it should be recalled that official Yerevan refused to end the war earlier, when it was possible to preserve vastly large territories. On October 19, 2020, President Putin showed Prime Minister Pashinyan a plan to end the war: Hadrut and Shushi remained under the control of the NKR, and Azerbaijani refugees were returning to it.
President Aliyev agreed with the plan, but the Armenian side chose to continue the war. At the same time, as evidenced by some sources, the main parts of the Armenian army did not participate in the conflict – the NKR army, local militia and Armenian volunteers held the defense. “Why didn’t you participate?” – a question to the military-political leadership in Yerevan.
Over the past year, the mass consciousness in Armenia has made somersaults, faced with the reality of defeat. After 1994, when Armenia won with the benevolent position of Russia, and received Karabakh itself, the Armenian society looked down on Azerbaijanis, they say, “they do not know how to fight,” and raised its generation in the spirit of victors.
All this time, Azerbaijan, systematically increased its military budget and purchasing new types of weapons from Israel and Turkey, was preparing for war. He knows how to fight in the 2020 aquarium.
In addition, for the first time, Turkey, as well as Kurdish extremists and militants of various terrorist groups, helped him so actively (by proxies and advisers), the number in the region, as reported by SVR director Sergei Naryshkin, has reached thousands of people.
Only Russia’s intervention and assistance saved the current authorities and the population of Nagorno-Karabakh from complete collapse and the transfer of the region under the full control of Azerbaijan.
Russian balance sheet in Transcaucasia
Last year Baku began construction of an international airport at the returned airport. President Aliyev opened the new air harbor together with President Erdogan – the symbolism can hardly be overestimated.
Turkey, according to the Azerbaijani leader, is a great country. Intellectuals of both states are actively promoting the concept of “one nation, two states”. The two presidents signed a declaration of allied relations. There is no doubt that the Turkish expansion into the South Caucasus finds a lively response among the elites and society of Azerbaijan.
In Armenia, the entire past year, politicians were engaged in settling scores. With a political ceasefire agreement, the passionaries chose to smash not the enemy at the front, but furniture inside government buildings.
Nikol Pashinyan won the re-election. Despite the defeat in the war, the Armenian society turned out to be so unprepared for the return of the former leaders in the person of ex-presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan, that even Pashinyan, who surrendered Karabakh, looks better against their background. Many of my Armenian colleagues on the sidelines say that the authorities simply drew the result. But, apparently, the situation is more complicated. Sergei Markedonov, Russia’s leading Caucasian scholar, offers an excellent metaphor: “Imagine that in Russia, officials from the times of Gorbachev and Yeltsin come to the polls — they no longer dictate the rules of the game.”
This raises the second part of the answer to the question “who is to blame?” In Armenia, a simple thesis is being actively promoted: “If Russia is our ally only in words and could not protect us from the enemy, then why befriend her at all? There is a strong Turkey nearby. Yes, there was genocide, but if Russia is no better than Turkey, then it’s time to establish relations with the latter, and the former can be asked to leave. “
“Russians are new Turks” – I saw such an inscription in Russian in December 2021 in Yerevan. Some of my interlocutors from the expert community assured that the trend is marginal. But their younger colleagues, who I can’t call sympathizers of Turkey and enemies of Russia, sound the alarm: “First, Pashinyan surrendered Karabakh, now he is preparing society for parting with Russia. And the West is actively helping him in this: to withdraw the base and make Armenia his outpost. ” We can add to this the ineffective attempts of the EU and France (Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron) to mediate in the resolution of the conflict.
Russia is pursuing a balanced policy in the South Caucasus that does not correspond to Russian national interests.
In terms of public relations in Armenia, Russia performs worse. The popular narrative within the Russian political class dealing with the affairs of the Caucasus (“Armenia will not go anywhere because of the Turkish threat”) no longer corresponds to reality. In the conditions of constant work with the mass media, NGOs and society, Armenia will completely “disappear” if Russia does not support the appropriate media policy, relations with intellectuals and the expert community, work with NGOs and the embassy.
Azerbaijan has the simplest, most understandable, black-and-white position.
In this sense, it is the guarantor of the preservation of the current status of the NKR. “If Russia is our friend, then why does it not allow us to return what belongs to us ourselves?” Aliyev to the final Karabakh issue.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board of Gazeta.Ru.